Jeff, list:
I think Paavola’s intention is to outline instinct and inference as “indeterminate dyads”. That is, I find that both are common in their capacities as methods for problem framing rising out of habit-taking but a major difference, as you say, is the quality/magnitude/duration of inference over instinct; that is, the production of a *good* abductive inference requires more and different experiences, which is the source for the inquirer's power to recognize better. Also, what’s obvious to you may not be obvious to someone else, especially a new/different person, or, a “modern reader”, which justifies one reason for calling attention to the problem. Consider the difference between “it rained last night” after seeing the grass is wet versus explanation for notice of missing B in CP 5.189. There is little at stake in the former whereas the latter just produced an unresolved debate between earnest inquirers. Moreover, coming to agreement on one matter simply requires checking the weather map (burstlike evidence), whereas the other involves mediation over the icon and index to produce common symbol (filamentlike). I would think of it this way. If the following were true, “*Although Peirce came to recognize the nature and role of the normative sciences only late in his career, still he was convinced that his own account of the hierarchical dependence of logic on ethics and of ethics on esthetics was a discovery of fundamental importance for a correct understanding of his system, and one which distinguished his "pragmaticism" from other less correct interpretations of his own famous maxim.*” ~Potter and, “*If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction*”. ~Peirce Should we classify “why grass is wet”/”it rained last night” as abductive inference? How about “why missing B”/”because B is Thirdness”? As per your quote from his work, I’m not entirely sure but I think he means that there is room for investigating fragments of the unity apart from the unity; since unity depends on parts. That is, there is great promise for applying modern tools to this problem that is as old and older than Plato. As for instinct/inference and questions of terms in general wrt to recent conversation; “Socrates begins with the good and then splits it into the just, the noble, and the good. The good is now a complex of three things, whose unity is as puzzling as its fragmentation.” ~Benardete “The contradiction can and must be resolved by the distinction between two meanings of justice. The distinction cannot become clear before one has understood the teaching of the *Republic* regarding the relation of philosophy and the city… …If justice in the individual were identical with justice in the city; this would require that the individual or rather his soul consist of the same three kinds of “natures” as the city. A very provisional consideration of the soul seems to establish this requirement: the soul contains desire, spiritedness or anger, and reason.” ~Strauss and Cropsey “Why, then, is spirit privileged over appetite as the ally of reason?” ~Moss “I show that ethics depends essentially upon esthetics and logic upon ethics.” ~ Peirce, *ON THE BEARING OF ESTHETICS AND ETHICS UPON LOGIC* one, two, three...spiritedness, desire, reason...spiritedness, appetite, reason... esthetics, ethics, logic...icon, index, symbol...C, A, B... Beauty, Goodness, Justice...Beauty, Justice, Goodness... Noble, Goodness, Justice... Best, Jerry Rhee On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 4:40 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Gary R., Ben, List, > > > A few quick thoughts about some recent comments concerning abductive > inference: > > > 1. Peirce uses the terminology of rule, case, result for the purpose of > exploring the relations between different forms of inference. The question > is, if the order of premisses (rule and case) leading to conclusion > (result) is helpful in an analysis of the genus of deductive inference, > then what we can we learn about the character of the genus of inductive and > the genus of abductive inference patterns by changing the order around? If > that is the question guiding the inquiry, then I don't see the motivation > for changing the terms that Peirce is using to refer to each of the > propositions. In fact, retaining the terminology is a helpful reminder that > what was serving in the deductive pattern as a first premiss is now serving as > a conclusion in the inductive inference pattern (and so on). As long as > we are clear that we are retaining this terminology for the purpose of > exploring how inductive and abductive patterns of inference are related to > the deductive pattern that is taken as the initial model, then I don't > think there will any confusion. In fact, that terminology helps to clear > up a number of things that might otherwise be obscured. > > > 2. On the face of it, I would think that the question serving as the title > of Sami Paavola's essay involves a confusion. On Peirce's account of > inference, the question is not "is abduction an instinct, or inference?" > Rather, we have good reason for accepting Peirce's claim that abductive > inferences can be more instinctive (e.g., perceptual judgments), or they > can be more self controlled arguments--and that the inferences made by > human organisms range as a matter of continuous degree from those that > are more instinctive to those that are more fully under the self-control of > the reasoner. > > > 3. Paavola says: "Peirce, of course, did