Jerry, List, the polish historian of science Ludwik Fleck once wrote:
"It is a particular interesting thing, how scholars, who dedicate their whole lifes to the separating of fiction from fact, are unable to separate their own dreams about science from the true form of science." To some degree the three normative sciences are all fiction, since they tell us how the beautiful, the good and the truth ought to be found. Looking at the actual state of the art ;) in the sciences: is logic really the crux of the matter? From my point of view it is not, as long as we speak of ideal type examples of the combination of abduction, deduction induction. It gets interesting when looking at how reasoning really takes place e.g. in ones own research diary. You really get down to the things if you have to explain somebody what you really did. I mean really, really, really (!). Not the idealized research paper style explanation. And it would be even more interesting to analyze such real reasoning to develop more general heuristics to be able to teach real life scientific reasoning. We are far from that... But, nevertheless, as Spock said:" Logic is the beginning of wisdom, not the end". In my opinion the crux of the matter lies somewhere else. I am an oldschool german. The whole scientific project, as i see it, is about enlightenment. Now... God created the cowboys and the indians, but when he was drunk the kantians! "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance." CSP goes for the same direction: "If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves they ought to remain." Lessing opposed this stance in his essay "On Truth": Will some people never learn, that it is absolutely not true, that a man has ever deliberatly blindfolded himself" Let's take Mendel as an example. Why did his contemporaries reject his ideas? I don't believe they deliberately blindfolded themselfes. They were just not able to see the same things as he did and that was the reason for their rejection. We learn to see things, the things are not just there, the construction of the thing is an active semiotic process. Something to be observed in every process of scientific socialization. Scientists are socialized into thought styles and thought collectives. These thought styles and collectives shape their field of experience. But this process also limits their experience, because it makes them see the rabbit and not the duck. Therefore i absolutely agree with what you wrote: "The mightiness of the icon can be understood with respect to experience in things beautiful. It is imbued with the power to bridge that great chasm between the vulgar and the wise." It is important to teach people in esthetics as an propedeutics to phenomenology. But before training the ability t make an experience comes the willingness to train. Which points back to my previous posts, where i tried to highlight the importance of ethics. You stressed in your last post the importance of the community of inquirers. We alway think of this community as the peircean-habermasian ideal community. But the more realistic view is the fleckian thought collective. This leaves the open question whether foolishness is an individual trait or one of the community? To make science better, we should study how it actually is and not how it should be. Only studying science as real phenomenon will enable us to put into practice the things on the should-be-to-do-list. Making the to do list longer doesn't really help. Coming back to Blachowitz. He writes: " I am not a practicing scientist. So who am I to criticize scientists’ understanding of their method? I would turn this question around. Scientific method is not itself an object of study for scientists, but it is an object of study for philosophers of science. It is not scientists who are trained specifically to provide analyses of scientific method." No, we don't need a another blind man to tell us how to study colors or driving instructors who never sat behind the wheel. It would be much better to teach practicing scientists the philosophy, history and sociology of science. This would be enlightenment in science... Best, Stefan Am 17. Juli 2016 21:24:23 MESZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee <[email protected]>: >Stefan, list: > > > >I think you’re right that we may learn something about reasonableness >by >asking an analogous question, “what is…a fool”. It is to ask and be >aware >of what we are doing when we ask the Socratic “what is…?” question. > > > >Yet, are we not being foolish by thinking we can add to the meaning of >*the* >fool by starting from scratch with no guidance as if no one else has >asked >and asserted on the notion before? The assumption being made on a >Peirce >list ought to be to speak for *everybody* on the meaning of *the* fool. >That is, the intention is to persuade others on a matter of common >conception through reasoning. This is what we do for *the* scientific >method. Yet, there is this great multiplicity when we should expect >only >one. So, are we being foolish or are we just expressing our nature? >It’s >fun to ask and answer “what is…”, is it not? Is it not in our nature >to do >so? > > > >You said, “Or, abduction, induction, deduction and the combination of >them >is so universal that even the idiots make use of it.” > > > >Yes, there is the trivial business of distinguishing one, two, three; >by >which I mean abduction, deduction, induction. It is universal and even >idiots make use of it. But this is not a theory intended for the >individual, as that is too complicated. It is a method for a community >to >adopt at the outset. Therefore, the better question is what makes >abduction/deduction/induction good or bad, not whether there is such a >thing and whether idiots make use of them. It appears at least Peirce >has >settled the matter of its universality. > > >You said, “P.S. @Convergence of truth: Do we know the mightiness of the >icon? Can truth converge when the universe itself evolves?” > > > >I believe that is the question being raised in fallibilism/convergence. >Perhaps the answer is not addressed in your assumptions. Perhaps we >ought >to look to others for guidance. > > > >“Only *everybody* can know the truth.” > >“The opinion fated to be *ultimately* agreed to by *all who >investigate* is >what we mean by the truth…” > > > >“I may as well, however, say a word about the indifference to logic >which >we find not on the part of “everybody”, - since “everybody” is more or >less >a fool, but on the part of really superior minds. Such minds desire to >understand the theory of every kind of doing in which they take part >when >any question of superiority between different methods of doing it is >open…no *lanterna pedibus*, no light to guide their researches.” >~Peirce > > > >“The attitude of an earlier type of writers was fundamentally >different. >They believed that the gulf separating “the wise” and “the vulgar” was >a >basic fact of human nature which could not be influenced by any >progress of >popular education: philosophy, or science, was essentially a privilege >of >“the few”… > > > >“Liberal education, which consists in the constant intercourse with the >greatest minds, is a training in the highest form of modesty, not to >say of >humility. It is at the same time a training in boldness: it demands >from us >the complete break with the noise, the rush, the thoughtlessness... > > > >Liberal education is liberation from vulgarity. The Greeks had a >beautiful >word for "vulgarity"; they called it *apeirokalia*, lack of experience >in >things beautiful. Liberal education supplies us with experience in >things >beautiful.” > >~Strauss, What is Liberal Education? > > > >The mightiness of the icon can be understood with respect to experience >in >things beautiful. It is imbued with the power to bridge that great >chasm >between the vulgar and the wise. > > > >one, two, three... > >beauty, goodness, truth... > >icon, index, symbol... > >esthetics, ethics, logic... > > >Best, > >Jerry Rhee > >On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 6:23 AM, sb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jerry, List, >> >> thanks for pointing back to the beginning of the thread. >> >> We always think that the scientific method, if there is *one*, is a >> extremely clever thing. Therefore, in contrast, I would turn the >question >> upside down and ask: Is there a distinct method of idiocy? >> >> I believe there are a million ways to make a fool of oneself. Or >> paraphrasing Manns Zauberberg: There are many ways of foolishness and >> intelligence is not the best of them. Or, abduction, induction, >deduction >> and the combination of them is so universal that even the idiots make >use >> of it. >> >> Maybe we learn more by asking what makes the fool? Is it making >mistakes? >> Is it being unlogic? Is it tenacity? Is it believing in apriori? Is >it >> believing in authority? Is it... What makes the fool and is it >universal? >> >> Depending on the idea of science we do not necessarily learn >something >> about science by trying to answer these questions but at least we >learn >> something about reasonableness. >> >> Best >> Stefan >> >> P.S. @Convergence of truth: Do we know the mightiness of the icon? >Can >> truth converge when the universe itself evolves? >> >> >> Am 15. Juli 2016 20:05:29 MESZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee ><[email protected]>: >>> >>> Hi list; >>> >>> >>> The original question is whether there is a distinct scientific >method… >>> >>> >>> >>> Which is to ask whether there is a scientific method agreeable to >not >>> just any mind but to *the* culture of *the* mind… >>> >>> or a scientific method agreeable to the *commens*… >>> >>> _______ >>> >>> >>> >>> If we consciously adopt the *lanterna pedibus* for this dark >question, >>> >>> >>> >>> then the asserted parallels are; >>> >>> >>> >>> The surprising fact, *scientific* *method*, is observed. >>> >>> But if *contrite fallibilism* were true, C would be a matter of >course… >>> >>> >>> >>> or, >>> >>> >>> >>> The surprising fact, *scientific method*, is observed. >>> >>> But if *convergence theory of truth* were true… >>> >>> >>> >>> or, >>> >>> >>> >>> The