Hi Ben, Harold, Jon, Edwina, Gary list:
This whole business of *one two three; one three two; Firstness Secondness Thirdness; Firstness Thirdness, Secondness; what is First or Second when speaking of an object *appears irresolvable. Everyone has his/her own pet theory for which it ought to be and why it ought to be that way. Surely, that is what Peirce wanted, for why not create such confusion and why not leave it at that? If we recall that *it is truth we’re after* and “*the elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action*”, then what does any of this have to do with truth? How can we settle why any one thing should ever be said to be any better than another? Why even use this corrupted system if it takes us no farther than any other? For certainly it is impossible to make a truth determination if we can’t even get our statement clear and there is no getting this statement clear. Where is this logic of vagueness that is supposed to help us? Perhaps I’m wrong. Maybe it is us who are corrupted for we’d rather ignore purposive action and piddle with fragmentary thoughts that satisfy our desires than proceed in inquiry. Maybe it is not truth we’re after, regardless of appearing to be genuine inquirers. Best, Jerry R On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 11:25 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Ben, > > > > The difference between Firstness and Secondness is not really that > complicated; I think if you look at the way Peirce defines them in the > “Neglected Argument” essay itself (as the first and second Universes, > EP2:435), you’ll see that Jon has it exactly right. Perhaps you’re confused > by trying to think of them *sequentially*, as ‘action and reaction.’ But > for Peirce, “brute forces” and actual events (such as “sound or other > shock waves hitting my body,” your original example, or any other physical > collision) are just as much “reactions” in the Peircean sense, and occur in > the second Universe, just as much as your subsequent bodily reaction to the > event. Of course any *phenomenon*, i.e. any actual thing or event that > *appears* (to anyone), has its own quality or Firstness, but in this case > it’s the Firstness of a Secondness; it has no singularity or individuality > of its own, as all things do in the Universe of Secondness, where > interactions occur. > > > > This should be clear even if you read the whole text that Edwina selected > a couple of texts from CP 1.307-8 (1907): > > [[[ 306. By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness > which involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor > consists in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of > consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its own positive > quality which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it > is, however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is > present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at every > moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple definition, I > will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of > consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of > anything else. > > 307. A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass, > since a coming to pass cannot be such unless there was a time when it had > not come to pass; and so it is not in itself all that it is, but is > relative to a previous state. A feeling is a *state,* which is in its > entirety in every moment of time as long as it endures. But a feeling is > not a single state which is other than an exact reproduction of itself. For > if that reproduction is in the same mind, it must be at a different time, > and then the being of the feeling would be relative to the particular time > in which it occurred, which would be something different from the feeling > itself, violating the definition which makes the feeling to be all that it > is regardless of anything else. Or, if the reproduction were simultaneous > with the feeling, it must be in another mind, and thus the identity of the > feeling would depend upon the mind in which it was, which is other than the > feeling; and again the definition would be violated in the same way. Thus, > any feeling must be identical with any exact duplicate of it, which is as > much as to say that the feeling is simply a quality of immediate > consciousness. ]]] > > > > As for the theological issue … now that IS complicated. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Ben Novak [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 14-Sep-16 10:55 > *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>; Edwina Taborsky < > [email protected]>; Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > > > Dear Jon: > > > > There are several issues floating around. > > > > 1. Example of firstness, secondness, thirdness > > > > You disagree with my example, as well as its amendment, but give a > definition of secondness that, unfortunately, does not compute for me. I > assume you are right, but you may be at a level of abstraction that is way > above my pay grade, as it were. > > > > In any event, I suggest that you think, at least in relation to me, on a > pedagogical level, i.e., teaching at the level of the student. For example, > in physics, I am told, introductory courses still begin with the old idea > of the atom with planet-like things called electrons whirling around a > nucleus--even though in more advanced courses in quantum physics these > rudimentary examples will be shown to be quite inaccurate. Nevertheless, > once a clear, simple, and elementary example is implanted, it is far easier > to correct an elementary example later by adding complicating factors, than > to insist on the most complications at the beginning, because the latter > will likely prevent the student from ever grasping the concept. In other > words, start simple. > > > > There is an old saying that wherever you have two philosophers together, > there are at least three opinions. In this regard, I am honored that Edwina > agrees with my example. Thank you, Edwina, for chiming in. You make things > much more lively. > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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