not have at his disposal many > of those conceptions that are attractive to the modern reader from this > perspective (for example the notion of ‘tacit knowledge’, or modern > conceptions of expertise)." While the terminology may have changed a bit > in the last century, I don't see anything in the modern conceptions that is > new--other than some shifts in the terms we use to talk about the > conceptions). As such, it appears to me that the suggestion Paavola is > making is simply false. > > > Am I missing something? > > > --Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Friday, April 29, 2016 1:55 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism? > > Correction: > > In my last post I wrote "Your order here (result/rule/ergo case) was also > recently suggested by Jon S as a possible 'inversion' of rule/case/result > for abduction." > > But, now I recall that Jon S gave the opposite order, ie. case/rule/result > and remarked that it is the reverse of the categorial pattern for inquiry > (which is correct). In my categorial vector theory I refer to the order, > case/rule/result, as the vector of aspiration, and the one Ben gave, of > result/rule/case as the vector of process (I often note that both inquiry > and biological evolution follow this order according to Peirce). Adding > these 2 to the 3 Peirce gives in the bean example, we have 5 of the 6 > possible categorial vectors, the remaining one being Hegel's dialectical > order. This is not to say that I'm at all sure that all these five > definitely represent inference patterns. GR > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 3:31 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Ben, list, >> >> Thanks for your two recent posts in this thread. I've been reflecting on >> them--and the whole matter of abduction--but I'm not sure exactly where to >> take that reflection at the moment. Still, I believe that continuing the >> inquiry might prove quite well worth the effort. >> >> There are clearly a number of scholars struggling with abduction in >> Peirce, and they are considering it from a number of different angles, yet >> with no clear cut resolution coming to the fore as far as I can tell. For >> example, Sami Paavola in "Peircean abduction: instinct, or inference?" >> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/instinctorinference.pdf argues >> "that Peirce did not resolve the relationship between inference and >> instinct in a clear-cut manner in his later writings." He continues: >> >> The interpretation that I advocate is to distinguish abductive instinct >> and abductive inference, which suggests that abduction can be developed >> further as a ‘pure’ form of inference: Various aspects of it can be >> analyzed further, for example, the nature of its premises, the inferential >> relationships within it, the strength and validity of it, how abductive >> inferences are used. That is, in Peircean terms, the grammar, the critic, >> and the methodeutic of abductive inference should all be further examined. >> >> The proposal that abductive inference should be developed further as a >> mode of inference does not mean that abductive instinct should be >> neglected, quite the contrary. Peirce analyzes many phenomena under the >> guessing instinct that are of interest to modern cognitive sciences, >> starting with the idea that human beings can use, in their problem solving, >> information of which they are not conscious. Peirce, of course, did not >> have at his disposal many of those conceptions that are attractive to the >> modern reader from this perspective (for example the notion of ‘tacit >> knowledge’, or modern conceptions of expertise). The idea of abductive >> instinct could be analyzed further by using these modern notions (from the >> conclusion of his paper). >> >> >> But returning to our discussion of abduction as a mode of inference, I >> think that your suggestion that we give some thought to what you referred >> to as 'abductive generalization' might prove a fruitful one. You wrote: >> >> Also in considering the beans example, I forgot that it's just one way of >> instancing Barbara and its inversions. After all, Barbara is named for its >> vowels as a mnemonic for the universality and affirmativity of its >> propositions - AAA. So, in a universe in which mammals are not _*defined*_ >> as warm-blooded air-breathing live-young-bearers: >> >> *Result:* All whales are warm-blooded, breathe air, and bear live young. >> >> *Rule:* All mammals are warm-blooded, breathe air, and bear live young. >> >> Ergo *Case:* (Plausibly) all whales are mammals. >> >> The "case" there is itself a new rule. I'm not sure whether that's an >> example of what Peirce means by abductive generalization, but there it is. >> >> Your order here (result/rule/ergo case) was also recently suggested by >> Jon S as a possible 'inversion' of rule/case/result for abduction. I was >> thinking of the bean example (which folllows the usual order: >> rule/result/ergo case) when he first suggested it, but yet remarked that it >> might be an interesting and valid way of looking at abduction, and your >> example above would seem to support that notion. I must admit that your and >> Jon S's order still strikes me as somewhat odd, while the question remains >> as to whether or not it adequately represents 'abductive generalization' >> (not an expression of Peirce's, I don't believe, but useful). >> >> One last, perhaps minor, matter is that I agree with Jon A that since >> 'result' only works for deduction, that another term might be better >> employed in consideration of induction and abduction. Since I associate >> 'result' with 1ns, I've tended to use the term 'character' rather than >> 'result' (as I did earlier in this thread and occasionally in other threads >> over the past few years). But Jon has suggested 'fact' to replace 'result', >> which he says has been used by others, for example, W. S. McCulloch. Since >> I associate 'fact' with 2ns (which Peirce, it seems to me, does as well), >> I'm going to continue to use 'character' as a substitute for 'result' >> unless someone comes up with an even better term. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 6:21 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary R., list, >>> >>> I got careless in my previous message. >>> >>> I said that "There is *F*, ergo anything is *F*" ("∃*F*∴∀*F*") would be >>> abductive; however, in a stipulatedly non-empty universe, its conclusion >>> entails its premiss, and so for my part I would rather call it inductive >>> than abductive, at least in the "usual" universes. A better candidate for a >>> toy example of an abduction to a rule would be "There is *FG*, ergo >>> anything *F* is *G*" ("∃*FG*∴∀(*F*→*G*)"). These are silly examples, >>> but I like the idea of being able to sort out even the simplest inference >>> schemata into deductive, inductive, and abductive, in terms of entailment >>> relations between the premiss set and the conclusion. In the second >>> example, "∀(*F*→*G*)" is arguably a selective generalization of "∃*FG*". >>> >>> >>> Also in considering the beans example, I forgot that it's just one way >>> of instancing Barbara and its inversions. After all, Barbara is named for >>> its vowels as a mnemonic for the universality and affirmativity of its >>> propositions - AAA. So, in a universe in which mammals are not _ >>> *defined*_ as warm-blooded air-breathing live-young-bearers: >>> >>> *Result:* All whales are warm-blooded, breathe air, and bear live >>> young. >>> *Rule:* All mammals are warm-blooded, breathe air, and bear live young. >>> Ergo *Case:* (Plausibly) all whales are mammals. >>> >>> The "case" there is itself a new rule. I'm not sure whether that's an >>> example of what Peirce means by abductive generalization, but there it is. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >>> On 4/28/2016 3:10 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >>> >>> Hi, Gary, >>> >>> I agree with most of what you say, only I don't see hypothesization of a >>> rule in the beans example. On the other hand, Peirce is explicit about >>> hypothesizing a new general (or rule) in the 1903 quote. >>> >>> [....] The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new >>> discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing >>> them. In some cases, it does this by an act of _*generalization*_. In >>> other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts >>> that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is >>> recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis [....] >>> (From "Syllabus", 1903, EP 2:287 >>> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-syllabus-syllabus-course-lectures-lowell-institute-beginning-1903-nov-23-some >>> ) >>> >>> Moreover, Peirce in a draft circa 1896 (CP 1.74) said "Kepler shows his >>> keen logical sense in detailing the whole process by which he finally >>> arrived at the true orbit. This is the greatest piece of Retroductive >>> reasoning ever performed." Clearly, Kepler was looking for a rule, not >>> merely for a special circumstance, to explain an orbit. >>> >>> The problem, which has been nagging at me for a while (and I have read >>> too little of the secondary literature), is how to distinguish, in a >>> reasonably simple way, such abductive inference from induction? >>> Now, by "generalization" Peirce usually meant what many would call _ >>> *selective*_ generalization. That's his hint to us there. >>> >>> I've tried to think in terms of the hypothesizing of a hidden special >>> circumstance, e.g., a hidden mechanism, that would have to happen by a new >>> rule in order to make sense at all. But, how much of this hidden special >>> circumstance does one really need to conceive of, in order to conceive of a >>> new rule? I've also wondered whether it's a matter of considering rules as >>> special circumstances at some level of abstraction, likewise as one may >>> consider integers as singulars at some level of abstraction, in an abstract >>> universe of discourse. >>> >>> But complications make me distrustful in questions of elementary >>> distinctions among inference modes. Remembering Peirce's idea of selective >>> generalization as a hint, it occurs to me that maybe it's a matter of a >>> need to select among the characteristics to extend. That's where some >>> guessing comes in. That is, Kepler's math may represent a character of the >>> appearance of orbits, but the orbits actually observed at that time might >>> be accounted for in other ways, and Kepler's math might conceivably have >>> worked just by accident up till then. Well, in Kepler's case, his ultimate >>> solutions could hardly plausibly have worked just by coincidence, but there >>> are plenty of cases where a mathematical model fits the past by accident >>> and turns out to lack predictive value. >>> >>> So, in the schema for abductive inference to a rule, maybe there should >>> be a premissual admission of characters that seemed salient, not all of >>> which are