Gary R., List: Jappy's paper is from earlier this year, and his book is not even out yet, so his hypothesis obviously has not been vetted much so far. I agree that he may be overstating the magnitude of Peirce's alleged change in theoretical framework; I brought it up because I find it interesting and would like to know if it holds any water. Ditto for my impression that Peirce referred only to Universes rather than Categories late in his life; I have no agenda there and would welcome evidence to the contrary. Your point about his isolation during that time period is well-taken.
Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:59 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jeff, Jon, List, > > *JD: Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to > different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between > subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.* > > > *The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's > theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes. How do we reconcile your > summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that > Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories? Which > 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of > being" or "universes of discourse"?* > > > I am again tending to think, perhaps along with Jeff, that it is possible > to make too much of this "shift in Peirce's theoretical framework that > Jappy hypothesizes." It is, after all, a mere hypothesis. Who else is > supporting this hypothesis? How might it be tested? > > *JD: I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the > realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his > later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and > was operating as this very high level of the discussion.* > > > *My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking > about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about > Universes. Jappy specifically claims that but I am not entirely sure that > this is also true in other areas.* > > > Jon, I think your impression that Peirce stopped talking about Categories > altogether in his later writings, and only talked about Universes" may > indeed be wrong (there may even be a kind of unconscious hidden agenda at > play here), so that until we have something more than Jappy's "claims" > (this will require considerably more research, I think), it is hard for me > to imagine that Peirce would reject his near life long championing of > Categories (which I think he held to be of as great significance as his > pragmatism, trichotomic semiotics, and Existential Graphs) for a *mere* > metaphysical facet of them. > > In addition, late in the career of a man as isolated as Peirce was, with > not many opportunites for publication at this point in his in life, that he > doesn't necessarily make a point of discussing his categories as such may > even suggest that they have become so much a part of his thinking that they > "go without saying." So, this seemingly single-minded emphasis on Jaffy's > hypothesis re: Universes, I find a bit troubling, I must admit. > > JD: My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my > daughter’s health issues. > > > Jeff, I think I have a sense, especially from getting to know you a bit at > the International Peirce Centennial Congress at UMass, Lowell, a couple of > years ago, of how difficult this has been for you for some time now, and I > can only now commend your strength and perseverance in the face of these > tremendous challenges. You, your daughter, and all your family will be in > my thoughts now and daily. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Jeff, List: >> >> JD: Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to >> different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between >> subjects that belong to different universes of discourse. >> >> >> The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's >> theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes. How do we reconcile your >> summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that >> Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories? Which >> 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of >> being" or "universes of discourse"? >> >> JD: I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the >> realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his >> later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and >> was operating as this very high level of the discussion. >> >> >> My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking >> about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about >> Universes. Jappy specifically claims that "after 1906 Peirce never again >> employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs," but I >> am not entirely sure that this is also true in other areas. >> >> JD: My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my >> daughter’s health issues. >> >> >> Prayers are ascending for your daughter, as well as for you and the rest >> of your family. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 5:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Gary F, List, >>> >>> How might we think about the relationship between the categories and the >>> universes? First, let's note that he uses these terms in a number of >>> different ways in different contexts. For instance, in the Harvard Lectures >>> of 1903, he provides a phenomenological account of the universal categories >>> that are found in all possible experience. In other places, such as his >>> work on algebraic and diagrammatic systems of logic, he provides a logical >>> account of the categories and universes that employed >>> when making assertions and drawing inferences. In what follows, I will >>> focus on the latter distinction (hence the change in the subject heading >>> for this post). >>> >>> For the sake of clarity, let's start by focusing our attention on one >>> place where he talks about categories and universes. Here is what Peirce >>> says about relations of reference and referential relations on the opening >>> pages of "Nomenclature and Division of Dyadic Relations": >>> >>> The broadest division of dyadic relations is into those which can only >>> subsist between two subjects of different categories of being (as between >>> an existing individual and a quality) and those which can subsist between >>> two subjects of the same category. A relation of the former kind may >>> advantageously be termed a *reference*; a relation of the latter kind, >>> a *dyadic relation proper*. A dyadic relation proper is either such as >>> can only have place between two subjects of different universes of >>> discourse (as the membership of a natural person in a corporation), or is >>> such as can subsist between two objects of the same universe. A relation of >>> the former description may be termed a *referential relation*; a >>> relation of the latter description, a *rerelation*. (CP 3.573). >>> >>> Notice what he says about relations of reference and referential >>> relations. Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong >>> to different *categories* of being. Referential relations subsist >>> between subjects that belong to different *universes* of discourse. >>> >>> >>> >>> For my part, I think Peirce is engaged a discussion the way that he >>> plans to handle these sort of relations in (1) his formal systems of >>> algebraic logic and existential graphs (both of which are mathematical >>> systems of logic) and (2) in his speculative grammar and critical logic as >>> two parts of his semiotic theory. His aim is to rethink the >>> mathematical systems so that he can then use them as tools in his >>> philosophical inquiries in semiotics. He sees that there are a number of >>> problems with the systems that Kempe and Schroder have developed, and he is >>> draw on the obvious shortcomings in these two formal systems for the sake >>> of gaining insight into how he might further develop his own >>> systems--especially the existential graphs. >>> >>> While there are a number of difficult issues that he is trying to >>> grapple with in this essay, it seems to me that one of the prominent >>> concerns is how to handle the quantifiers and modal operators in these >>> logical systems. In particular, I think he is worrying about the >>> relationships between the realms that the quantifiers and modal operators >>> each range over in the different sorts of assertions that make use of such >>> logical conceptions. >>> >>> >>> >>> He adds the following remark about his limited aims in this essay: >>> >>> >>> >>> The author's writings on the logic of relations were substantially >>> restricted to >>> >>> existential relations; and the same restriction will be continued in the >>> body of what >>> >>> here follows. A note at the end of this section will treat of modal >>> relations. (CP, 3.574) >>> >>> >>> >>> He sees the limitations that are involved in restricting the formal >>> systems to existential relations. Now that he is ready to make the move >>> from the alpha and beta systems of the existential graphs to the gamma >>> system, he is trying to sort through the thorny issues involved in >>> understanding the realms over which different sorts of modal assertions >>> (e.g. it is logically necessary that, it is metaphysically necessary that, >>> it is physically necessary that, etc.) range over, and it is not obvious >>> what will be needed once we allow the formal system to express operations >>> of hypostatic abstraction so that the predicates that are formed on the >>> basis of such operations may themselves be treated as objects for further >>> inquiry. Given the fact that such predicates may themselves have the >>> character of what is possible or what is a necessary rule, we now have a >>> system where the quantifiers may range over objects having different >>> modal characteristics. >>> >>> >>> >>> Here is a point that he makes about modal dyadic relations in the >>> appended part of the essay: >>> >>> >>> >>> Dyadic relations between symbols, or concepts, are matters of logic, so far >>> as they are not derived from relations between the objects and the >>> characters to which the symbols refer. Noting that we are limiting >>> ourselves to modal *dyadic *relations, it may probably be said that >>> those of them that are truly and fundamentally dyadic arise from >>> corresponding relations between propositions. To exemplify what is meant, >>> the dyadic relations of logical *breadth *and *depth, *often called >>> denotation and connotation, have played a great part in logical >>> discussions, but these take their origin in the triadic relation between a >>> sign, its object, and its interpretant sign; and furthermore, the >>> distinction appears as a dichotomy owing to the limitation of the field of >>> thought, which forgets that concepts grow, and that there is thus a >>> third respect in which they may differ, depending on the state of >>> knowledge, or amount of information. To give a good and complete account of >>> the dyadic relations of concepts would be impossible without taking into >>> account the triadic relations which, for the most part, underlie them; and >>> indeed almost a complete treatise upon the first of the three divisions >>> of logic would be required. (3.608) >>> >>> >>> >>> The issue Peirce is highlighting here is a problem for any system of >>> mathematics—including systems of algebraic logic and the existential >>> graphs. How should the systems be constructed so that they embody the >>> growth of the very concepts that are being modeled in the systems? >>> >>> >>> >>> Peirce describes the special problems that crop up when we move back and >>> forth between quantifiers and the modal operators that extend over the >>> realms of physical objects that might stand in relations of necessity or >>> contingency and quantifiers and modal operators that range over logical >>> conceptions and relations when he makes the following remark about some >>> assertions that Dr. Carus has made: >>> >>> >>> >>> Yet philosophical necessity is a special case of universality. But the >>> universality, or better, the generality, of a pure form involves no >>> necessity. It is only when the form is materialized that the distinction >>> between necessity and freedom makes itself plain. These ideas are, >>> therefore, >>> as it seems to me, of a mixed nature. CP 6.592 (also see CP 5.223) >>> >>> To put the idea in simpler terms, I think Peirce is pointing out that >>> the quantifiers and the modal operators range over pretty much the same >>> realms (i.e., the widest realm of all that is possible) when we move up to >>> the level of philosophical necessity (i.e., the laws of logic and the laws >>> of metaphysics). So, to address a question that Jon S and Gary F posed a >>> bit ago, I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the >>> realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his >>> later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and >>> was operating as this very high level of the discussion. He saw that the >>> distinction could be dropped because, at this high level “philosophical >>> necessity is a special case of universality.” >>> >>> >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> >>> >>> PS My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my >>> daughter’s health issues. As such, I will try to jump in when I am able but >>> may be absent from the discussion for some time when these more >>> personal matters are more pressing. >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca] >>> Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 3:03 PM >>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>> >>> Jon, Gary R et al., >>> >>> I’ve been away for a couple of days and haven’t yet caught up with the >>> discussion. However I’ve done a bit of searching through Peirce’s late >>> texts to see whether I could confirm your suggestion that Peirce “seems to >>> have shifted toward discussing "Universes" rather than "categories.” I >>> found a couple of extended discussions of the difference between >>> “Categories” and “Universes,” one in the “Prologemena” of 1906. But I also >>> found two other places where Peirce writes of “the three Universes”: the >>> long letter to Welby of Dec. 1908 (EP2:478 ff.) and a 1909 letter to James >>> (EP2:497). He doesn’t refer to Categories in these letters, so that would >>> seem to support your suggestion. I found very little that uses either term >>> from 1909 on. >>> >>> I see that Gary R. has corrected me on my reference to the >>> ‘ur-continuity’, and I’ll leave any further comments on that until I catch >>> up with the thread. >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>
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