Gary, Jon, list:
I’m really enjoying your latest exchange. Nice questions and responses! Here is something I found today in “Encounters and Reflections, Conversations with Seth Benardete”: *Seth*: It goes back to a point in the preface to Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, about the distinction between the Greeks and the moderns- they begin with things and we begin with concepts… *Michael*: Do you think that Strauss really thought the Greeks began with things, in some way that we don’t? And if he did, do you think he was right? *Seth*: You could say this is a first-sailing formulation. *Michael*: Which one? *Seth*: From the concepts to the things. Then there’s a second sailing, where the thing shows itself to be more problematic than you thought. I think Strauss was concerned with the difficulty in getting back to the right starting point for the first sailing… *Michael*: It seems to me we’ve been suggesting two ways to understand what Strauss might have meant by preparing for philosophy, and I’m not sure how they fit together. One would be restoring something like what you could call “natural opinion”, as opposed to the concepts we begin with… … *Seth*: Right, right. You can say the Platonic dialogues are imitations precisely because they imitate this two-fold structure. They present to you what it means for people to understand things as they do, but also show that there is another understanding that is not in agreement with that self-understanding at all, and then give an account of how the two are related to one another. Plato seems to have gone out of his way to represent this double character. Hth, Jerry R On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 4:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Thanks for your patience and persistence. You make a good case (no pun > intended) that the logic of deduction is more clearly presented by giving > the Rule first, followed by the Case as something that necessarily falls > under it; and that this was one of the specific points that Peirce intended > to convey in the passage of interest. Hence, that sequence (3ns/2ns/1ns) > is to be preferred, even if it is not strictly required. > > Can the same be said of presenting the Rule first in hypothesis/abduction, > as Peirce does in CP 2.623? I am still inclined to think > otherwise--consistent with CP 5.189, the surprising fact (Result) properly > comes first, followed by the circumstances of its occurrence (Rule) as the > reason why the surprising fact would be a matter of course if the credible > conjecture (Case) is true. So besides having three different conclusions, > the three forms of inference have three different starting > points--Rule/Case/Result for deduction, Case/Result/Rule for induction, and > Result/Rule/Case for abduction. > > Of course, it also remains unresolved between us whether the surprising > fact in abduction corresponds to Firstness, as the Result does in > deduction; or to Secondness, as Peirce typically categorizes facts in other > contexts. And I still see guessing a Rule as induction, rather than > abduction; one must know (or presuppose) that these white beans are from > this bag in order to infer that all of the beans in this bag are (probably) > white. See my comments on the Kepler example, as well. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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