> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:15 AM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote: > > 'Semiotic realism' is good - could we extend it to 'triadic semiotic process > realism' ?
While some see semiotic just as thirdness I think typically those using it consider all three categories are always at work. But I agree that there’s an undue privileging of thirdness in the term “semiotic realism.” Although realism within the Peircean framework technically is about thirdness. > On Aug 22, 2016, at 4:22 PM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote: > > It is a difficult matter, but I am rather convinced that Peirce’s concept of > good is closer to Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism than to a personal cult > worshipping a creator god. I think the divine is the force of that drives > evolution and the development of scientific rationality from instinct to > logic. Which is close to Aristotle’s entelechy and to some degree to the Holy > Spirit in Christianity. The Euthypro problem is always at play. I think traditional post-Augustinian Christianity had some answers for that as do many forms of Christianity that tend to reject Augustine. What I find interesting both to Peirce’s notion as well as the similar notion that pops up in process theology is the place it has for chance thereby reformulating the very meaning of determinism. > Hegel like Peirce has a triadic process philosophy which is clearly objective > idealism. The dialectical dynamics of thinking is triadic, but Peirce does > not believe in Hegel’s ‘aufhebung’ where thesis and anti-thesis met and > create a new level. Peirce did not work much with hierarchies as far as I > know. Finally he did not have Peirce’s Secondness that is the foundation of > his realism. Look for Hegel in CP. It’s worth noting that while Peirce often had highly critical things to say of Hegel, when he came out of hiding to given the various lectures due to James’ intercession people were shocked at just how Hegelian Peirce’s thought was. It’s also worth noting that many descendants of Peirce intellectually such as Royce or Dewey often had far stronger Hegelian elements. That said I confess my bias against Hegel is far worse than my bias against Hegel. I’ve begun to reassess Hegel only due to how Hegelian certain elements of the mature Peirce are. This hasn’t made reading Hegel any more enjoyable but perhaps I’m less likely to leap to condemnation as nonsense what I once did.
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