> On Oct 26, 2016, at 10:01 AM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > I am wondering, whether it is helpful at all to ponder about "nothing", > because I doubt that it can be more than a myth. Same with beginning, > creation, tychism, and platonic ideas. I have the hypothesis, that > reverse-engineering is not possible if you only have the status quo, and no > symbolic second documentary. You can reverse-engineer the derivation of > species, because you have the DNA of existing ones for symbolic documentary. > But in the physicochemical realm there is no such documentary, not even the > background radiation, which is not symbolic, but indexical. So, this is > merely a hypothesis: Myths cannot be falsified or verified (demythicized) > merely with indices and icons. Is that so??
Normally I’d agree but I think that this really depends upon how one is using the terms. If it’s in the more pejorative sense of myth then I’d agree it’s not too terribly fruitful. I think Peirce though is being very careful. In that way he’s doing something different from say the Timaeus even if he is undoubtedly influenced by it. He’s quite clear I think as to what he means by the positive sense of nothing. I think his analysis is thus very important and not all mythic the way bad platonism is. (There’s a reason why platonism came to have such a bad reputation due to mystics and romantics in the 18th and 19th century) I’d add that while I’m less patient with the more metaphoric language in the Continental tradition, there is a reason to use such language. It’s a kind of logic of vagueness. While I much prefer the way Peirce deals with a logic of vagueness there is a method to the madness in Continental philosophy. I think the danger is that people who aren’t so careful do descend into a kind of word mysticism where it becomes clear they’re just aping words in a manner they think is acceptable but don’t mean anything by it. I don’t think the important figures like Heidegger are doing that even if they are not always successful. In a way Peirce’s own often confusing neologisms play a similar role. Just perhaps with quite the genealogical mythic etymology that besets Heideggers and others in that particular phenomenological tradition. Finally I’d say that while there are great reasons to find the classic platonists annoying, there are pretty good reasons why their common metaphors remain in play even today. They can be quite helpful to helping one mentally grasp pretty difficult concepts. While Peirce thankfully doesn’t make use of all their metaphors, (no breaking of vessels and light flowing down into containers) the places he does use them he often has very good reasons to use them. (IMO)
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