*Then what is your meaning? When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer: --here are three fingers --a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger. Very good. You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point. What is it? Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin --it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question, what is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger. True. And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence. There is not, he said. But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, or softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise --the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft? You are quite right, he said. And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light? Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained. Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two. True. And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different? Certainly. And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if there were undivided they could only be conceived of as one? True. The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner; they were not distinguished.*
*Yes. Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused. Very true. Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is small?' Exactly so. And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.* On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., Jon A.S., list, > > I'm not sure why an argument has developed over whether human activity > proceeds from dissatisfaction or positive desire, etc. Usually we regard > those as various ways of talking about the same multifaceted phenomena. A > desire for something implies dissatisfaction with what one has, and indeed > can make one feel dissatisfied with one's lacks more than one would > otherwise be. "Want" originally meant "lack." > > Desire - pangs (pains), frustration, etc. Pangs of physical hunger can be > physically painful. > Hope - annoyed or angry impatience. > Pleasure - distaste for imminent interference, something that can feasibly > get in the way. > Attachment - fear at the prospect of loss of that to which one is > attached. (E.g., parents' fears for their offspring.) > > I wouldn't get too concerned about the emphasis on positive or negative > unless somebody comes along and says, > > "Bite your tongue. Get a cinder in your eye. When you feel good you feel > nothing." > > I had a friend who used to quote that with dramatic sternness and it > annoyed me not only because I thought it was stupidly glib, but because I > knew that he didn't believe it for a moment. He was more talkative in more > detail about positive pleasures than anybody I ever knew. I just looked the > quote up and found that it's widely attributed to Buckminster Fuller. > > It is possible do overdo the positive or negative emphasis. It's > interesting that Socrates sometimes argued in terms of practical > implications, oftenest practically implied conflicts of values, unintended > or unexpected bad consequences, etc. So Socrates's arguments often have an > admonitory cast. Peirce however also looks for practically implied benefits > and advantages that one might have overlooked. > > On another note, the argument about the relative value of theory versus > practice, or of theoretical knowledge versus practical knowledge, or of > manipulation versus self-control, is unclear to me. I don't think it's > enough to say that one is needed for the other. They're all needed for each > other. > > Best, Ben > > On 5/23/2016 8:58 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Jon, > > Replies to your replies inserted. > > Gary f. > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected] > <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* 20-May-16 20:05 > > Gary F., List: > > Gf: Now I’m seeing the limitations of your hypothesis that ALL human > endeavor is rooted in dissatisfaction. It seems to ignore more positive > motivations such as curiosity, participation and playfulness in all its > forms. The quest for knowledge can be much more than an escape from a state > of dissatisfaction. > > Js: Although I mainly had in mind the irritation of (genuine) doubt, it > seems to me that curiosity, participation, and playfulness can all be > understood as forms of dissatisfaction. The quest for knowledge would > cease altogether if everyone were truly satisfied with the current state of > their knowledge. > > Gf: Are you claiming that everyone has to be aware enough of “the current > state of their knowledge” to make such a judgment on it before undertaking > any investigation? The fact that curiosity etc. *can be understood* as > forms of dissatisfaction doesn’t imply that any feeling of dissatisfaction > necessarily enters into the actual process. I doubt that all explorers are > so introspective. > > Gf: But discovery of principles *in nature* — including the nature of > conscious purposes as a specialized subset of final causes, or natural > purposes — is, for any philosopher, ethically privileged over manipulation > of any kind, because self-control depends on it. > > Js: I am not sure that I follow this. How does self-control depend on the > discovery of principles in nature? > > Gf: This is such an essential part of Peirce’s critical common-sensism and > pragmaticism that I hardly know where to begin. How can you exercise any > control over your actions if you have no idea of their predictable > consequences? Where can you get such ideas except by learning from > experience about principles of causality in nature, and intentionality in > human nature? (Human nature is a part of nature, not apart from it.) > > Js: Where and how do we draw the line between what is "natural" and what > is "artificial"--i.e., the result of human manipulation? > > Gf: The answer to that would vary with the contextual situation, and I > don’t see the relevance of the question in this context. My whole point is > that there *is no* definite division between natural and conscious > purposes; purposefulness, which Peirce calls Thought (or Thirdness), is a > continuum including everything from natural tendencies to conscious > decision-making and adoption of ideals of conduct. Manipulation, like all > conduct, is always done for *some* purpose; ethics is a matter of > becoming conscious of what those purposes are, to the extent that one can > judge some end (as well as some means to an end) to be better than another. > So your next question makes no sense to me either: > > Js: Why should "natural" purposes always be "ethically privileged" over > human purposes? > > Gf: Since I didn’t say that, I might as well just quote Peirce on the > development of conscious purposes in humans: > > [[[ To return to self-control, which I can but slightly sketch, at this > time, of course there are inhibitions and coördinations that entirely > escape consciousness. There are, in the next place, modes of self-control > which seem quite instinctive. Next, there is a kind of self-control which > results from training. Next, a man can be his own training-master and thus > control his self-control. When this point is reached much or all the > training may be conducted in imagination. When a man trains himself, thus > controlling control, he must have some moral rule in view, however special > and irrational it may be. But next he may undertake to improve this rule; > that is, to exercise a control over his control of control. To do this he > must have in view something higher than an irrational rule. He must have > some sort of moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference > to an esthetic ideal of what is fine. There are certainly more grades than > I have enumerated. Perhaps their number is indefinite. The brutes are > certainly capable of more than one grade of control; but it seems to me > that our superiority to them is more due to our greater number of grades of > self-control than it is to our versatility. ]]] CP 5.533 > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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