Clark, List: CG: I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or RLT rather than CP for reasons like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out the dates - although perhaps that’s me)
It is not just you--I have come to despise not only the arbitrarily jumbled topical arrangement of the Collected Papers, but also the need to find just the right footnote in order to determine the date of any particular passage, which is often associated with an earlier paragraph than the one of interest. Those dates are not entirely reliable, either. A good example of the problems that can arise is a fairly recent (and very interesting) paper on "A Neglected Argument" that still dated CP 6.486-491 to 1910, despite the EP footnotes explaining that this is actually the *first *(unpublished) additament that Peirce wrote in 1908; and treated CP 6.492-493 as part of the original article written in 1908, even though the accompanying footnote states plainly that it is "From an unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > CP 6.185-213 is the manuscript text for the eighth and final Cambridge > Conferences lecture and actually dates from 1898, not 1892-1893--thus > coming *after* Peirce became a full-blown three-category realist, > according to Fisch. The PDF that you linked is how it appears in the > stand-alone volume containing those lectures, *Reasoning and the Logic of > Things*, edited by Ketner and Putnam. > > Yeah I was confused on that. I have *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* and > knew the delivery date. But the introduction for the CP 6 put the date as > earlier. So I started to think it was a preliminary text. (I’m at work so I > don’t have access to my library - I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or > RLT rather than CP for reasons like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out > the dates - although perhaps that’s me) Thanks for clearing that up. That > explains why it’s so modal realist. > > Is there a plausible way to integrate the two mentions of a blackboard > into a single diagram? Could it be that the one in NEM 4.345 (RLT 162-163) > corresponds to "a Platonic world" in CP 6.203-208 (RLT 261-263)? In other > words ... > > - The "clean blackboard" represents "a continuum of some indefinite > multitude of dimensions" [3ns] (CP 6.203). > - The initial chalk mark represents "a springing up of something new" > [1ns] whose continuity "is nothing but the original continuity of the > blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous" (CP 6.203). > - Persistent groups of such chalk marks represent "reacting systems" > [2ns] that result when "the generalizing tendency [3ns] builds up new > habits from chance occurrences [1ns]" (CP 6.206). > - Some of these "reacting systems" aggregate together into multiple > "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.207-208). > - Eventually, "a discontinuous mark" [2ns] is differentiated out of > one of them as "this [determinate] Universe of Actual Existence" (CP 6.208, > NEM 4.345). > > I think it does given the explicit reference to platonism. > > What I have in mind here is Peirce's notion that every part of a true > continuum is itself a true continuum. Since each Platonic world is > represented by a merged collection of marks on the blackboard, the latter > is *also *a blackboard; or perhaps we should distinguish it, for the sake > of clarity, by calling it a "whiteboard" whose own continuity is derived > from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. It is then "a > discontinuous mark" on the whiteboard, which is itself a merged collection > of white marks on the original clean blackboard, that represents "this > Universe of Actual Existence." > > Yes I think this is right. It gets at the issues we’ve been discussing. > Although I hasten to add I’ve not read the full exchange from last week yet. >
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