> On Nov 3, 2016, at 5:01 PM, Søren Brier <sb....@cbs.dk> wrote: > > I agree that Pierce claims that to do science you must have faith in the > possibility of finding truth and that knowing is connected to thirdness. I > wonder if it has anything to do with agapism?
I think in the places he uses faith he means something closer to hope. (Which is one of the strong senses of faith) Of course course 1 Cor 13:10-13 is relevant here: But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known. And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity. > We know that Peirce’s view is influenced by “a Schelling-fashioned idealism > which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. And Schelling was himself influenced by the Platonists who held those views. I’ve not read it (and I don’t even know if it’s in a translation since I don’t read German) but apparently he had a well regarded commentary on Plato’s Timaeus which is relevant to all these. Some see Schelling’s philosophy as a mixture or even conflation of Plato and Kant. Which is interesting since in many ways that describes Peirce as well. I know John Sallis’ commentary on the Timaeus (very Continental styled philosophy so I suspect many here wouldn’t like it) grapples with Schelling there quite a bit. I really liked that little book of Sallis’ and think it quite relevant. While Kelly Parker never brings it up, the earlier Peirce’s use of substance fits quite closely to Schelling as represented by Sallis. (Again I’ve not read Schelling here so I can’t speak to the actual text itself) > CP 6.102, so Emerson and his over-soul may also have some influence, but I > have only found him twice in SP. I agree that Peirce avoids the concept of > demiurge and thereby all the discussions of the good and evil of that concept. > That wasn’t what I said. Quite the opposite. I was saying that Peirce’s process God in many ways is Plato’s demiurge. It’s not God as this origin but God as these creative principle that brings form to receptacle. That’s also why it has to be real but not actual given the logic of the Timaeus. In Christianity likely due to gnosticism the demiurge had a rather bad reputation. With Spinoza due to his Jewish background you don’t see that. Admittedly ‘Nature’ as Spinoza’s demiurge lacks the agent/choice aspects that the demiurge has. There’s also arguably in most readings the elimination of teleology. Both those elements are brought back by Peirce although the swerve as chance but also choice is perhaps a bit more ambiguous. > Hartshorne has analyzed the concept of Good in many religious philosophies. I > wonder why his interpretations do not come up in these discussion. He is a > highly recognized theologian and Peirce scholar. > Hartshorne did have some odd views on Peirce though. He thought Peirce’s secondness was wrong for instance as I recall. I have some of Hartshorne’s works in my library but I confess I was not enamored of him. I have some friends who absolutely love him though. I just find the places he breaks from Peirce as problematic as Peirce found James’ breaks. > One other way to understand Peirce’s concept of God is that the ‘farther’ or > ‘Godhead’ is the type and the ‘son’ is the token and the sign process is the > ‘holy spirit’, but I have never seen that in any of his writings. Yes and that would line up with how he uses the Trinity. But I don’t recall it explicit in anyplace. As I said there was this weird ambiguity between son as mediator and spirit as mediator. Although to be fair this difference between son and holy ghost in its more platonic conception was a key break between the eastern Church and western Church notions of the Trinity. At least as I recall. Again this isn’t my area of specialty.
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