Jon A., List: Thanks for that. I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found it quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's *Dictionary *appeared in print. Rosa Mayorga pointed to a considerably earlier passage from a draft of "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in her book, *From Realism to "Realicism": The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce*.
Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both whose subject and predicate are general terms. And, therefore, it is not merely the case, as we saw before, that universals have reality on this theory, but also that there are nothing but universals which have an immediate reality. But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the sense of that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider sense of that which can be only in one place at one time. It will be convenient to call the former singular and the latter only an individual … Now a knowledge that cognition is not wholly determined by cognition is a knowledge of something external to the mind, that is the singulars. Singulars therefore have a reality. But singulars in general is not singular but general. We can cognize any part of the singulars however determinate, but however determinate the part it is still general. And therefore what I maintain is that while singulars are real they are so only in their generality; but singulars in their absolute discrimination or singularity are mere ideals … In short, those things which we call singulars exist, but the character of singularity which we attribute to them is self-contradictory. With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these are called individuals. They are generals that is, not singulars, because these latter occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one date. (W2:180-181; 1868) Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a general, which seems to render nominalism--the view that everything real is singular, so nothing real is general--effectively self-refuting. He defined an individual as a collection of singulars joined across places and times, which is thus general when taken as a whole. Furthermore, *absolute *singulars are "mere ideals," such that (ironically) an individual is really a *continuum *as Peirce came to understand that concept decades later. Consequently, anything that we cognize *about *individuals is *necessarily *general, rather than singular. This suggests to me the following argument for realism. P1. All singulars are absolutely determinate. P2. No objects of thought are absolutely determinate. C1. Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars. P3. If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects of thought are generals. C2. Therefore, all objects of thought are generals. P4. Some objects of thought are real. C3. Therefore, some generals are real. My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions of terms, so the nominalist must deny one of the other two premisses in order to deny the conclusion. Rejecting P2 amounts to claiming that we can ascertain that an object of thought has or does not have every conceivable predicate; but those are infinite, and our minds are finite, so this is impossible. Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that we have no genuine knowledge of reality--i.e., that it consists entirely of incognizable "things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely the view for which Peirce frequently criticized nominalists, because it blocks the way of inquiry. Regards, Jon S. On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Here is one page: > > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, > > Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine > of Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts and comments. > > Regards, > > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List: > > I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his > opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently > preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone > ever tried to figure out why? In a new book, *Peirce's Empiricism: Its > Roots and Its Originality*, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be > that he thinks 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's *katholou*," > or because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most," > and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions ... > but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51). > > On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular," > while "general" is opposed to "singular." All of these identify types of > propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is > indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and > particular (some). Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type > of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically, > individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality. > > Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be > appreciated. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >
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