Dear list:
Lest we not ignore all who investigate, Alasdair McIntyre situates the neglected argument and makes some amusing philosophical moves in his lecture, “On Being a Theistic Philosopher in a Secularized Culture” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tm-5JXRXkM First, he recognizes Peirce as a first-rate philosopher at 12:50 and goes on to expose multiple themes of his argument, including the importance of being open to closer examination of premisses. He diagnoses this as a problem of how explanation is to be conceived. Then, he proposes a ridiculous argumentation that is not so ridiculous via analogy with Idea, that which “denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it.” The narrative can be understood through an explanation (at 17:00-20:21); by which I mean a syllogism where: C (consequent, output, First) = opera loving, James Joyce quoting, equation solving, atheistic physicists A (antecedent, input, Second) = hadrons, leptons or bosons "First and Second, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience, and they satisfy the mind for a very long time. But at last they are found inadequate, and the Third is the conception which is then called for. The Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and brings them into relationship." ____ To the philosophical question: “What kind of God is required for the James Joyce reading physicist to exist and for us to be able to think properly? Do we have to accept Christian theism, can we just believe in an unmoved mover of some sort? What God do we need?” (at 1:11:30) “*Certainly an unmoved mover won’t help you very much…But it’s also very clear that the line between God whom we can respond to only on the basis of his self-revelation...so that revealed truth is essential to taking any account of what it would be to stand before God. We don’t have to have revealed truth in that strong sense to have a belief in God that is a belief in a divine law-giver of the kind to whom we have to be responsive, not just to the law, but also to Him as law-giver. * *It’s very important that when Aquinas speaks about the natural law and about the duties that we have under the natural law, among those duties are duties to God. That by the light of reason, rightly understood, we apprehend a God who gives us a law, and He is the kind of God, who gives us that kind of law and we respond to Him as the God who understands us in this way. So, this kind of God is built up*…” So, how does one enter into such a conversation (1:14:38)? one two three… C = Father A = Son B = Spirit God… ….where God is not the Father but can be through interpretation or at the ultimate limit of inquiry. …where the Son answered, "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.” (modified from John 14:6) _____ And to the final question at 1:29:14 on walking away: How do you keep from walking away? What is expected of us to make our ideas clear? What ties things down? What can be said about stating an unconditional affirmation explicitly? What is the neglected argument? ________ Such are old patterns that are not always tied down. That is: “Most of the extreme controversies in which philosophers abandon all pretense of dialogue and turn their backs on arguments can be traced to differences concerning the structure of arguments and their relations to objects and to minds.“ ~Richard McKeon, Dialogue and Controversy in Philosophy *The surprising fact C is observed. * *But if A were true...* Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 3:58 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary F, List, > > Gary F wrote: > > *[GF: ] *But I think you will agree that *possibility* is the logical > equivalent of Firstness, not Thirdness. Peirce at this stage in his > thinking often identified continuity with generality, and he wrote c.1905 > that “The generality of the possible” is “the only true generality” (CP > 5.533). So I don’t think continuity is confined to Thirdness; and I think > Gary Richmond has argued that the ur-continuum or *tohu bohu* represented > by the blackboard in Peirce’s famous cosmology lecture is the first > Universe, which comprises “vague possibilities.” > > In some comments on cosmic origins in "One, Two, Three" (1886) Peirce > writes: > > ". . . we must suppose that there is an original, element > > al, tendency of things to acquire determinate properties, to take habits. > This is the Third or mediating element between chance, which brings forth > First and original events, and law which produces sequences or > > Seconds > " ( > W5.293 > ). > > I > would emphasize "original" and "elem > ental" in such passages. But > I have tended to base my argumentation regarding this topic on the later > cosmological lecture > s > of the 1898 Cambridge > series. In the final > lecture Peirce offers his famous blackboard analog > y. > For those on the list not familiar with it, I'll briefly rehearse it here. > > Peirce > begins by placing > a chalk mark on the board, a bit of spontaneity (1ns) which doesn't last > (it is "indifferent as to continuity" > he writes > ). "It tends itself readily to generalization but is not in itself > general. The limit betwee > n > the whiteness and the blackness is essentiall > y > discontinuous, antigeneral" (RLT:282). > > But note: "The original potentiality > [represented by the blackboard] > is essentially continuous, or general." > > > However, nothing can > ' > happen > ' > until the mark has some staying power, that is, begins to take on habits. > > "Once the line will stay a lit > t > le after it is marked, another line may be drawn beside it. Very soon our > eye persuades us there is a > > *new* line, the envelope of those others." > > He goes