Agreed - all three categories are fundamental to semiosis; I don't see how
anyone can view 'semiotic just as Thirdness'. But I think that the definition
of realism isn't so much about Thirdness or any 'undue privileging' [??] but
about the LOCATION of the universals. Realism considers that universals are
real, held within the community [eg the species] . Nominalism considers that
universals are personal concepts, held within and by the individual - and
presumably, only within human symbolism.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: CLARK GOBLE
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 7:32 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:15 AM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote:
'Semiotic realism' is good - could we extend it to 'triadic semiotic
process realism' ?
While some see semiotic just as thirdness I think typically those using it
consider all three categories are always at work. But I agree that there’s an
undue privileging of thirdness in the term “semiotic realism.” Although realism
within the Peircean framework technically is about thirdness.
On Aug 22, 2016, at 4:22 PM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote:
It is a difficult matter, but I am rather convinced that Peirce’s concept
of good is closer to Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism than to a personal cult
worshipping a creator god. I think the divine is the force of that drives
evolution and the development of scientific rationality from instinct to logic.
Which is close to Aristotle’s entelechy and to some degree to the Holy Spirit
in Christianity.
The Euthypro problem is always at play. I think traditional post-Augustinian
Christianity had some answers for that as do many forms of Christianity that
tend to reject Augustine. What I find interesting both to Peirce’s notion as
well as the similar notion that pops up in process theology is the place it has
for chance thereby reformulating the very meaning of determinism.
Hegel like Peirce has a triadic process philosophy which is clearly
objective idealism. The dialectical dynamics of thinking is triadic, but
Peirce does not believe in Hegel’s ‘aufhebung’ where thesis and anti-thesis met
and create a new level. Peirce did not work much with hierarchies as far as I
know. Finally he did not have Peirce’s Secondness that is the foundation of his
realism. Look for Hegel in CP.
It’s worth noting that while Peirce often had highly critical things to say
of Hegel, when he came out of hiding to given the various lectures due to
James’ intercession people were shocked at just how Hegelian Peirce’s thought
was.
It’s also worth noting that many descendants of Peirce intellectually such as
Royce or Dewey often had far stronger Hegelian elements. That said I confess my
bias against Hegel is far worse than my bias against Hegel. I’ve begun to
reassess Hegel only due to how Hegelian certain elements of the mature Peirce
are. This hasn’t made reading Hegel any more enjoyable but perhaps I’m less
likely to leap to condemnation as nonsense what I once did.
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