Ben U., List: The assignment of categories to the three forms of inference is another area that seems unsettled. Thanks for the references that show Peirce's position in 1878 and in 1903. The latter reflects my tendency to focus on Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness as possibility/actuality/necessity, hence abduction/induction/deduction. In the immediately previous lecture, Peirce admitted, "Concerning the relations of these three modes of inference to the categories and concerning certain other details, my opinions, I confess, have wavered." As indicated by a footnote in EP 2, this sentence and the text that followed replaced text that Peirce deleted from the initial draft, which was a little bit more definitive as presented in *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking* and given among the definitions of "abduction" at http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/abduction.
Now, I said, Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected with Thirdness ... But my connection of Abduction with Firstness, Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by my finding no essential subdivision of Abductions, that Induction split at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities, while in the logic of relatives the three figures of syllogism gain a reality which is not so easily perceived in non-relative syllogism but really exists there also. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon A., Jon S., Gary R., Edwina, > > Jon A., I see a problem with your criticism, in that it seems precise in > itself yet too vague in application. > > It's not apparent to me that Gary R. or Jon S. or I have been treating > categories as non-relational essences, at least in any way that you would > not also be accusing Peirce of doing. If you think that Peirce went too far > in that direction, please say so. > > There is not only the quote from CP 2.711 which I gave recently > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-05/msg00002.html but also > another passage, in the third-to-last paragraph (EP 1:198-9, W 3:337-8, CP > 2.643, CLL 151-2) of "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878) > https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI > in which Peirce associates the three modes of inference with categories on > the basis of the categorial nature of their respective conclusions. Once > again, the deductive conclusion (result) is volitional (Second), the > inductive conclusion (rule) is habitual (Third), and the abductive > conclusion (case) is sensuous (First). In these discussions, a lot of the > relational aspects are left implicit; Peirce doesn't in those places > exposit the whole theory of the categories complete with tuples. > > As we know, in later years Peirce instead associated deduction with > thirdness and induction with secondness, this time at least partly because > of the modalities of the conclusions that they produce: "Deduction proves > that something _*must be*_; Induction shows that something _*actually is*_ > operative; Abduction merely suggests that something _*may be*_." (CP > 5.171) http://www.textlog.de/7658.html . > > If you think that Peirce went too far in such direction, please say so. It > would clarify at least a little your criticism of the rest of us here. > You're allowed to criticize us and Peirce too. We know that I don't share > Peirce's view of the categories, and I seem to recall from misty years ago > that you don't regard them as basic, the integers, if anything, were your > basics, and you have been interested first of all in the tuples and the > irreducibility of some dyads, some triads, and no higher-ads, in which > regard you do agree with Peirce. > > Best, Ben >
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