Ben, Jon S, list, I did find the example CP 2.711 (the decapitated frog example as representing something like a syllogism in Barbara) a bit 'peculiar', Ben. But *that'*s neither here not there, and I did find intriguing.
Today I'll merely try one last time to explain why I find the categorial associations of the three inference to be what I have always thought them to be, then reread and reflect on your and others comments on this matter, read some additional Peirce on the subject, and see where I find that I then stand on the matter, whether I've been convinced by your argumentation or not. It would mean changing my position of some 12 years; but I'm not married to it, so, who knows? Maybe I will. At the moment, I am doubting it. I'm having trouble accessing my CD ROM-CP, so I'm limited at the moment as regards Peircean passages I can quickly cite, so for my present purpose I'll refer yet again to the bean example, especially as it was the original source of my thinking in the matter. So, here are the three patterns as given at 2.623 with my remarks in brackets. DEDUCTION *Rule*. -- All the beans from this bag are white. *Case*. -- These beans are from this bag. [Ergo] *Result*. -- These beans are white. [In my thinking, deduction follows the "order of analysis" (Peirce's language) as given in "The Logic of Mathematics" (see, esp. CP 1.489 - 491), 3ns -> 2ns -1ns. You may recall that Peirce offers this in that paper as the reverse order of Hegelian dialectic (which he calls dilemmatic). Now Hegel's thesis/antithesis/synthesis is nothing other than Peirce's something/other/medium, or 1ns/2ns/3ns. If that is the case than Peirce's analytical (or involution) reversal of this is 3ns/2ns/1ns, that is, 3ns involves 2ns &1ns and 2ns involves 1ns but 1ns involves nothing but itself (this is one of the principal forms of his derivation of the categories, btw). [So in deduction, as I see it, the rule (3ns)--the entire bag of beans, involves the sample I've chosen (an *existential sample* being a 2ns--citations forthcoming), and because of the rule, the result will be a character (1ns), namely, that all the beans in the sample will *necessarily* be white. Admittedly this is different from the decapitated frog/nervous system example, but I'm not sure that that's the best example for our logical purposes, although for Barbara more generally, I suppose it's fine.] INDUCTION *Case*. -- These beans are from this bag. *Result*. -- These beans are white. [Ergo] *Rule*. -- All the beans from this bag are white. [In induction we commence with an existential sample (2ns), find that it has a character (1ns), in this case, whiteness, and so posit that *probably* all the beans from the bag will be white (that is, that they are likely to be white, esp. if our sample is large enough; but our sample may be too small, and we'll discover other colors of beans along with, perhaps, many--but *not all*--white ones.] [This follows the *vector of determination*, that is 2ns -> 1ns> 3ns, which is also that of semiosis itself. For both induction and semiosis it seems to me that there is *no certainty* (it is not necessary) that the character (or sign) truly or fully represents the object.] HYPOTHESIS *Rule*. -- All the beans from this bag are white. *Result*. -- These beans are white. [Ergo] *Case*. -- These beans are from this bag. [I had earlier argued that in some cases of abduction (but perhaps not in this one) that one *may not* know what the rule is, that the putative rule is indeed a rule (law). But in this case, perhaps by the kind of *abductive generalization* Ben has been remarking on, we make the *supposition* that they are *possibly *from this bag of white beans. Perhaps later on we'll find that there was another bag of white beans which had been removed, and it will be found that it was from that *other* bag that this handful was pulled. [For me abduction (as I see it categorially, 3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns) is the inverse, not of deduction, but of induction, while it is the mirror of deduction.] Well, I'm still seeing it this way, since a couple of folk are seeing it differently, I am certaom;u keeping an open mind and, as I suggested, will continue the inquiry (which, for me, will include reviewing recent posts in this thread and reading some Peirce and, perhaps, some secondary literature). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:57 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon S., Gary R., list, > > My diagram arises from a particular account by Peirce of deduction. Gary > R. may have some other passages from Peirce in mind. > > Best, Ben > > > On 5/1/2016 4:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > List: > > Ben U. and I seem to be on the same page here. He diagrammed deduction > thus ... > > 2. Minor premiss, case. Sensation, feeling [firstness]. > |> 1. Major premiss, rule. Habit [thirdness]. > 3. Conclusion, result. Decision, volition [secondness]. > ... and I would diagram abduction (per CP 5.189 via CP 2.623) thus ... > > 3. Explanatory hypothesis A, case. Possibility [firstness]. > |> 2. Reason why C would follow from A, rule. Necessity [thirdness]. > 1. Surprising fact C, result. Actuality [secondness]. > Simply reversing the order would also be a diagram of deduction, but with > the major and minor premisses switched. As Ben U. pointed out, this has no > effect on the logic itself, but perhaps it helps illustrate why abduction > is sometimes called retroduction. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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