Jacob, Clark, Jon S, John, list, Jacob wrote:
Peirce's classification is not static [. . .] so that a field began as a descriptive science and developed into a classificatory one. As a field's body of understanding grows, it becomes more lawlike because it discovers laws governing that area of inquiry. I think that this is essentially correct in one important, even commanding sense. But the passage Jon quoted from "An Outline Classification of the Sciences" suggests that it the movement might be in two directions. Here's the passage shortened to help bring out the point, I hope. CSP: Nomological physics discovers the ubiquitous phenomena of the physical universe, formulates their laws [. . .] Classificatory physics describes and classifies physical forms *and seeks to explain them by the laws discovered by nomological physics *with *which it ultimately tends to coalesce*. Descriptive physics describes individual objects [. . .] endeavors to explain their phenomena *by the principles of nomological and classificatory physics*, and *tends ultimately itself to become classificatory*. (CP 1.188, emphasis added). At the outset of his discussion of his classification, Peirce comments: It turns out that in most cases the divisions are Trichotomic; the First of the Three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws, the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and endeavoring to explain them (CP 1.180). So, according to this trichotomic schema, Nomological physics, being concerned essentially with discovering laws may be seen to be associated with 3ns, Classificatory physics, in "arranging classes of forms" with 1ns, and Descriptive physics, in "describing individual phenomena" with 2ns. So, employing a trikonic diagram: Classificatory physics (1ns) |> Nomological physics (3ns) Descriptive physics (2ns) So, what I'm suggesting is that while I would tend to agree with Jacob that the movement is principally from Descriptive through Classificatory , to Nomological physics (2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns), following what I've termed the vector (that is, categorial pathway) of *determination*, on the other hand, the passage which Jon quoted (e.g. "Classificatory physics describes and classifies physical forms *and seeks to explain them by the laws discovered by nomological physics") s*uggests that the reverse vector* may* also in play, at least to some extent, that is commencing with--rather than arriving at--Nomological physics (3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns), what I've termed the vector of *representation*. So, for example, Nomonological physics "draws upon metaphysics and upon mathematics *for principles," **not-*-or at least not essentially--from the two other branches of physics in the classification. Indeed, one can see this reverse movement in other parts of the Classification of Sciences (for example, in the three branches of logic as semeiotic). In the present instance, a comparison with Nomonological, Classificatory, and Descriptive Psychics (the other wing of Idioscopy, i.e., the "special sciences") might prove helpful. The Psychical Sciences are discussed at CP 1.187. The above comments are offered as mere suggestions for further inquiry. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Dec 7, 2016 at 2:48 PM, jacob longshore <[email protected]> wrote: > Clark, List, > > > This is an unprepared reply (= my books aren't available to me now), but > if I remember right, Peirce's classification is not static. In the 1898 > lectures on *Reasoning and the Logic of Things *(I think), he mentions > how the various disciplines evolve - even the Platonic forms are dynamic in > this respect - so that a field began as a descriptive science and developed > into a classificatory one. As a field's body of understanding grows, it > becomes more lawlike because it discovers laws governing that area of > inquiry. > > > I don't have my books unpacked yet, so I can't cite pages, but I think > it's in the above work. And I could well be misunderstanding things. But > this is how I recall my understanding (!) of Peirce on his classification > of the sciences. > > > Best, > > Jacob > > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 7, 2016 6:54 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy) > > I’ll confess that much of Peirce’s classification of the sciences never > made much sense to me - if only because in practice anyone actually working > in any field seemed to not fit the category. However the above type of > classifications seem much more useful in that they are talking about > aspects or modes one uses. As John noted these are always at play to > varying degrees in any science. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