on at some length to describe this proto-universe. But it is, > > again, a* proto*-universe. > It is *not* *this* universe. > "At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the > existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world" of which there are many > , > and it is out of these one is "differentiated" in an "actual universe of > existence" (RLT:283) > > And, ". . .if we suppose the laws of nature to have been formed under the > influence of a universal tendency of things to take habits, there are > certain characters that those laws will necessarily possess" (RLT:283). > For prime example, these laws > themselves evolve > , involving the introduction of chance elements (1ns) > , although I don't recall > if > he discusses that > point > in this lecture. > > He will later discuss two continuities of this,* our*, universe, that of > Time and that of Space. > For me, that > discussion is one of the high points of a lecture which in my opinion is > as > profound > as anything he produced (the whole series is > , imo > ). > > But moving > past Time (as fascinating as his discussion is in RLT) > to Space since > I > haven't discussed 2ns > at all yet > , he remarks that while Space is a continuity "and, therefore, a > Thirdness, the whole nature and function of space refers to Secondness. It > is the theatre of the reactions of particles." > > ( > I should add as an aside that Peirce sometimes speaks of 3ns as lawfulness > and 2ns as the embodiment of laws in actuality. > ) > > As for the application of vectors here, Peirce at one points remarks that > his various musings on early cosmology are pre-scientific (or something > like that). So, while he'll say in some places re: this early cosmology, > 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns, in my thinking you cannot factor out the original > continuity > (3ns) > or there would be no theater > in which > these proto-events > might occur., and that is exactly where he commences in the 1898 > blackboard analogy. > > Note, finally, this passage on Synchecism which one finds immediately > preceding the blackboard metaphor in RLT. > > 1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Logic > of Continuity | RLT 261; CP 6.202 > > … the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon > continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to secure to thirdness its really > commanding function, I [find it indispensable] that it is a third, and that > Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other > elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have > anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call my theory > > Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity. > > So, one sees here that Peirce does indeed in 1898 associate these > "elements" (chance, brute reaction, and continutiy) with the categories, > that they *must* have their own independent characters, but that 3ns has > a "commanding function." > > > On the other hand, to repeat: > Peirce considers his cosmological musing prescientific. So it's OK to > refer to synechism as a scientific theory once > > *this* universe has evolved from a vast spectrum of possibilities > (there's also a multi-universe theory implied here, btw) > , but if one wants to consider the Peircean equivalent to the question > "What preceded the Big Bang > ," > you have to go to this ur-continuity (which > > I've sometimes personally thought of as > the Mind of God, not the God of *this* universe, but of all *possible > universes*). > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 10:59 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, list, >> >> >> >> On the question of which of the three Universes may *not* “have a >> Creator independent of it,” I’d like to offer an argument that it could be >> the Universe of Firstness rather than Thirdness. However I won’t have time >> this week to construct an argumentation as thoroughgoing as your argument >> for Thirdness as Creator; so instead, I’ll just insert a few comments into >> your post, below. I’ll put Peirce’s words in bold. >> >> >> >> Gary F >> >> >> >> } God himself culminates in the present moment, and will never be more >> divine in the lapse of all the ages. [Thoreau] { >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* 9-Oct-16 22:45 >> >> List: >> >> As I mentioned a few weeks ago when I started the thread on "Peirce's >> Theory of Thinking," there is an intriguing paragraph about cosmology in >> the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." It >> did not actually accompany the article originally, but nevertheless is in >> the Collected Papers as CP 6.490. Before discussing it directly, a few >> preliminaries are in order. >> >> In the very first sentence of the published article itself, Peirce >> stated, "The word 'God,' so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say), is the >> definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really >> creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2.434). In the >> second additament, the one that did appear in *The Hibbert Journal*, he >> added, "It is that course of meditation upon the three Universes which >> gives birth to the hypothesis and ultimately to the belief that they, or at >> any rate two of the three, have a Creator independent of them …" (CP 6.483, >> EP 2.448). Furthermore, in three different manuscript drafts of the >> article that are included in R 843, Peirce explicitly denied that God is >> "immanent in" nature or the three Universes, instead declaring (again) that >> He is the Creator of them: >> >> - "I do *not* mean, then, a 'soul of the World' or an intelligence is >> 'immanent' in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, >> of matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them." >> - "Indeed, meaning by 'God,' as throughout this paper will be meant, >> the Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to >> Him, >> Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being *not* 'immanent >> in' the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of >> every >> content of them, without exception." >> - "But I had better add that I do *not* mean by God a being merely >> 'immanent in Nature,' but I mean that Being who has created every content >> of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and >> the world of all minds, without any exception whatever." >> >> These passages shed light not only on Peirce's concept of God--he was >> clearly a theist, not a pantheist or panentheist, at least as I understand >> those terms--but also on what exactly he had in mind with his three >> Universes of Experience that the article describes as consisting of Ideas, >> Brute Actuality, and Signs. These evidently correspond respectively to (1) >> ideal possibilities, matter, and minds; (2) Ideas, Matter, and Mind; and >> (3) ideal possibilities, physical facts, and minds. Of course, it is >> barely a stretch, if at all, to identify these with his categories of >> Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. >> >> *[GF: ] *I think it would be less of a stretch to identify the *contents* >> of those Universes as Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, i.e. as subjects or >> objects in which Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (respectively) >> inhere. This leaves open the possibility of identifying *one* of the >> categories as *Creator* of all three Universes. As you have pointed out >> already, Peirce begins by defining “Idea” as “anything whose Being consists >> in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any >> person's faculty or impotence to represent it.” These are clearly contents >> of the *first* Universe, and Peirce certainly asserts their Reality >> (after defining that term): “*Of the three Universes of Experience >> familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings >> to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local >> habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the >> fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not >> in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality.*” >> >> *[GF: ] *I think it is worth noticing that Peirce defines the contents >> of the first Universe by quoting from *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, Act V >> – which is largely a dialogue about reality and dreams; and that his >> definition of Reality (in the previous paragraph) uses a dream as an >> example of something that is unreal in one sense but real in another: “ >> *“Real”** is a word invented in the thirteenth century to signify having >> Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to identify their subject, and >> possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any single man >> or group of men, or not. Thus, the substance of a dream is not Real, since >> it was such as it was, merely in that a dreamer so dreamed it; but the fact >> of the dream is Real, if it was dreamed; since if so, its date, the name of >> the dreamer, etc. make up a set of circumstances sufficient to distinguish >> it from all other events; and these belong to it, i.e. would be true if >> predicated of it, whether A, B, or C Actually ascertains them or not.*” >> >> *[GF: ] *Peirce is saying that the *substance* of the dream is not Real, >> although the *fact* of the dream is. But he has just defined “idea” in >> the *vernacular* sense as “*the substance* of an actual unitary thought >> or fancy” and contrasted that sense with “Idea,” defined as “*anything >> whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, >> regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it*” – >> which has the Reality proper to the first Universe, the Reality of a >> *possibility*. (and *not* the reality of a *substance*. Once this “airy >> nothing” or “anything” does get fully represented, then it has the Actual >> (and perhaps substantial) Reality proper to the second Universe, and if it >> actually represents something *to somebody* (insert sop to Cerberus), >> then it has the Reality proper to the third Universe. To me it seems >> logical enough to regard this insubstantial Being, this *capacity*, as >> the Creator of all three Universes. This would be somewhat analogous to >> regarding abduction as Creator of the hypothesis which, my means of >> deduction, creates a theory which through inductive testing becomes more >> and more substantial. As we all know, abduction is the only source of new >> ideas; perhaps Firstness is the only source of Ideas. Likewise we might >> regard the dreamer as Creator of the dream *and* of the fact of the >> dream *and* of whatever might be predicated of it (i.e. of its meaning, >> if it has any). Thirdness, on the other hand, has *connective* rather >> than *creative* power: “*The third Universe** comprises everything whose >> Being consists in active power to establish connections between different >> objects, especially between objects in different Universes.