Ben - I think you are correct in your example and definition of Firstness and
Secondness. That is, the sound/shock wave that you feel in your body IS an
example of Firstness. As Peirce writes, this is a STATE, not a reaction [which
would be Secondness].
"A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass....a feeling
is a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of time as long as it
endures". 1.307.
Think of Firstness as a STATE, a singular experience, a whole feeling.
Firstness is a state that affects another body, so to speak. It is not just the
sound/shock wave isolate from interaction but is instead the interaction of
that sound/shockwave with another. That interaction, which is a qualitative
state, is Firstness. Remember, Peircean semiosis requires a network, an
interaction; nothing is isolate-in-itself.
Secondness develops when the other part of the interaction reacts. So,
Secondness, just as you point out, is your body's flinching or other reaction.
All of this is part of the process of Mind. Again, as Peirce writes "Every
operation of the mind, however complex, has its absolutely simple feeling, the
emotion of the tout ensemble" 1.311.
This points to, again, the fact that Firstness is not an isolate state but an
interactional state.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Ben Novak
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 12:12 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear Jon:
I am confused, but perhaps something I said created the confusion. So, let's
see if I can obtain a state of unconfusement. The problem is whether my
example of firstness, etc. can be corrected. Here is my original example:
I am a student sitting in a class listening to an interesting lecture, when
suddenly an explosion occurs. It could be a firecracker under behind the
professor's desk, or a truck wreck on the street right outside the classroom
windows. The sound of true explosion, whatever it is, is sudden, unexpected,
and immediate. The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute
firstness--I feel them. Secondness is what my body does in reaction, which is
to immediately and involuntarily, raise my head, flinch, and commence other
bodily reactions to the explosion waves reaching me. Thirdness occurs next,
when my mind begins to wonder what just happened.
In correcting me, you write:
BN: The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute firstness--I
feel them.
I would be inclined to associate this more with Secondness, because it is
Reaction of the shock waves and your body, not a Quality that is what it is
independent of anything else.
What I am proposing is that I delete the words "--I feel them."
What I intended to convey was the idea that you earlier corrected me on,
where you distinguish between reality and existence this way:
Reality consists of that which has whatever characters it has, regardless of
whether anyone thinks or believes that it has those characters; existence
consists of that which interacts or reacts with other things.
What I mean in the example of firstness, etc. above is that the shock or
sound waves constitute firstness, i.e., brute reality. By secondness in the
example I mean that when the sound or shock wave hit me, I become aware of
them, and my body involuntarily and without conscious thinking reacts. And by
thirdness, I first wonder what made the sound or shock waves. Can I achieve
this by deleting "--I feel them," and is the example then sound?
Thanks,
Ben N.
Ben Novak
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart
will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes
may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message
will have gone." Oswald Spengler
On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 11:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
Ben N., List:
Thanks for attempting to steer the discussion back to the original thread
topic. :-)
BN: The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute
firstness--I feel them.
I would be inclined to associate this more with Secondness, because it is
Reaction of the shock waves and your body, not a Quality that is what it is
independent of anything else.
BN: So, let's go back to Jon's 2nd, 3rd, and 4th questions, because I
think he is on to something:
While I appreciate the vote of confidence, I believe that we still need to
address the first question first--to what was Peirce specifically referring as
"a theory of the nature of thinking" or "this theory of thinking"?
These were both unusual expressions for him to use; neither appears
anywhere else in the Collected Papers. By contrast, "theory of logic" and
"science of logic" each occur 20 times, while "theory of reasoning" occurs 18
times and "science of reasoning" occurs five times. Even "theory of thought"
and "science of thought" show up only once each, and one of those occasions is
in the cited title of a work by someone else. However, in CP 1.573 (also EP
2.376; 1906), Peirce does state that "Logic, regarded from one instructive,
though partial and narrow, point of view, is the theory of deliberate
thinking." Furthermore, in manuscript R 634 (1909), a draft preface for a book
whose working title was Meaning, he wrote that "logic is the theory of
thinking, so far as thinking conduces to the attainment of truth." He went on
to say, later in the same paragraph, that "logic should be regarded as
coextensive with General Semeiotic, the a priori theory of signs." So it seems
plausible, and perhaps likely, that Peirce had his entire theory of "Logic,
Considered as Semeiotic" in mind when he wrote "A Neglected Argument."