extended by inference to the whole. That very selection may >>> amount to an idea new to the case. Moreover, some of the characters may be >>> formulated (e.g., mathematically) in a new way, the idea new to the case. >>> Still, doubts nag at me. These may be patterns of abductive inference, but >>> my sense is that one needs to be able to distinguish abductive inference >>> (to a rule) from induction even in ridiculously crude cases. >>> >>> The idea of induction is that of inference from a part or fragment of a >>> system to the whole. Yet it is possible to state any inference to a rule >>> without any reference to a positively granted larger whole. If I conclude >>> that, for any *F*, *F* is *G* , then I have not asserted or entailed in >>> the conclusion the existence of a whole or even of a part of the population >>> of *F* 's. Induction and testing, however, do need a positively granted >>> larger whole to test. When one abduces to a rule, it may simply be that >>> one "attenuates" one's focus to the rule itself, the rule as embodying a >>> kind of real necessity, and _*that*_ rule, taken as itself real, >>> indefinitely projectable across a population not yet contemplated, etc., is >>> what is new to the case. So, the implausibly crude ampliative inference >>> "There is *F*, ergo anything is *F*" ("∃*F*∴∀*F*") would be abductive, >>> not inductive (in a stipulatedly one-object universe, it would be a >>> reversible deduction). Well, I've been pottering around with these ideas >>> for a while and I haven't gotten much farther. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >>> On 4/27/2016 12:42 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >>> >>> Ben, list, >>> >>> You gave Peircean examples whereas the rule (or law) is *already known* >>> either before or after the surprising fact. This seems all well and good to >>> me for certain types of abductions, say, those involved in sleuthing, >>> Sherlock Holmes style. >>> >>> But what of those inquiries in which the rule (law) is *not* known, *but >>> is exactly the hypothesis* of the inquirer? This is to say that >>> scientists sometimes come to uncover laws hitherto unkown or unrecognized >>> (such as those hypothesized by Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Planck, etc.) >>> >>> I have sometimes thought that in *that* context--that is, of someone >>> hypothesizing a law *not* previously known--that, modifying the 1878 >>> bean example you gave: >>> >>> Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, containing >>> different kinds of beans. On the table there is a handful of white beans; >>> and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans >>> only. I at once infer as a probability, or a fair guess, that this handful >>> was taken out of that bag. This sort of inference is called _*making an >>> hypothesis* _. It is the inference of a _*case* _ from a _*rule* _ and _ >>> *result* _. (CSP) >>> >>> the situation might look something like this (although I'm not sure that >>> any bean example will quite do for this purpose. >>> >>> Suppose I enter a room and find a large number of bags which I know to >>> contain different kinds of beans. Near one bag I find a handful of white >>> beans (the surprising fact) and I make the supposition (the hypothesis) >>> that *that* particular bag of beans is all white. I examine the bag of >>> beans (make my experiment) and find that the bag in question does indeed >>> contain only white beans (the rule). (GR) >>> >>> Well, it may turn out that I know beans about abduction, but it does >>> seem to me that the scientifically most fruitful and significant hypotheses >>> are those where the law (rule) is *not* know in advance and is only >>> supposed by the scientist, again, exactly * as the hypothesis* . >>> >>> Peirce gives an example of that kind of hypothesis, one which is, shall >>> we say, *fresh* at the time (the rule or law not being previously >>> known): >>> >>> Fossils are found; say, remains like those of fishes, but far in the >>> interior of the country. To explain the phenomenon we suppose the sea once >>> washed over the land (CP 2.625). >>> >>> Now suppose that a historian of the region in which those fish fossils >>> were found, himself finding documents showing that a large caravan of >>> traders had brought large quantities of dried fish into that region, >>> pooh-poohs my *sea washing over the land* hypothesis, which I have >>> already imagined (for some good reasons) to have happened in other parts of >>> the world as well. Thus, as other investigators find many other places, >>> including deserts, etc., containing many fish fossils where there was no >>> possibility of any fish trade occurring, my hypothesis takes hold and is in >>> time accepted quite generally by the scientific community. >>> >>> (Another, not unrelated example, would be that of continental drift.) >>> >>> It seems to me that Peirce intended to cover both kinds of hypotheses >>> even in his bean illustrations as he offers examples of both (the fossil >>> example is preceded by what I referred to above as a sleuthing type of >>> example). Any help which you or others can offer towards clarifying this >>> matter--of someone hypothesizing a rule or law not previously known--would >>> be appreciated. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 >>> <718%20482-5690> * >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 11:49 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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