surprising fact, *scientific method*, is observed. >>> >>> But if *contrite fallibilism/convergence* were true… >>> >>> >>> >>> or, >>> >>> >>> >>> The surprising fact, *scientific method*, is observed. >>> >>> But if *CP 5.189* were true… >>> >>> >>> >>> So, which is best? Which is vague? Which is complete? Which is >clear? >>> >>> Which is at the *end of inquiry*? Which at the *here and now*? >>> >>> Do they imply the same of one another or merely emphasize >differences? >>> >>> Must the working hypothesis come at the beginning? >>> >>> Is there room for growth of symbols, where an act of knowing a real >>> object alters it? >>> >>> >>> >>> If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism, *is it* >nothing >>> else than the question of the logic of abduction? >>> >>> >>> >>> Perhaps it is our conceit that there is only one way of >understanding a >>> phenomenon… >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> Jerry Rhee >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 12:49 PM, sb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary F., >>>> >>>> maybe i misread your original post. I was triggered by "and >>>> historically, there’s a lot of truth to that". Knee jerk reaction >pushing >>>> an already open door... >>>> >>>> Best >>>> Stefan >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Am 14. Juli 2016 15:47:42 MESZ, schrieb [email protected]: >>>>> >>>>> Stefan, I would concur with everything you say here. “Revolt >against >>>>> authority” as *a* founding myth of “modern science” is, to me, not >a >>>>> hypothesis but an oversimplified story (all stories are simplified >to some >>>>> degree). One can find traces of it in, for example, the “Cosmos” >television >>>>> series, both the original with Carl Sagan and the more recent one >with Neil >>>>> deGrasse Tyson. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> gary >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *From:* sb [mailto:[email protected]] >>>>> *Sent:* 14-Jul-16 05:29 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary F., >>>>> >>>>> yes i agree, Peirce reading of the history of science is based on >the >>>>> idea that we are standing on shoulders of giants. >>>>> >>>>> But i doubt the revolt against authority hypothesis. Take for >example >>>>> Galileo, he never revolted against the church. He was deeply >rooted in the >>>>> tradition of christian natural philosophy. And the catholic church >of the >>>>> middle ages was quite tolerant towards natural philosophy. Galileo >referred >>>>> to this tolerant tradition in his defense. The intolerance against >natural >>>>> philosophy was something new and was a product of the church >internal war >>>>> between jesuits and dominicans. In this view Galileos ideas were >the battle >>>>> field but not the source of the battle. >>>>> >>>>> Or take Newton as another example. Did he revolt against >tradition? No, >>>>> he was deeply rooted in the hermetic tradition and most of his >work is >>>>> dedidicated to alchemy. The close relation between his work on >gravity and >>>>> his alchemical work has been shown by history of science. >>>>> >>>>> Newton as an alchemist shows that there was already a tradition of >>>>> experimenting. Lots of it esoteric, but also proto-scientific or >already >>>>> serious chemistry. And were Galileos instruments constructed >without >>>>> experimenting? >>>>> >>>>> Also many of the great scientist wanted their discoveries in >accordance >>>>> with their christian faith: Galileo, Newton, later Darwin and also >Peirce >>>>> did so. >>>>> >>>>> Yes, the whole world view changed in the 16th century, but it is >not >>>>> that easy like the modern revolutionaries that rebell against >authority on >>>>> one side and the outdated antimodern on the other side. Knowledge >>>>> production in that time was a complex web of social relations in >which a >>>>> complex set of ideas circulated. >>>>> >>>>> I know your not making it that simple (your comment about the >source of >>>>> the hypothesis) but many people in science still believe in the >founding >>>>> myth. >>>>> >>>>> Putting the said above in the context of the original exchange >between >>>>> Olga, John and Gary my point is that when we look closer the sharp >line >>>>> between science and non-science gets blurred. I think it is >important to >>>>> keep the difference between the organizational borders of the >sociological >>>>> phenomenon science, the individual scientific skills (scientific >>>>> craftsmanship like statistics, experiments etc.) and the scientifc >ethos in >>>>> mind. In my opinion the ethos is the most important whether >someone is >>>>> within an scientific organization and has scientific skills or >not, because >>>>> the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions. >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> Stefan >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail >>>> gesendet. >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail >> gesendet. >> -- Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail gesendet.
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