Jon, Gary, list: I do not see how we're back to anything at all about a complete inquiry when you have not spoken a whit on "beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity above Animality'"
Best, Jerry R On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 10:39 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > wrote: > Gary R., List: > > GR: As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed > in critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about > that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may > think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen > entertained in the literature. > > > My default suspicion of novelty is flaring up again, so I am inclined to > withdraw my off-the-cuff suggestion as having no merit. I was just > thinking that the validity of each individual reasoning type (abduction, > deduction, induction) falls under logical critic, while complete inquiry > that includes them all falls under methodeutic; and I see the PM as > pertaining primarily to the Second Stage only, deduction--identifying > practical consequences of a hypothesis so that it can be tested. However, > I went back and found this earlier quote and comment from Ben U. > > CSP: Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made > almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and of > rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification. > (L75.280) > > > BU: Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and > of rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of > methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is > how the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. > Methodeutic does not have the same special interest in deduction and > induction; the specific justifications of deductions and inductions as > valid are topics of critical logic. > > > I was evidently conflating the *justification *of deduction, which falls > under logical critic, with the *application *of deduction within a > complete inquiry--employing the PM--which falls under methodeutic. But I > also see Ben here explicitly associating the PM with "the logic of > abductive inference," which confuses me again. In my mind, "definition ... > rendering ideas clear ... [and] consideration of conceivable experimental > consequences" all pertain to the *explication* of hypotheses (deduction), > not their *formulation *(abduction). Ben also provided this quote ... > > CSP: Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any > special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental > verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This > is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, EP 2.235) > > > ... but that is discussing the *admissibility *of a hypothesis *after *it > has been formulated. Does that assessment more properly fall under the > justification of *abduction *(logical critic) or, as I just proposed, the > application of *deduction *within a complete inquiry (methodeutic)? Ben > later seemed to favor the latter, as well ... > > BU: Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, > "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which > starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis > should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is > justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select > that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb > "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. > In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. > > > ... and I now find this analysis quite persuasive. When Peirce calls > pragmatism "the logic of abduction," he is not referring to the *validity > *of abduction by itself, but how abduction fits into a *complete > *inquiry--i.e., > methodeutic rather than logical critic. Bringing us back to the original > thread topic--after all that, perhaps we can simply identify this as > Peirce's "theory of thinking" in the context of "A Neglected Argument." > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> Reading over our several posts on this topic it appears that we are in >> the main in agreement that the distinction between the PM and pragmaticism >> in its fullness ought not be conflated as, apparently, Houser has to some >> extent, for example, in his misquoting Peirce in the essay, replacing the >> "pragmatic maxim" with "pragmatism." >> >> If we avoid this conflation then we can legitimately, I think, identify >> the security offered by the pragmatic maxim and the uberty which >> pragmaticism offers in the context of a complete inquiry. >> >> As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed in >> critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about >> that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may >> think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen >> entertained in the literature. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> GR: But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the >>> "rule of pragmatism" in this essay. >>> >>> >>> Yes, but my point is that he does *not *call the PM the "rule of >>> abduction"; so again, I am positing a distinction between Peirce's >>> pragmatism (i.e., pragmaticism) as the "logic of abduction" and the PM as >>> the "rule of pragmatism." Pragmaticism as a whole--i.e., all three >>> Stages of Inquiry, taken together--*includes *the PM, but the PM is not *all >>> *there is to it. The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), >>> not abduction; which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. >>> I wonder if another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to >>> logical critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic. >>> >>> Frankly, Houser misquoted Peirce when he wrote, "Peirce had come to see >>> that *pragmatism *has the limitations that come with choosing security >>> over uberty: '[it] does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral >>> virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity >>> above Animality'" (EP 2.xxxii, emphasis added). What Peirce actually >>> wrote is, "Yet *the maxim of Pragmatism* does not bestow a single smile >>> upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things >>> that alone raise Humanity above Animality" (EP 2.465, emphasis added). >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, List, >>>> >>>> Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that >>>> "Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the >>>> latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole." >>>> >>>> On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I >>>> keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction" >>>> if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic >>>> maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule >>>> of abduction," as you did." >>>> >>>> But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of >>>> pragmatism" in this essay. He writes: >>>> >>>> "That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in >>>> 1871 to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465). >>>> >>>> So, there is *this* sense