Jeffrey, Ben list:
You said: Peirce says: "As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible"; this acceptance ranges in different cases -- and reasonably so – from a mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to believe." *Surprise*: a mere expression of it in the interrogative mood *Suspect*: as a question meriting attention *Matter of course*: to uncontrollable inclination to believe You said: At the very least, the idea that the question has been formulated by a *sincere desire to learn*, and in a manner that does not embody undue bias or prejudice, and that it does not close the door of inquiry all seem to *provide some justification to the claim that the question is plausible*. The argumentation, then, is: The *surprising* fact, the Father, is observed. But if the Son were true, the Father would be a *matter of course*. Hence, there is reason to *suspect* that Son is true. *Jesus answered, "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.**” * ~John 14:6 So, what makes the statement Jesus is the way and truth, Son of God, plausible? What determines it? “Let us acknowledge, then, that we have a preamble.” Let us acknowledge, then, that CP 5.189 is the best form of abduction. Let us acknowledge, then, that CP 5.189 is a complete pragmatic maxim. With best wishes, Jerry Rhee On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 2:15 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff D., Gary R., list, > > I assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we > variously may think for our own parts. Peirce spells out the difference > between critical and methodeutical justifications in the Carnegie > application _New Elements of Mathematics_ passage that I quoted earlier. > The fuller passage can be seen both by Google preview > https://books.google.com/books?id=aLxTkSob9UMC&pg=PA62&; > lpg=PA62&dq=%22Methodeutic+has+a+special+interest+in+Abduction%22 in Joe > Ransdell's reconstruction at Arisbe (although it looks like Joe missed some > italicizations) http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/ > l75v1-08.htm#m27 : > > MEMOIR 27: OF METHODEUTIC > > [....] > > From Draft B - MS L75.279-280 > > The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of > the nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it is assumed that the > signs considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and be true. But > just as critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its > intended ultimate object, the reality, so methodeutic looks to the purposed > ultimate interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to > in order to be pertinent to the purpose. Methodeutic has a special interest > in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it > is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any > hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But among > justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is suitable for > being tested by experiment. There is no such need of a subsequent choice > after drawing deductive and inductive conclusions. Yet although methodeutic > has not the same special concern with them, it has to develop the > principles which are to guide us in the invention of proofs, those which > are to govern the general course of an investigation, and those which > determine what problems shall engage our energies. It is, therefore, > throughout of an economic character. Two other problems of methodeutic > which the old logics usually made almost its only business are, first, the > principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear; and second, the > principles of classification. > [End quote] > > Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and of > rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of > methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is > how the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. > Methodeutic does not have the same special interest in deduction and > induction; the specific justifications of deductions and inductions as > valid are topics of critical logic. > > The difference matters because instinctual plausibility has to do with how > much one thinks a hypothesis true. That a hypothesis is conceivably > testable does not lend assurance of its truth. More specific concerns of > methodeutic including the economics of resarch - the suitability of a > hypothesis for testing because of cheapness, or because of its bearing on > other hypotheses, i.e., its caution (as in 20 Questions), incomplexity, or > breadth, have no direct bearing on one's assurance, going in, that the > hypothesis is true. A hypothesis, merely by being easier or more promising > to test, does not become a more plausible and naturally simple explanation > of a phenomenon. > > In "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction" (Lecture VII of the 1903 Harvard > lectures on pragmatism), see CP 5 196–200 http://www.textlog.de/7663.html > , and somewhere in EP 2:226–241 > > .... What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to > be worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. > But what other conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? .... Any > hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special > reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental > verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This > is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. > [End quote] > > Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent > that rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does > not offer rules for instinct. > > Best, Ben > > *On 9/25/2016 1:56 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:* > > Ben U., Gary R., List, > > The following remarks seem--at least to my ear--to bear on the some > relationships between plausibility and methodeutical justification. > > Peirce says: "As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible"; > this acceptance ranges in different cases -- and reasonably so -- from a > mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting > attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to > uncontrollable inclination to believe." > > The inference to a hypothesis expressed in the interrogative mood suggests > that the holding of the question to be "plausible" (e.g., well-fitted to > the surprising phenomena, well-formed as having great uberty, etc.) does > seem to derive its plausibility from the first rule of reason. At the very > least, the idea that the question has been formulated by a sincere desire > to learn, and in a manner that does not embody undue bias or prejudice, and > that it does not close the door of inquiry all seem to provide some > justification to the claim that the question is plausible. > > What is more, the suggestion that plausibility comes in varying degrees, > ranging from the lowest levels of assurance up to the "high peaks" of > plausibility does suggest that the principle of continuity applies to the > manner in which seek and then provide degrees of assurance. For instance, > the efforts to rid one’s estimations of plausibility of the undue effects > of bias and prejudice are something that one might seek to improve on an > incremental basis. What is more, the manner in which one might assure that > the door of inquiry is kept open might vary from something like a door that > is barely cracked open to one that is wide open. Furthermore, the way in > which the door is held open might vary from a door that swings > uncontrollably due to the "winds" of vicissitude, to one that is firmly > held open with a wedge. > > Finally, the remark that "where conjecture mounts the high peaks of > Plausibility -- and is *really* most worthy of confidence" suggest that > what makes a conjecture really worthy of confidence is that the many > estimations of the suitability of the hypothesis as an explanation is a > process that has effectively been guided by the pragmatic maxim. If the > leading conceptions in the hypothesis have been clarified up to the third > degree, then it *really* is most worthy of our confidence as a > hypothetical explanation of a set of surprising phenomena. The fact that > the surprising character fades the more worthy it is of our confidence does > suggest that the fit is one with a large system of our other beliefs that > are relatively well settled as habits--and that the hypothesis is > *sufficient* to explain all that was, initially, quite surprising. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > *From:* Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:50 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Jeff D., Gary R., list, > > Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which > Peirce elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, instinctual > simplicity; it bears upon assurance by instinct; I don't find him > discussing methodeutical justification (e.g., testability) of abductive > inference in the passage that you quoted. I've had some further thoughts on > the nature of assurance by form, but they would just lead us further into > byways. > > You get into some of the bigger question that you raised in earlier posts, > including the idea that Peirce's Humble Argument may be the only game in > town (my words) on the questions that it concerns. I have lots of > half-formed remarks that I could offer on that, and when I try to get > started, I digress. Maybe I should just mention topics that occur to me but > that I'm unsure of how to address: > > • Only game in town - is the assurance of the Humble Argument's being the > only game in town to be acheived by instinctual plausibility, by > experience, or by form? Probably by a combination, but would one kind of > assurance be foremost in the overall assurance? For example, suppose that > string theory were proven mathematically to be the only consistent way to > unite general relativity with quantum field theory. It would still have to > have assurance by experience by accordance with all observations, but it > would still lack confirmation of predictions that distinguish it from > general relativity per se and quantum field theory per se, which > predictions, since they are about quantum gravity, would currently require > a particle collider the size of the known universe - a conceivable > practical test, but contingently fantastically impractical for us. So, if > it were to be found, I'd call such an assurance of string theory (as sole > possible mathematico-physical unifier of GR and QFT) an assurance by form. > See what I mean about my digressions? More to the point, I should just ask, > how does one strengthen the assurance that the Humble Argument is the only > game in town? > > • Common elements in theological ideals of various religions - how alike > are those ideals, really? > > Best, Ben > > *On 9/25/2016 12:06 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:* > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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