> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > EDWINA: I understand your point but I'll have a problem with the > identification of 'community' only in the present tense. The very nature of > Thirdness is its focus on the future existentiality of the 'type' - a type > developed within the history of both Firstness and Secondness. I don't > confine semiosis to the human realm but include the physico-chemical and > biological realms. Therefore, I use the term of 'community' to refer to its > ability not only to exist within individual articulations but to 'be > continuous in the future'.
I think it really depends upon the type of analysis. From an ontological view all semiotic processes are continuous even in a finite time period. But typically that’s irrelevant for most types of concerns we’re bringing to our analysis. So I agree in one way, but would just say that emphasizing this gets at the idea of what is real or true determined by some indefinite future stability. Given the foe is nominalism and some of the nonsense that gets brought up in discussions of realism I think it’s a useful point to emphasize. I’m here thinking particularly of Dummett’s Truth and Other Enigmas. His analysis of both truth and realism seemed quite profound when I read it in college. Then (about the time I was coming to take Peirce seriously) I realized many of the problems with how he approached the issue. I really think the emphasis Peirce gives to the problem avoids a slew of problems philosophy found itself in. Even when things appear clear, such is in Dummett’s very clear writing, it still presents the problem in a way that hides issues.
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