Jeff, List: Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's writings. I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about whether #3 is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce. I have been operating under the assumption that this term should be confined to #1 and #2--i.e., clarifying and applying Peirce's own views, rather than going beyond them. I agree with your suggestion that #4 does not really belong on the List.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hello Clark, List, > > I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that > might guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was > developing. Let's distinguish between three locations on the broad spectrum: > > 1. Interpreting Peirce's texts as faithfully as possible, where the aim > is to find the truth about his particular arguments and philosophical views. > > 2. Reconstructing the arguments so as to put them in the best shape, > where the aim is to find what are truly the best forms of those arguments > working from the assumptions and methods he was employing. > > 3. Drawing explicitly from Peirce's ideas and arguments for the purpose of > putting them to work to find the truth about what is really the case. > > 4. Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with very little > attention to or care for what Peirce wrote. > > For my part, I believe that all four approaches and aims may be > considered reasonable (although the fourth might suffer in ways that might > have been avoided). What is more, I believe that the first three sorts of > inquiries belong in the discussion on the Peirce-list. Having said that, I > do believe it is helpful to be clear about what one is doing in making a > given post--and to make that clear to others. Otherwise, we will just be > talking past one another. All things considered, I believe that you are > correct in saying that Peirce thinks that the third sort of approach and > aim should, in general, be controlling over the first and second. Having > said that, he has written quite a lot on what it is to do the first or > second sort of thing well or poorly. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > > I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we > variously may think for our own parts. > > I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the > social changes in the intervening century or so. As I mentioned a few weeks > ago I think that most thinkers in the academy were they to conduct the > experiment might come to somewhat different results. Since what counts is > the community of inquirers and not just Peirce, it does seem that is a > fruitful avenue to consider. > > That’s not to deny the utility of focusing in on Peirce’s beliefs. It’s > just that I think we can and must separate the arguments somewhat from the > person proposing them. One danger I see in Peircean studies is that it > falls into the trap of becoming purely about exegesis of Peirce’s thought. > That’s an important step - especially given that many aspects of Peirce’s > thought were so poorly understood for so many years. But when his thought > isn’t extended beyond that, when a quote of Peirce becomes like a Bible > verse quoted by a fundamentalist religious believer, I think we’re missing > something fundamental about Peirce’s aims. (Not saying anyone here is doing > that mind you - just that I think it’s an ever present danger I myself fall > into occasionally) In Peircean terms we confuse the dynamic object with the > immediate object. > > On Sep 25, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > > Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent > that rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does > not offer rules for instinct. > > Ben, do you think that Peirce distinguishes between those good at guesses > or hypothesis formation and those who are not? > > For instance in a more contemporary context we’d distinguish between the > hypothesis of a scientist working in their area of knowledge and someone > not with that background. It seems to me that while Peirce usually > discusses critical common sensism in the context of regular broad social > common sense that it applies even better to subgroups. That is subgroups > develop a common sense based upon their experience over years. > > It seems to me that if we distinguish the initial application of abduction > towards a hypothesis with repeated community testing of the concept then > things do get a bit trickier. I recognize that the discussion the past few > days has primarily been on this initial application of abduction. The > question then becomes to what degree continued inquiry upon what we might > call metaphysical remains abductive and to what degree it goes beyond this. > > Again science offers many examples here. Ideas often are not falsified by > continued inquiry and experimentation. Rather they simply fall out of favor > slowly as alternative hypothesis seems more persuasive. That is the normal > idea of verification or falsification never happens simply because our > experiments are themselves so theory laden. (As Quine pointed out long ago > although which I think one can find within Peirce as well) In turn this > lines up with his critical common sensism. > > Allow me a quote from the archives. In this case from Teresa Calvet from > way back in Feb 2006. > > The bare definition of pragmaticism, writes Peirce (in "What Pragmatism Is > "), "could convey no satisfactory comprehension of it to the most > apprehensive of minds" of the doctrines "without the previous acceptance > (or virtual acceptance) of which pragmaticism itself would be a nullity" > (CP 5.416). Peirce says here that these preliminary propositions "might all > be included under the vague maxim, 'Dismiss make-believes'", a maxim that > could also be called, "the adoption of the general philosophy of common > sense". This normative exhortation "do not make believe; (...) recognize, > as you must, that there is much that you do not doubt, in the least" (CP > 5.416) was enounced before by Peirce, in 1868, in "Some Consequences of > Four Incapacities" (W2, p. 212). Instead of presenting Peirce simply as > anti-Cartesian, I prefer to follow what he himself said: "Although > pragmaticism is not a philosophy, yet (...) it best comports with the > English philosophy, and more particularly with the Scotch doctrine of > common sense" (CP 8.207) and to insist that pragmaticism "involves a > complete rupture with nominalism" (CP 8.208). To illustrate Peirce's > position, William Davis suggests (already in 1972) the analogy of a jig-saw > puzzle, "where each new bit adds significance to the whole, although each > bit is incomplete in itself and there is no real foundation piece upon > which all else is based. Any piece will do to start with, where nothing is > infallible in principle, though much does not fail in practice" (Peirce's > Epistemology, p. 20). Ten years later Susan Haack also uses that image (in > the last section, "The Jigsaw of Knowledge", of her paper "Descartes, > Peirce and the Cognitive Community"). But we could also cite here the > following paragraph of "Some consequences of four incapacities": > "Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far > as to proceed only from tangible premisses which can be subjected to > careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its > arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not > form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose > fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and > intimately connected" (W2, p. 213). > > One could then open Peirce's 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (and > present his conception of philosophy). It is also in these conferences that > Peirce formulates three propositions which appear to him to put the edge on > the maxim of pragmatism (or three cotary propositions): 1) there are no > conceptions that are not given in perceptual judgments [or: all conceptions > are given in perceptual judgments] (this is Peirce's interpretation of the > slogan Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu); 2) > perceptual judgments contain general elements; and 3) abductive inference > "shades into perceptual judgments without any sharp demarcation between > them" and states that "the maxim of pragmatism, if true, fully covers the > entire logic of abduction" (CP 5.196). > > It’s that last point I wish to emphasize. Abduction "shades into > perceptual judgments without any sharp demarcation between them.” This is > very much akin to what philosophers of science since at least the middle of > the 20th century have noted about competing theories that can explain data. >
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