Jon, list: You pull that quote as if everything is self-evident. Yet, you never provide that certain maxim that is posed by pragmatism, as if that is understood.
Yet, if you pose it, state it clearly, say it explicitly, express it out loud; you will discover that it is the wrong maxim. "...if our opponent will only say something; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to seek to give an account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything, in so far as he cannot do so." Best, Jerry R On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > This passage conveniently lays out Peirce's views on what we have been > discussing today. > > CSP: If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see > that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That > is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render > needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as > hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful > suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism > really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic ... Thus, > the maxim of pragmatism, if true, fully *covers* the entire logic of > abduction. It remains to inquire whether this maxim may not have some > *further > *logical effect. If so, it must in some way affect inductive or > deductive inference. But that pragmatism cannot interfere with induction > is evident; because induction simply teaches us what we have to expect as a > result of experimentation, and it is plain that any such expectation may > conceivably concern practical conduct. In a certain sense it *must* > affect *deduction*. Anything which gives a rule to abduction and so puts > a limit upon admissible hypotheses will cut down *the premisses* of > deduction, and thereby will render a *reductio ad absurdum* and other > equivalent forms of deduction possible which would not otherwise have been > possible. But ... to affect the premisses of deduction is not to affect > the logic of deduction ... Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in > the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable > of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such > verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. But just > here a broad question opens out before us. What are we to understand by > experimental verification? The answer to that involves the whole logic of > induction. (CP 5.196-197) > > > The pragmatic maxim "fully covers the entire logic of abduction" by > serving as the rule that determines "the admissibility of hypotheses," not > their generation or justification. Although "pragmatism cannot interfere > with induction," nevertheless "the whole logic of induction" is precisely > the "experimental verification" of which a hypothesis must be capable in > order to be admissible. On the other hand, pragmatism "must affect > deduction" by cutting down its premisses; but even so, it does not do so in > such a way as "to affect the logic of deduction." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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