*” >> >> [resuming JAS:] What I quoted above from CP 6.483 and EP 2.448 suggests >> the possibility that only two of the three Universes have a Creator >> independent of them, which raises the question of which one might not. >> Peirce provided a major clue in CP 6.490: >> >> A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium* >> would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A >> disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that >> it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every previous >> time. But in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable >> of thinking … Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far as it is >> manifested in time, appear as having a character related to the >> habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is related to uniformity. >> >> According to Peirce, then, God is "pure mind," and thus in some sense may >> not be *completely *independent of the Universe of Mind (i.e., >> Thirdness), while nevertheless being the independent Creator of the other >> two Universes--of Ideas and ideal possibilities (i.e., Firstness), and of >> Matter and physical facts (i.e., Secondness). >> >> What does all of this have to do with cosmology? By 1908, Peirce >> apparently no longer held (if he ever did) that Firstness came first, so to >> speak; God *created* Firstness (and Secondness), but God Himself *is* >> Thirdness. Furthermore, what exactly did God create when He created >> Firstness? Peirce once again supplied the answer in CP 6.490: >> >> In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before or >> after the evolution of time, there must then have been a tohu-bohu of which >> nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally. There must >> have been, therefore, a little of everything conceivable. >> >> In other words, there was an infinite range of vague possibilities, >> consistent with Peirce's evolving mathematical definition of a >> *continuum*, which is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness. >> >> *[GF: ] *But I think you will agree that *possibility* is the logical >> equivalent of Firstness, not Thirdness. Peirce at this stage in his >> thinking often identified continuity with generality, and he wrote c.1905 >> that “The generality of the possible” is “the only true generality” (CP >> 5.533). So I don’t think continuity is confined to Thirdness; and I think >> Gary Richmond has argued that the ur-continuum or *tohu bohu* >> represented by the blackboard in Peirce’s famous cosmology lecture is the >> first Universe, which comprises “vague possibilities.” —Anyway, that’s >> all I have time for today, so I’ll leave the rest to you, for now! >> >> He continued: >> >> There must have been here and there a little undifferentiated tendency to >> take super-habits. But such a state must tend to *increase itself*. >> For a tendency to act in any way, combined with a tendency to take habits, >> must increase the tendency to act in that way. Now substitute in this >> general statement for "tendency to act in any way" a tendency to take >> habits, and we see that that tendency would grow. It would also become >> differentiated in various ways. >> >> The tendency to take habits is another paradigmatic manifestation of >> Thirdness, and Peirce had suggested thirty years earlier in "A Guess at the >> Riddle" (CP 1.414, EP 1.279) that "habits of persistency" were precisely >> what enabled substances to achieve permanent existence; i.e., Secondness. >> >> I probably could (and eventually might) say more about CP 6.490, but >> these initial observations are reminiscent of and consistent with the >> famous "blackboard" passage from the last Cambridge Conferences lecture of >> 1898, "The Logic of Continuity" (CP 6.203-209, RLT 261-263). Peirce >> offered a clean blackboard as "a sort of Diagram of the original vague >> potentiality," differing from it by having only two dimensions rather than >> "some indefinite multitude of dimensions." A chalk line drawn on the >> blackboard--by the hand of God, perhaps?--represents a brute discontinuity, >> but it is not really a line itself; it is a surface, one whose continuity >> is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the underlying >> blackboard. The only true line is the limit between the white and black >> areas, "the reaction between two continuous surfaces into which it is >> separated." >> >> Peirce acknowledged that all three categories--whiteness or blackness >> (Firstness), the boundary between them (Secondness), and the continuity of >> each (Thirdness)--are necessary for the reality of the chalk line. >> However, he suggested that the continuity of the blackboard (Thirdness) is >> primordial in the sense that its reality somehow precedes and sustains that >> of *anything* drawn upon it. A chalk line that persists, rather than >> being erased, represents the establishment of a habit--which is also >> entirely derived from and dependent on the continuity of the underlying >> blackboard: >> >> This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and >> as such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity. It must have its >> origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality. >> Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is >> essentially general. >> >> As additional lines are drawn and persist, they join together under other >> habits to constitute a "reacting system." Eventually, "out of one of these >> Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of >> existence in which we happen to be." So Peirce reaffirmed here that the >> law of mind, which is the law of habit, is primordial in the sense that all >> physical laws are derived from it (cf. CP 6.24-25). Furthermore, according >> to Peirce, God as "pure mind," as well as the universal tendency to take >> habits and the "Platonic worlds" of Ideas and ideal possibilities, were and >> are *real* prior to--and hence apart from--the world of Matter and >> physical facts that now *exists*. His position was an "extreme >> scholastic realism," indeed! >> >> Regards, >> >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