I have now discovered further clues, which pertain to all four of my
"interesting questions," in the manuscripts that contain various drafts of that
article (R 841-844). The final version, as published in The Hibbert Journal,
contains a somewhat lengthy description of the "hidden argument," followed by a
relatively brief discussion of the Three Stages of Inquiry and their logical
validity. What appears to be the very first draft (R 842) has it the other way
around, as the following introductory comments anticipate.
CSP: Yet this [humble] argument has seldom been much insisted upon by
theologians for the reason that, persuasive as it is, it has not seemed to them
to be logical. This I conceive has been due to a false theory of logic; and
consequently the main substance of the present paper must be a brief abstract
of a defence of a theory of logic according to which the theological argument
in question is as logically sound as it certainly is persuasive. Thus, I am to
outline two arguments, one supporting the other. The latter, which I will
designate as the humble argument, although every mind can feel its force, rests
on far too many premisses to be stated in full. Taking the general description
of it as a minor premiss, and a certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it
will follow by a simple syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that
consequently whoever acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in
accepting its conclusion.
What Peirce here called "a certain theory of logic" seems to be precisely
what he later characterized in the first additament as "a theory of the nature
of thinking" and "this theory of thinking." It is the major premiss, and "a
general description of the humble argument" is the minor premiss, of "a simple
syllogism" whose conclusion is "that the humble argument is logical." Notice
the modesty of this claim--Peirce was not so much trying to "prove" the Reality
of God as merely assert that anyone who embraces his theory of logic and
recognizes that the humble argument is consistent with it "need have no scruple
in accepting its conclusion." He continued ...
CSP: Only, of course, it becomes necessary to establish the major
premiss, which is the theory of logic; and it is sufficiently clear that to do
this in a thoroughly satisfactory manner would involve going over the whole of
the critical branch of logic and showing that the theory in question
satisfactorily explains every variety of argument. Now I cannot, within
reasonable limits, consider more than the main genera of arguments. So much, I
will do. The subsidiary arguments of a mixed character, although highly
important in actual reasonings, cannot, within my limits, be considered.
Moreover, the critical branch of logic really, even more than apparently,
depends upon the very difficult and still vexed analytical branch, whose
problems could not easily be brought to the apprehension of ordinary readers,
to say nothing of the task of laying the foundations for their scientific
solutions. But fortunately, we have an instinct for that which is rational,
and upon that ordinary readers ought to rely. Accordingly, while I cannot here
present a thoroughly scientific defence of my theory of logic, I shall hope to
make it appear reasonable.
I find it fascinating, and perhaps relevant in this context, that Peirce
appealed to his readers' "instinct for that which is rational" in an effort to
make up for his inability to lay out his theory of logic "in a thoroughly
satisfactory manner." He then proceeded to offer only a single paragraph
outlining the "hidden argument," followed by many pages about Retroduction,
Deduction, and (especially) Induction, before (apparently) realizing that he
had far exceeded the allotted length and had to start over, almost from
scratch. In fact, some of this content was published as CP 2.755-772 under the
heading, "The Varieties and Validity of Induction," with no indication that it
is connected with "A Neglected Argument"; instead, it is referenced simply as
manuscript "G" and incorrectly dated c.1905. Two different versions of the
text end with equal abruptness. A later fragment (in R 843) includes this
alternative summary.
CSP: My main concern is to show that that line of reflexion which I call
the Neglected Argument is an argument, and a particularly strong one, of the
kind with which every positive scientific inquisition must begin. The lowliest
minds will rest content with this without any fault in their conclusion or
their logic; while the more critical, may still their lingering doubts, by
completing the line of inquiry which the Neglected Argument opens; while on its
concomitants they may base another Argument supporting the former, and so be
led on to further reflections, remarks, and experiences which attain all the
force of sound induction, the highest grade of certainty to which the human
mind can attain in any Real subject.
For many (most?), the NA is sufficient by itself--and Peirce is fine with
that! For those not fully satisfied by the NA, it serves instead as the
initial step of a more rigorous investigation. Both outcomes are fully
consistent with Peirce's "theory of the nature of thinking," as captured in
this structural engineering metaphor from the published article.
