Helmut, List: The justification of abduction/retroduction (by itself) falls under logical critic, rather than methodeutic. However, pragmat[ic]ism as methodeutic tells us how abduction/retroduction fits within a complete inquiry--the justified hypotheses that it produces are admitted or rejected on the basis of the pragmatic maxim, and those that are admitted subsequently undergo deductive explication and inductive evaluation. Abduction/retroduction alone contributes to uberty, while the pragmatic maxim, deduction, and induction all contribute to security. Quoting "A Neglected Argument" once again ...
CSP: Observe that neither Deduction nor Induction contributes the smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry. They render the indefinite definite; Deduction Explicates; Induction evaluates: that is all. Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the vaguest, he managed to communicate to some fellow, we are building a cantilever bridge of induction, held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every plank of its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason; and neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new concept to the structure. Nor is this less true or less important for those inquiries that self-interest prompts. (CP 6.475, EP 2.443; 1908) Regards, Jon On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 2:34 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a > deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility) > does. Obviously abduction is something personal/individual that escapes > methodeutics. So the problem of > uberty/security/abduction/deduction/pragmatism/pragmatic > maxim etc. is not solved by my contribution. > Best, > Helmut > > 30. September 2016 um 20:49 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > > Helmut: > > I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by *plausibility*, > which indeed pertains to the justification of abduction. In your example, > it is *plausible* that these white beans are from this bag that contains > only white beans. On the other hand, it would obviously *not *be > plausible to suggest that these white beans are from this other bag that > contains only black beans. > > Regards, > > Jon > > > On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Jon, list, >> >> you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second >> statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...". >> This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the >> conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about >> abduction should have for first premiss an epistemologic explanation, what >> observer-personal possibility / abduction is, and for second premiss the >> case that suits to that. Like: >> 1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*. >> 2.: The fact that all beans from the bag are white, and that these beans >> are white, and nothing else that might contradict the possibility is known >> by the observer about the bag and the beans, suits the above scheme. >> 3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification >> of an abduction, that the beans are from the bag. >> >> But I dont know, if this helps the discussion. >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> 29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Helmut, List: >> >> I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies >> as a genuine deduction. It is not *necessarily* true that "it is >> possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for >> some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans. >> In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things, >> at least somewhat. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> >>> Dear list members, >>> I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag >>> are white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an >>> abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are >>> white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a >>> deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an >>> abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But >>> talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view >>> it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the >>> pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction. >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> >>
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