Helmut, List, The trichotomic division of Physical Science (not only physics, but all the physical sciences) which we've been discussing in this thread is that outlined in the third branch of Science of Discovery (= pure, or, theoretical science), that is, *Idioscopy*, or, the Special Sciences. As I'd earlier mentioned ,*Physics* (i.e., Physical Science) is one of two comprising Idioscopy, the other being Psychical Science.
All three divisions of *Science of Discovery*, I.Mathematics, II. Cenoscopy, or Cenoscopic Philosophy (1. phenomenology, 2. normative science == i. theoretical esthetics, ii. theoretical ethics, iii. logic as semeiotic, III metaphysics) are principally concerned with developing *theory*, even though they can--and often quasi-necessarily do--employ examples from the practical sciences and ordinary experience. Helmut wrote: "I guess that about science there is a duality: research and teaching." For Peirce, besides *Science of Discovery* (theoretical research science), there are two other* Grand Divisions of Science*, namely *Science of Review*, which brings scientific findings together in such forms as writings on the philosophy of science, as well as in digests and outlines (including Peirce's own Outline Classification of Science), and, as well, *Practical Science* (applied science). So, I would think that teaching (including university teaching) concerns itself especially with Science of Review since the findings of theoretical science are organized there (*not* in classificatory or observational physics as you suggested). . You wrote: "Surprising observation plus existing hypoteses (like phlogiston): 1ns// experiments and their results: 2ns//modified old, or completely new hypothesis: 3ns." I can't make much sense of your "trichotomy," but its theoretical content at least would find its place in the third division of logic as semeiotic, namely, methodeutic (also called speculative or, theoretical rhetoric), for there one is concerned with all that is involved in, shall we say, optimizing scientific inquiry, especially in a *complete inquiry* involving hypothesis formation, the deduction of the implications of given hypotheses for the purposes of devising experiments to test them, and the inductive testing of them (any given hypothesis may fail the test). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 12:56 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, list, > I guess that about science there is a duality: research and teaching, like > in a university. Now I wonder, whether descriptive science is part of the > investigative/inquiry process (research), or is it a means of communication > with other scientists like colleagues and students, so about teaching? I > mean, does the trichomity "classificatorial physics/ nomological physics/ > descriptive physics" cover the whole scientific area, which is both > research and teaching? And, if one would separate these two functions, eg. > one would focus solely on inquiry/research, then there would be a different > trichotomity? Eg.: Surprising observation plus existing hypoteses (like > phlogiston): 1ns// experiments and their results: 2ns//modified old, or > completely new hypothesis: 3ns. Or something. About the trichotomy > "classification/nomology/description" I would guess, that nomology is a > matter of research only, classification of both research and teaching, and > description of teaching alone. Is that so? > Best, > Helmut > > 07. Dezember 2016 um 22:09 Uhr > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > > Jacob, Clark, Jon S, John, list, > > Jacob wrote: > > > Peirce's classification is not static [. . .] so that a field began as a > descriptive science and developed into a classificatory one. As a field's > body of understanding grows, it becomes more lawlike because it discovers > laws governing that area of inquiry. > > > I think that this is essentially correct in one important, even commanding > sense. But the passage Jon quoted from "An Outline Classification of the > Sciences" suggests that it the movement might be in two directions. Here's > the passage shortened to help bring out the point, I hope. > > CSP: Nomological physics discovers the ubiquitous phenomena of the > physical universe, formulates their laws [. . .] Classificatory physics > describes and classifies physical forms *and seeks to explain them by the > laws discovered by nomological physics *with *which it ultimately tends > to coalesce*. Descriptive physics describes individual objects [. . .] > endeavors to explain their phenomena *by the principles of nomological > and classificatory physics*, and *tends ultimately itself to become > classificatory*. (CP 1.188, emphasis added). > > At the outset of his discussion of his classification, Peirce comments: > > > It turns out that in most cases the divisions are Trichotomic; the First > of the Three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second > arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws, > the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and > endeavoring to explain them (CP 1.180). > > > So, according to this trichotomic schema, Nomological physics, being > concerned essentially with discovering laws may be seen to be associated > with 3ns, Classificatory physics, in "arranging classes of forms" with 1ns, > and Descriptive physics, in "describing individual phenomena" with 2ns. So, > employing a trikonic diagram: > > Classificatory physics (1ns) > |> Nomological physics (3ns) > Descriptive physics (2ns) > > > So, what I'm suggesting is that while I would tend to agree with Jacob > that the movement is principally from Descriptive through Classificatory , > to Nomological physics (2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns), following what I've termed the > vector (that is, categorial pathway) of *determination*, on the other > hand, the passage which Jon quoted (e.g. "Classificatory physics > describes and classifies physical forms *and seeks to explain them by the > laws discovered by nomological physics") s*uggests that the reverse vector* > may* also in play, at least to some extent, that is commencing > with--rather than arriving at--Nomological physics (3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns), > what I've termed the vector of *representation*. > > So, for example, Nomonological physics "draws upon metaphysics and upon > mathematics *for principles," **not-*-or at least not essentially--from > the two other branches of physics in the classification. > > Indeed, one can see this reverse movement in other parts of the > Classification of Sciences (for example, in the three branches of logic as > semeiotic). In the present instance, a comparison with Nomonological, > Classificatory, and Descriptive Psychics (the other wing of Idioscopy, > i.e., the "special sciences") might prove helpful. The Psychical Sciences > are discussed at CP 1.187. > > The above comments are offered as mere suggestions for further inquiry. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Dec 7, 2016 at 2:48 PM, jacob longshore <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> Clark, List, >> >> >> >> This is an unprepared reply (= my books aren't available to me now), but >> if I remember right, Peirce's classification is not static. In the 1898 >> lectures on *Reasoning and the Logic of Things *(I think), he mentions >> how the various disciplines evolve - even the Platonic forms are dynamic in >> this respect - so that a field began as a descriptive science and developed >> into a classificatory one. As a field's body of understanding grows, it >> becomes more lawlike because it discovers laws governing that area of >> inquiry. >> >> >> >> I don't have my books unpacked yet, so I can't cite pages, but I think >> it's in the above work. And I could well be misunderstanding things. But >> this is how I recall my understanding (!) of Peirce on his classification >> of the sciences. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Jacob >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 7, 2016 6:54 PM >> *To:* Peirce-L >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy) >> >> I’ll confess that much of Peirce’s classification of the sciences never >> made much sense to me - if only because in practice anyone actually working >> in any field seemed to not fit the category. However the above type of >> classifications seem much more useful in that they are talking about >> aspects or modes one uses. As John noted these are always at play to >> varying degrees in any science. >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ > peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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