in which Houser may not be *entirely *incorrect, >>>> at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to >>>> imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism >>>> ought *not >>>> *be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism >>>> far beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "*used*. . .to call" it the >>>> rule of pragmatism). >>>> >>>> As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a >>>> footnote to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' >>>> somewhat different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic >>>> (Houser's "rich suggestiveness"). >>>> >>>> In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, >>>> Peirce wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring >>>> out the amount and kind of *security* (approach to certainty) of each >>>> kind of reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable >>>> *uberty*, or *value in productiveness *(emphasis added) of each kind >>>> (CP 8.384). [EP2:553, fn 7] >>>> >>>> >>>> As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our >>>> argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen >>>> as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in >>>> itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to >>>> some considerable degree. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>> >>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>> *Communication Studies* >>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>> *C 745* >>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>>> >>>> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gary R., List: >>>>> >>>>> GR: But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the >>>>> pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our >>>>> approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute >>>>> to >>>>> the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care" >>>>> (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that >>>>> it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what >>>>> Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my >>>>> thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all >>>>> three stages of a complete inquiry). >>>>> >>>>> GR: So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM >>>>> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 >>>>> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to >>>>> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that >>>>> there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the >>>>> "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of >>>>> pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did. >>>>> The two notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said, >>>>> "pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three >>>>> stages of a complete inquiry)." Abduction, when employed with "solicitous >>>>> care," provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the >>>>> smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475, >>>>> EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security. The >>>>> hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441). The PM, on the other >>>>> hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning. >>>>> But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465). >>>>> >>>>> GR: The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one >>>>> takes up each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most >>>>> security and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But >>>>> how should we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and >>>>> uberty? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To summarize my suggested answer--abduction provides uberty, by >>>>> generating new hypotheses; deduction provides security, by explicating >>>>> those hypotheses in accordance with the PM; and induction provides both, >>>>> by >>>>> evaluating those hypotheses against experience. As you hinted, Houser's >>>>> comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only >>>>> one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:03 PM, Gary Richmond < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Ben, Jeff D., Clark, Jon S, List, >>>>>> >>>>>> Ben concluded his argument (over several messages) by writing: >>>>>> "Peirce made plausibility a question of logical critic, and testability, >>>>>> potential fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus he separated >>>>>> them not just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining to >>>>>> different levels of logic - very apples versus oranges " >>>>>> >>>>>> I tend to agree with this and the whole thrust of your argumentation, >>>>>> all nicely supported by the texts you've quoted, Ben. But I have one >>>>>> question which keeps gnawing and deeply related to this. >>>>>> >>>>>> Nathan Houser comments in his introduction to the very late article >>>>>> (1913), "An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and Uberty" >>>>>> (EP2:463; note: "uberty" defined as "rich suggestiveness") that in this >>>>>> text, written just months before Peirce died, that he is arguing that >>>>>> "reasoning involves a trade-off between security and uberty," and that >>>>>> "deductive reasoning provides the most security, but little uberty, which >>>>>> abduction provides much uberty but almost no security." "Pragmatism, it >>>>>> seems," Houser writes, "falls in on the side of security." >>>>>> >>>>>> But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the *pragmatic >>>>>> maxim*, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our >>>>>> approximation to [the] *security* of reasoning. But it does not >>>>>> contribute to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for >>>>>> solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous >>>>>> care" >>>>>> to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, >>>>>> but >>>>>> the PM, what Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical >>>>>> analysis." In my thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of >>>>>> inquiry >>>>>> (including all three stages of a complete inquiry). >>>>>> >>>>>> So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM >>>>>> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the >>>>>> 1913 >>>>>> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to >>>>>> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. >>>>>> >>>>>> The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes up >>>>>> each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security >>>>>> and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how >>>>>> should >>>>>> we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty? >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> Gary R >>>>>> >>>>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>>>> >>>>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>>>> *Communication Studies* >>>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>>>> *C 745* >>>>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>>>>> >>>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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