Hi everyone,
There is multiplicity of ideas now flowing. My intention for this thread has been close to Peirce: “A certain amount of labor must be bestowed upon their literary polish; for my purpose requires that they should be read by persons who are not professional logicians. Indeed, for persons who are disposed to think, I believe that as far as in me lies I should make them even attractive; although I am painfully conscious of my small literary ability.” But this business of speaking to *the public* is not a simple matter. Consider: “Only everybody can know the truth” ~Goethe “The opinion which is fated <http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html#note2> to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.”~Peirce “Esotericism, one might say, is based on the assumption that there is a rigid division of mankind into an inspired or intelligent minority and an uninspired or foolish majority. But are there no transitions of various kinds between the two groups?” ~Strauss ______________ Again, this has been an exercise in which the foolish majority (me) is attempting to join the intelligent minority (us, philosophers) regarding mediation of syllogism and CP 5.189. In keeping with that purpose, please chime in if you disagree with my summary. On the question of whether CP 5.189 *is* or *is not* a syllogism: “I'll continue to assert that abduction can't be a syllogism, for a syllogism by definition is deductive. Not inductive. Not abductive.” ~Edwina Taborsky (*NO because syllogism only deduction*) “I'd say that CP 5.189 is a "syllogism" in a broad sense admitted by Peirce, though the broad senses are not usual senses nowadays. Usually people mean a deductive categorical syllogism, in Barbara and the rest.” ~Ben Udell (*YES, if rearrangement is allowed, and allowed because Peirce*) “The distinction between the “Why” of hypothesis and the “How” of induction is not very great; both ask for a statistical syllogism, of which the observed fact shall be the conclusion, the known conditions of the observation one premiss, and the inductive or hypothetic inference the other. This statistical syllogism may be conveniently termed the *explanatory syllogism*. In order that an induction or hypothesis should have any validity at all, it is requisite that the explanatory syllogism should be a valid statistical deduction.” ~Peirce, The General Theory of Probable Inference (1883) Of the latter, he has not yet formulated CP 5.189 and there is not consensus in this chain of whether Peirce is or is not referring to CP 5.189 in the NA. However, CP 5.189 is introduced in the Harvard Lectures by: “Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis,- which is just what abduction is,-was subject to certain conditions. The form of inference therefore is this: The surprising fact, C, is observed…”~ Peirce, 1903 ________________ Now, as to whether we are classifying things in CP 5.189 correctly: “Virtually the first thing everyone has to learn. It is common to all arts, science, and forms of thought.” “What?” “Oh, that *trivial business* *of being able to identify one, two, and three*. In sum, I mean number and *calculation*.” (*Republic*, 522c) “A fundamental accommodation of this sort is the recognition that all men are moved by their calculation of goods (pleasures) and evils (pains), but that *few are capable of making such calculations accurately*.” ~Strauss and Cropsey “This is going to be *very* *simple*…” ~Benardete ______________ This simplicity is belied by the following different calculations given for CP 5.189. If the true one is the good one, then which is the good one…the *correct* one? The surprising fact, C, is observed; [cf. Result] But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, [cf. Rule] Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. [cf. Case] ~Paavola 1. Surprising fact C, result. Actuality [secondness]. 3. Explanatory hypothesis A, case. Possibility [firstness]. 2. Reason why C would follow from A, rule. Necessity [thirdness]. ~Jon S 2. Minor premiss, case. Sensation, feeling [firstness]. 1. Major premiss, rule. Habit [thirdness]. 3. Conclusion, result. Decision, volition [secondness]. ~Ben U. _____________ Ben, Jon, Gary, list members: If you won’t mind modifying yours above to state clearly, in the form of *Paavola*, what you consider to be Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness, Result/Rule/Case, Major/Minor/Conclusion, subject/predicate/middle (so we can see them side-by-side in order to decide on equivalence). If request does not make sense because the number of terms is ambiguous or doesn't conform to the structure, please state that, too, please. Alternatively, simply classify according to beans and bags and I will do the transformation into CP 5.189 with explication. The goal is simply to organize things clearly in one place. I will assume that you have made the necessary conversion into the deductive form so as to assign major/minor/conclusion and subject/middle/predicate consistently. I am not including vector of determination or order of analysis, as that appears to be different in kind from First/Second/Third. Plus, I am not sure how that fits with there being a logic of icons, index and symbols. I believe my request for the work appears necessary if we are to arrive at consensus. If we don’t have consensus, The next question would be, who decides… or more importantly, how is that which is fated to be agreed upon to be decided? ________________ The way begets one; One begets two; Two begets three; Three begets the myriad creatures… ~Lau 42 “But it will be asked, why stop at three? Why not go on to find a new conception in distinct idea for Four, Five, and so on indefinitely? The reason is that while it is impossible to form a genuine three by any modification of the pair, without introducing something of a different nature from the unit and the pair, four, five, and every higher number can be formed by mere complications of threes. To make this clear, I will first show it in an example. The fact that *A presents B with a gift C, is a triple relation*, and as such cannot possibly be resolved into any combination