Jon A,
I looked over what you wrote above. There is simply zero mention of esthetics, ethics and their connection to logic. That is, I don't think you understand what is meant by *essence*. If Peirce’s pragmatism is different from others in that these are necessary, then why is it that your summary looks away from it? Perhaps there is something worth looking into a bit deeper…even for old-timers like yourself. Is that not what we call fallibilism and is Peirce not a fallibilist? “Those who fail to appreciate the importance of fallibilism reason: we see these laws of mechanics; we see how extremely closely they have been verified in some cases. We suppose that what we haven’t examined is like what we have examined, and that these laws are absolute, and the whole universe is a boundless machine working by the blind laws of mechanics. *This is a philosophy which leaves no room for a God!* No, indeed! It leaves even human consciousness, which cannot well be denied to exist, as a perfectly idle and functionless *flâneur* in the world, with no possible influence upon anything – not even upon itself. Now will you tell me that this fallibilism amounts to nothing?” http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/fallibilism Best, Jerry R On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon A., Jon S., Gary R., Edwina, > > Jon A., I see a problem with your criticism, in that it seems precise in > itself yet too vague in application. > > It's not apparent to me that Gary R. or Jon S. or I have been treating > categories as non-relational essences, at least in any way that you would > not also be accusing Peirce of doing. If you think that Peirce went too far > in that direction, please say so. > > There is not only the quote from CP 2.711 which I gave recently > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-05/msg00002.html but also > another passage, in the third-to-last paragraph (EP 1:198-9, W 3:337-8, CP > 2.643, CLL 151-2) of "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878) > https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI > in which Peirce associates the three modes of inference with categories on > the basis of the categorial nature of their respective conclusions. Once > again, the deductive conclusion (result) is volitional (Second), the > inductive conclusion (rule) is habitual (Third), and the abductive > conclusion (case) is sensuous (First). In these discussions, a lot of the > relational aspects are left implicit; Peirce doesn't in those places > exposit the whole theory of the categories complete with tuples. > > As we know, in later years Peirce instead associated deduction with > thirdness and induction with secondness, this time at least partly because > of the modalities of the conclusions that they produce: "Deduction proves > that something _*must be*_; Induction shows that something _*actually is*_ > operative; Abduction merely suggests that something _*may be*_." (CP > 5.171) http://www.textlog.de/7658.html . > > If you think that Peirce went too far in such direction, please say so. It > would clarify at least a little your criticism of the rest of us here. > You're allowed to criticize us and Peirce too. We know that I don't share > Peirce's view of the categories, and I seem to recall from misty years ago > that you don't regard them as basic, the integers, if anything, were your > basics, and you have been interested first of all in the tuples and the > irreducibility of some dyads, some triads, and no higher-ads, in which > regard you do agree with Peirce. > > Best, Ben > > On 5/2/2016 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Jon A., List: > > I gather that you believe this whole discussion to be misguided, but does > that warrant blocking the way of inquiry for those of us who are still > interested in exploring it? Perhaps the outcome will be a consensus that > it is indeed a mistake to assign categories to rule/case/result at all > ... or that it makes no practical difference what assignments we make > ... or that the "correct" assignments depend on which aspect of the > categories is in focus. Or maybe the outcome will be no consensus at all; > the attempt might still be worthwhile anyway. > > I tend to "default" to the categories as possibility/actuality/necessity, > and that guides where I stand currently on this particular matter. Others > might lean more toward quality/relation/representation, or > feeling/action/thought, or chance/law/habit. How do we resolve situations > when these different characterizations of Peirce's three categories suggest > different answers? Per your latest message, what exactly is the "critical > question that has to be asked," and at which "step of analysis" should we > be asking it? > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:24 AM, Jon Awbrey < <[email protected]> > [email protected] > wrote: > > Jon S., > > Most of the old timers on this List have already heard > and ignored this advice more times than I could care to > enumerate but since you and maybe a few other onlookers > may not have heard it before, I will give it another try. > > Peirce's categories are best viewed as categories of relations. > To a first approximation, firstness, secondness, thirdness are > simply what all monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively, > have in common. (At a second approximation, we may take up the > issues of generic versus degenerate cases of 1-, 2-, 3-adicity, > but it is critical to take the first approximation first before > attempting to deal with the second.) > > In that light, thirdness is a global property of the whole triadic > relation in view and it is a category error to attribute thirdness > to any local domain or any given element that participates in that > relation. > > As it happens, we often approach a complex relation by picking one of > its elements, that is, a single tuple as exemplary of the whole set of > tuples that make up the relation, and then we take up the components of > that tuple in one convenient order or another. That method lends itself > to the impression that k-ness abides in the k-th component we happen to > take up, but that impression begs the question of whether that order is > a property of the relation itself, or merely an artifact of our choice. > > Failing to examine that question puts us at risk for a type of error > that I've rubricized as the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Abstraction” (FOMA). > As I see it, there is a lot of that going on in the present discussion, > arising from a tendency to assign Peircean categories to everything in > sight, despite the fact that Peirce's categories apply only to certain > levels of structure. > > Regards, > > Jon > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
