Dear all, Perhaps I ought to point out the elephant in the room.
Despite your admission that: "*any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good *abduction" why do disagreements persist and why are disputants unable to work themselves out of the problem? I need not refer by name to any particular instance... Best, Jerry R On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also > very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and > methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and > pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism > itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete *inquiry. > > Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction. > While logical *critic* concerns itself with the nature and strength of > the three types of inferences, *methodeutic* concerns itself with these > three patterns of inference as *together* they figure in a complete > inquiry. > > Thus, as you concluded: *any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis > passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry > is a *good *abduction. > > And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as > semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic *rhetoric* by Peirce. For it > is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that we are > *persuaded* that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," that is, > that it is a "good" abduction. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> Thanks for your kind words. I think that the discussion over the last >> several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between >> logical critic and methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls >> under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the >> PM--like pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a >> *complete *inquiry. >> >> CSP: Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was >> recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory >> hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain >> conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a >> hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or >> some of them. The form of inference, therefore, is this: >> >> The surprising fact, C, is observed; >> >> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, >> >> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2.231) >> >> >> But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough for a >> hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete inquiry. As >> Ben U. brought to our attention ... >> >> BU: Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, >> "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which >> starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis >> should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is >> justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select >> that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb >> "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. >> In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. >> >> >> In other words, the PM is *required *before we can take that next step. >> In fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this *later in the very same >> lecture *in which he presented CP 5.189. >> >> CSP: If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see >> that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That >> is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render >> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as >> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful >> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of >> pragmatism really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to >> logic, and is not understood as a proposition in psychology. For the maxim >> of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or import >> differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in >> connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably >> modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception. (CP >> 5.196, EP 2.234) >> >> >> Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if sound, >> must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of >> hypotheses." Peirce subsequently explained why this is so. >> >> CSP: Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of >> Abduction, let us consider it under that form. What is good abduction? >> What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a >> hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other >> conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? The question of the goodness of >> anything is whether that thing fulfills its end. What, then, is the end of >> an explanatory hypothesis? Its end is, through subjection to the test of >> experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the >> establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be >> disappointed. Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the >> absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of >> experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such >> verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, >> EP 2.235) >> >> >> CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet >> are *not *"capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not >> *admissible >> for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation. In other >> words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may nevertheless turn >> out to be a *bad *abduction; whereas *any *abduction whose resulting >> hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages >> of inquiry is a *good *abduction. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Helmut, List, >>> >>> Nice summary statement, Jon, which the quotation brings home. >>> >>> This discussion has been quite valuable for me as it clarified a matter >>> which, as I noted in my initial post on the security/uberty question, has >>> troubled me for some time. Perhaps most helpful was seeing that Houser had >>> conflated the PM and 'pragmatism' in his introduction to the piece, and >>> that much of my confusion arose from that (and that's yet another lesson >>> learned here, namely, that even a *great* Peirce scholar--which I and >>> many consider Nathan Houser to be--can err in any given interpretation). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
