Jon, Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine of Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts and comments.
Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > > List: > > I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his > opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently > preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone ever > tried to figure out why? In a new book, Peirce's Empiricism: Its Roots and > Its Originality, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be that he thinks > 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's katholou," or because "laws > are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most," and "propositions > expressing such laws are not universal propositions ... but are general > propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51). > > On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular," while > "general" is opposed to "singular." All of these identify types of > propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is > indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and > particular (some). Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type of > generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically, individuals > are actualized from a continuum of potentiality. > > Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be > appreciated. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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