Clark, Ben, Edwina, list:
From your recent posts, I would say you are brightening the blind spot, albeit not directly with help of the *lanterna*. To that, your comments have not been explicit, merely implicit; indexed as “structure pretty similar to intuitions”, “common sensicalism”, *etc*., for why you choose to invent new terms is either all very predictable or puzzling. _______ *It is walking upon a **bog**, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way.** ~Peirce* “*By their fruits, ye shall know them*” ~Peirce (Matthew) *SOCRATES:... **Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are **not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection**, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.* *MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.* “*Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition*.” ~Herbert Simon *Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is “up to us” to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most speedily.” (1.615)* *"The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?" ~Plato * “When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent arguments in its favor, each independent argument *pro* or *con* produces a certain impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its quantity upon the frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to the truth, and the algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant impression that measures the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole… The occasions when we naturally balance reasons *pro* and *con* mostly relate to what we prefer to do, not to questions of fact.” ~Peirce The irony, I hope, is clear. one two three… *pro con action*. Best, Jerry Rhee On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do > affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we > cannot begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who > self-describes as a 'Lutheran Layman' would have a different approach than > my own, as I self-describe as an atheist. Our very understandings of even > the term 'god' would therefore differ. > > And as Jerry points out - we don't 'begin' our understandings with Peirce. > Many of us are aware of Plato and Aristotle - and after all, Peirce > described himself as heavily influenced by Aristotle. > > > Yes. I think someone characterized Peirce’s epistemology not as focused on > beliefs and their justification but on the change of beliefs. This shifts > it from the more traditional Aristotelian approach with its similarities to > mathematics into a more process view. Peirce was really pushing back > against the Foundationalist moves that characterized most philosophy well > up to the middle 20th century since Descartes. Even when Foundationalism > was discarded you had things like coherentism or the like that still > adopted much of the structure of Descartes. It was a static analysis. > > If we do justice to abduction and the NA I think we have to avoid that > static kind of analysis. > > Further the analysis can’t simply move towards the current perhaps > somewhat contingent makeup of philosophy departments. Rather we have to ask > about the diversity of views as they conduct the argument. It’d seem that > only then can we make sense of its strength or weakness. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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