of dual relations.” ~ Peirce, A Guess at the Riddle _________ To the Peirce-list community: Thank you for your interest, attention, work and patience on this matter! With best wishes, Jerry Rhee On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 5:57 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Ben, Jon S, list, > > I did find the example CP 2.711 (the decapitated frog example as > representing something like a syllogism in Barbara) a bit 'peculiar', Ben. > But *that'*s neither here not there, and I did find intriguing. > > Today I'll merely try one last time to explain why I find the categorial > associations of the three inference to be what I have always thought them > to be, then reread and reflect on your and others comments on this matter, > read some additional Peirce on the subject, and see where I find that I > then stand on the matter, whether I've been convinced by your argumentation > or not. It would mean changing my position of some 12 years; but I'm not > married to it, so, who knows? Maybe I will. At the moment, I am doubting > it. > > I'm having trouble accessing my CD ROM-CP, so I'm limited at the moment as > regards Peircean passages I can quickly cite, so for my present purpose > I'll refer yet again to the bean example, especially as it was the original > source of my thinking in the matter. So, here are the three patterns as > given at 2.623 with my remarks in brackets. > > DEDUCTION > > > *Rule*. -- All the beans from this bag are white. > *Case*. -- These beans are from this bag. > [Ergo] *Result*. -- These beans are white. > > [In my thinking, deduction follows the "order of analysis" (Peirce's > language) as given in "The Logic of Mathematics" (see, esp. CP 1.489 - > 491), 3ns -> 2ns -1ns. You may recall that Peirce offers this in that > paper as the reverse order of Hegelian dialectic (which he calls > dilemmatic). Now Hegel's thesis/antithesis/synthesis is nothing other than > Peirce's something/other/medium, or 1ns/2ns/3ns. If that is the case than > Peirce's analytical (or involution) reversal of this is 3ns/2ns/1ns, that > is, 3ns involves 2ns &1ns and 2ns involves 1ns but 1ns involves nothing but > itself (this is one of the principal forms of his derivation of the > categories, btw). > > [So in deduction, as I see it, the rule (3ns)--the entire bag of beans, > involves the sample I've chosen (an *existential sample* being a > 2ns--citations forthcoming), and because of the rule, the result will be a > character (1ns), namely, that all the beans in the sample will > *necessarily* be white. Admittedly this is different from the decapitated > frog/nervous system example, but I'm not sure that that's the best example > for our logical purposes, although for Barbara more generally, I suppose > it's fine.] > > > INDUCTION > > > *Case*. -- These beans are from this bag. > *Result*. -- These beans are white. > [Ergo] *Rule*. -- All the beans from this bag are white. > > [In induction we commence with an existential sample (2ns), find that it > has a character (1ns), in this case, whiteness, and so posit that > *probably* all the beans from the bag will be white (that is, that they > are likely to be white, esp. if our sample is large enough; but our sample > may be too small, and we'll discover other colors of beans along with, > perhaps, many--but *not all*--white ones.] > > [This follows the *vector of determination*, that is 2ns -> 1ns> 3ns, > which is also that of semiosis itself. For both induction and semiosis it > seems to me that there is *no certainty* (it is not necessary) that the > character (or sign) truly or fully represents the object.] > > > HYPOTHESIS > > > *Rule*. -- All the beans from this bag are white. > *Result*. -- These beans are white. > [Ergo] *Case*. -- These beans are from this bag. > > [I had earlier argued that in some cases of abduction (but perhaps not in > this one) that one *may not* know what the rule is, that the putative > rule is indeed a rule (law). But in this case, perhaps by the kind of > *abductive > generalization* Ben has been remarking on, we make the *supposition* that > they are *possibly *from this bag of white beans. Perhaps later on we'll > find that there was another bag of white beans which had been removed, and > it will be found that it was from that *other* bag that this handful was > pulled. > > [For me abduction (as I see it categorially, 3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns) is the > inverse, not of deduction, but of induction, while it is the mirror of > deduction.] > > Well, I'm still seeing it this way, since a couple of folk are seeing it > differently, I am certaom;u keeping an open mind and, as I suggested, will > continue the inquiry (which, for me, will include reviewing recent posts in > this thread and reading some Peirce and, perhaps, some secondary > literature). > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 4:57 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon S., Gary R., list, >> >> My diagram arises from a particular account by Peirce of deduction. Gary >> R. may have some other passages from Peirce in mind. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> >> On 5/1/2016 4:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> >> List: >> >> Ben U. and I seem to be on the same page here. He diagrammed deduction >> thus ... >> >> 2. Minor premiss, case. Sensation, feeling [firstness]. >> |> 1. Major premiss, rule. Habit [thirdness]. >> 3. Conclusion, result. Decision, volition [secondness]. >> ... and I would diagram abduction (per CP 5.189 via CP 2.623) thus ... >> >> 3. Explanatory hypothesis A, case. Possibility [firstness]. >> |> 2. Reason why C would follow from A, rule. Necessity [thirdness]. >> 1. Surprising fact C, result. Actuality [secondness]. >> Simply reversing the order would also be a diagram of deduction, but with >> the major and minor premisses switched. As Ben U. pointed out, this has no >> effect on the logic itself, but perhaps it helps illustrate why abduction >> is sometimes called retroduction. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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