List: This passage conveniently lays out Peirce's views on what we have been discussing today.
CSP: If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic ... Thus, the maxim of pragmatism, if true, fully *covers* the entire logic of abduction. It remains to inquire whether this maxim may not have some *further *logical effect. If so, it must in some way affect inductive or deductive inference. But that pragmatism cannot interfere with induction is evident; because induction simply teaches us what we have to expect as a result of experimentation, and it is plain that any such expectation may conceivably concern practical conduct. In a certain sense it *must* affect *deduction*. Anything which gives a rule to abduction and so puts a limit upon admissible hypotheses will cut down *the premisses* of deduction, and thereby will render a *reductio ad absurdum* and other equivalent forms of deduction possible which would not otherwise have been possible. But ... to affect the premisses of deduction is not to affect the logic of deduction ... Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. But just here a broad question opens out before us. What are we to understand by experimental verification? The answer to that involves the whole logic of induction. (CP 5.196-197) The pragmatic maxim "fully covers the entire logic of abduction" by serving as the rule that determines "the admissibility of hypotheses," not their generation or justification. Although "pragmatism cannot interfere with induction," nevertheless "the whole logic of induction" is precisely the "experimental verification" of which a hypothesis must be capable in order to be admissible. On the other hand, pragmatism "must affect deduction" by cutting down its premisses; but even so, it does not do so in such a way as "to affect the logic of deduction." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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