Jon, list:

Jon, list:



Consider this usage selected by Kennedy:



“Peirce showed that historians are in error when they talk of judging
testimony by balancing probabilities because “in a scientific sense, there
are no ‘probabilities’ to be judged.”  Probability, Peirce wrote, “is the
ratio of the frequency of occurrence of a specific event to a generic
event.”  A testimony “is neither a specific event, nor a generic event, but
an individual event.”



Peirce further pointed out that what people were justifying by claiming
Balancing Likelihoods was really simply relating “what they prefer to do”
to what they don’t prefer. ... “Likelihood is merely a reflection of our
preconceived ideas.”



Also this from Peirce’s criticism of Hume’s definition of miracles:



“…a statement is only a law of nature if it is true, general (or
universal), and contingent. It must be general to be a law, and it must be
contingent to be a law of nature rather than a law of logic (‘all bachelors
are unmarried’ is true and general, but not a law of nature!).”



Now consider:



All generals are universals                                    All G (M)
are U (P)

*All particulars are generals*                                    *All P
(S) are G (M)*

Therefore, all particulars are universals                All P (S) are U (P)



Vs.



All universals are generals

*All singulars (individual events) are universals*

Therefore, all singulars are generals



_______





Hth,

Jerry R

On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 5:54 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine
> of Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts and comments.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> List:
>
> I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his
> opposition to various forms of nominalism.  He seems to have consistently
> preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone
> ever tried to figure out why?  In a new book, *Peirce's Empiricism:  Its
> Roots and Its Originality*, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be
> that he thinks 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's *katholou*,"
> or because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most,"
> and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions ...
> but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51).
>
> On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular,"
> while "general" is opposed to "singular."  All of these identify types of
> propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is
> indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and
> particular (some).  Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type
> of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically,
> individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality.
>
> Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be
> appreciated.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
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