CSP: Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and
such ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval
wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the
vaguest, he managed to communicate to some fellow, we are building a cantilever
bridge of induction, held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every
plank of its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by
the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason; and neither Deduction nor
Induction contributes a single new concept to the structure. (CP 4.475)
I am still digesting all of the contents of the manuscripts, but those are
some thoughts so far. I am very grateful to Jeffrey Downard for calling to my
attention the Scalable Peirce Interpretation Network (SPIN), which is making
images of Peirce's manuscripts available for transcribing
(http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 3:05 PM, Ben Novak <[email protected]> wrote:
Dear Jon Alan Schmidt:
I would like to go back to the point that this chain of emails began. Jon
Alan Schmidt asked about something he found Peirce had said in the Neglected
Argument, which had been omitted in the version published in the Essential
Peirce:
CSP: Among the many pertinent considerations which have been crowded
out of this article, I may just mention that it could have been shown that the
hypothesis of God's Reality is logically not so isolated a conclusion as it may
seem. On the contrary, it is connected so with a theory of the nature of
thinking that if this be proved so is that. Now there is no such difficulty in
tracing experiential consequences of this theory of thinking as there are in
attempting directly to trace out other consequences of God's reality.
Jon said that raised "a few interesting questions," namely:
1.. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the
nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their
"logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or
something else?
2.. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with
"the hypothesis of God's reality"?
3.. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of
thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively
trace and inductively test?
4.. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the
nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would thereby
also be "proved"?
I have some tentative thoughts about these matters, including a couple of
ideas that I found in the secondary literature, but would appreciate seeing
what others have to say initially.
So, let me respond.
I thought I understood firstness, secondness, and thirdness when our
discussion began. This is the example I had in mind. I am a student sitting in
a class listening to an interesting lecture, when suddenly an explosion occurs.
It could be a firecracker under behind the professor's desk, or a truck wreck
on the street right outside the classroom windows. The sound of true explosion,
whatever it is, is sudden, unexpected, and immediate. The sound or other
shock waves hitting my body constitute firstness--I feel them. Secondness is
what my body does in reaction, which is to immediately and involuntarily,
raise my head, flinch, and commence other bodily reactions to the explosion
waves reaching me. Thirdness occurs next, when my mind begins to wonder what
just happened. All this can happen in far less than the blink of an eye.
Peirce's analysis of it by breaking it down in this way was thought to be a
fertile way of beginning to understand thinking, or to begin a theory of
thinking.
Please correct me again, Jon, if that is not an elementary example of
firstness, etc.
However, I soon got lost in the subsequent discussion of these, where
thirdness became intertwined with secondness and firstness, and so on, in the
subsequent emails. I do not doubt that all of you are correct that Peirce did
take this rudimentary example to far heights of thinking which I may just be
constitutionally unable to rise to. But my reading of Peirce suggests that he
was a very pragmatic person who appreciated someone from Missouri showing up
and saying "show me." In any event, so much of the subsequent discussion
involved concepts going back and forth with no examples that allowed them to be
brought to earth for examination. At least, that is what it seemed to me.
So, is it possible to get back to the original question. Remember that
Peirce thought that all this became clear to him his daily walks through the
woods, and he wrote this essay suggesting that its thinking would be available
to anyone of ordinary intelligence who pondered the three universes suggested
on their own daily walks through the woods.
So, let's go back to Jon's 2nd, 3rd, and 4th questions, because I think
he is on to something:
1.. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with
"the hypothesis of God's reality"?
2.. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of
thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively
trace and inductively test?
3.. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the
nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would thereby
also be "proved"?
In response, some raised the ontological argument of St. Anselm. But the
raising of it was not followed through. Here is my question (which I hope
"nests" all three of Jon's questions):
What would Anselm's ontological argument look like if it were restated in
Peirce's terms? In other words, could Anselm have discovered the same argument
as Peirce? Would this give us any insight into the theory of thinking? Peirce
says that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively and
inductively test such a theory of thinking. Someone from Missouri might say,
"Show me."
Ben Novak
Ben Novak
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart
will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes
may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message
will have gone." Oswald Spengler
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