Helmut: I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by *plausibility*, which indeed pertains to the justification of abduction. In your example, it is *plausible* that these white beans are from this bag that contains only white beans. On the other hand, it would obviously *not *be plausible to suggest that these white beans are from this other bag that contains only black beans.
Regards, Jon On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second > statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...". > This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the > conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about > abduction should have for first premiss an epistemologic explanation, what > observer-personal possibility / abduction is, and for second premiss the > case that suits to that. Like: > 1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*. > 2.: The fact that all beans from the bag are white, and that these beans > are white, and nothing else that might contradict the possibility is known > by the observer about the bag and the beans, suits the above scheme. > 3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification of > an abduction, that the beans are from the bag. > > But I dont know, if this helps the discussion. > Best, > Helmut > > 29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Helmut, List: > > I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies > as a genuine deduction. It is not *necessarily* true that "it is > possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for > some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans. > In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things, > at least somewhat. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> Dear list members, >> I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are >> white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an >> abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are >> white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a >> deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an >> abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But >> talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view >> it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the >> pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction. >> Best, >> Helmut >> >
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