Jon, Ben, list, I too agree with both of you on this. Hookway is helpful here. See especially 0.5 of The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and pragmatism
https://ucdenver.instructure.com/courses/339417/files/3199485/download?download_frd=1 Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Ben, List: > > I agree; that is why I acknowledged the distinction between unembodied > qualities as medads (feelings) and embodied qualities as monadic predicates > (concepts). > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 10:49 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Jon S., list, >> >> I don't have a quote handy, but Peirce said specifically that the >> pragmatic maxim is for clarifying not qualities of feeling, but >> conceptions. I suppose that that could include conceptions of qualities of >> feeling, but not the qualities of feeling themselves. A mechanical quality >> (such as the unscratchability or 'hardness' of a diamond) is not a quality >> of feeling. Instead it's an if-then property that we think of as a quality >> as if of feeling. Peirce said something to that effect, but it may take a >> while for me to dig it up. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 1/9/2017 11:07 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> >> Ben, List: >> >> BU: This rule-style of formulation reflects a major difference between >> Peirce's generals and Peirce's qualities of feeling which are generals when >> reflected on but are not rules and are not formulated as rules. >> >> I am not convinced that there is a significant difference here, at least >> when it comes to applying the pragmatic maxim in order to ascertain the >> meanings of our concepts of qualities--as *monadic* predicates embodied >> in *actual* things--at the third grade of clearness. As with generals, >> we define them using a subjunctive conditional that is true regardless of >> whether the relevant test is ever actually performed. "For all *x* , if >> *x* is hard, then *x* would resist scratching." "For all *x* , if *x* >> is red, then *x* would primarily reflect light at wavelengths between >> 620 nm and 750 nm." The difference is that qualities are also real as >> *medads* --possibilities not predicated of anything actual, but simply >> being what they are independently of anything else. >> >> BU: At first I thought I knew what you meant, but somehow it's become >> less clear to me, I can't even recapture what I at first thought you meant. >> I'm trying to put it in the context of your regarding the use of the word >> "general" as evoking the possibility of exceptions. >> >> It was not really about that; more the idea that a general as a continuum >> whose multiple instantiations are *different* --even if only >> infinitesimally *distinguishable* --seems more plausible than a >> universal whose multiple instantiations are somehow supposed to be >> *identical* . >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 4:52 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com > >> wrote: >> >> Jon S., list, >> >> _*Universum* _ in the sense of the whole world goes back at least to >> Cicero in the 1st Century B.C. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h >> opper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Duniversus >> >> You wrote, >> >> Note also Peirce's stance that universal propositions do not assert the >> existence of anything. So "if a cat, then a mammal" could be true even if >> neither cats nor mammals exist. >> [End quote] >> >> Yes, that's my point about "if a cat, then a mammal" - as a compound term >> in the form Cx→Mx, it's true of absolutely everything in the world (the >> actual world, at least), and this is reflected by the usual kind of logical >> formulation "For all *x* , if *x* is a cat, then *x* is a mammal" (i.e., >> "For all *x* : *x* is not a cat and/or *x* is a mammal"). This >> rule-style of formulation reflects a major difference between Peirce's >> generals and Peirce's qualities of feeling which are generals when >> reflected on but are not rules and are not formulated as rules. With the >> conditional form "Cx→Mx", Peirce's generals are maximally general in a >> sense, just not pertinent in all cases. As you note, it doesn't entail the >> existence of anything, at least not of anything in particular (in Peirce's >> view a universe of discourse smaller than two objects should be ruled out, >> so the existence of at least two objects is automatically, if not always >> relevantly, entailed by any term or proposition in a Peircean universe). >> >> You wrote: >> >> Peirce's identification of generality with continuity leads me to think >> that every general is a continuum of possibilities. Hence multiple >> instantiations of the same general are not identical, just different parts >> of the same continuum, which is why they are continua themselves and not >> necessarily distinguishable from each other. >> >> At first I thought I knew what you meant, but somehow it's become less >> clear to me, I can't even recapture what I at first thought you meant. I'm >> trying to put it in the context of your regarding the use of the word >> "general" as evoking the possibility of exceptions. >> >> Anyway, your idea that Peirce chose "general" because it suggests the >> possibility of exceptions remains appealing. One could extend the idea to >> include the possibility of growth and evolution (as of a genus, and as of a >> symbol); the idea of the "universal" true of absolutely everything seems >> somehow more static and uniform. Mathematics could get away with it because >> of mathematics' having its counterbalancing imaginative freedom, but for >> the other things "general" seems better. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
