Jon, Ben, list,
Js: I did not say anything about a particular feeling of dissatisfaction, only that we engage in inquiry when we are dissatisfied with our current knowledge; i.e., when we experience the irritation of (genuine) doubt. gf: OK, I guess we have a case of polyversity here. To me, “experiencing the irritation” of doubt IS a “particular feeling of dissatisfaction.” My point was that if you classify even something like playfulness as “a form of dissatisfaction,” “its being so consists merely in our so regarding it” (Peirce, MS 293). Js: You said before that "discovery of principles in nature ... is, for any philosopher, ethically privileged over manipulation of any kind." Isn't this a judgment that one particular end is better than any other? Gf: No. Principles of nature, i.e. legisigns, are the ends which govern means. Critical consideration of ends is what ethics is all about, not knowledge of means to any taken-for-granted end (whether those means are technological or not). That’s what I meant by “ethically privileged.” Anyway, as I tried to say awhile back, when we look at the semiotic or meaning cycle as a whole, theory and practice take turns, and there’s no way of determining which comes first in a cycle. But then, as Peirce says, “of these two movements, logic very properly prefers to take that of Theory as the primary one (EP2:304-5). Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 23-May-16 13:35 Gary F., List: Gf: Are you claiming that everyone has to be aware enough of “the current state of their knowledge” to make such a judgment on it before undertaking any investigation? The fact that curiosity etc. can be understood as forms of dissatisfaction doesn’t imply that any feeling of dissatisfaction necessarily enters into the actual process. I doubt that all explorers are so introspective. My point was that we are unlikely to undertake an investigation of something that we already know, or at least believe that we already know. I did not say anything about a particular feeling of dissatisfaction, only that we engage in inquiry when we are dissatisfied with our current knowledge; i.e., when we experience the irritation of (genuine) doubt. Gf: This is such an essential part of Peirce’s critical common-sensism and pragmaticism that I hardly know where to begin. How can you exercise any control over your actions if you have no idea of their predictable consequences? Where can you get such ideas except by learning from experience about principles of causality in nature, and intentionality in human nature? (Human nature is a part of nature, not apart from it.) Now I see what you meant, thanks for clarifying. Gf: My whole point is that there is no definite division between natural and conscious purposes; purposefulness, which Peirce calls Thought (or Thirdness), is a continuum including everything from natural tendencies to conscious decision-making and adoption of ideals of conduct. Manipulation, like all conduct, is always done for some purpose; ethics is a matter of becoming conscious of what those purposes are, to the extent that one can judge some end (as well as some means to an end) to be better than another. You said before that "discovery of principles in nature ... is, for any philosopher, ethically privileged over manipulation of any kind." Isn't this a judgment that one particular end is better than any other? Is the warrant for this perhaps the notion that achieving this end is a prerequisite to properly evaluating all other possible ends? Even if so, don't we have to know how to go about discovering principles in nature before we can proceed with doing so--or else learn how to do so by doing so (i.e., trial and error)? If mathematics is the practice of necessary reasoning, for which deductive logic is the theory, then what is the practice of creative reasoning, for which abductive logic is the theory? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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