Dear list:
Good idea but before Superman, perhaps we should deal with the universe of relations between sophistry and philosophy: There is a great illustration that depicts this difference between eros and epithumia in Benardete’s Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, c.f., Fig.1, *Introduction*. And lest it be said Peirce did not have a sense of humor, from *Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities:* “There are two ways in which deceptive sophisms may result from this circumstance. In the first place, contradictory propositions are never both true. Now, as a universal proposition may be true when the subject does not exist, it follows that the contradictory of a universal -- that is, a particular -- cannot be taken in such a sense as to be true when the subject does not exist. But a particular simply asserts a part of what is asserted in the universal over it; therefore, the universal over it asserts the subject to exist. Consequently, there are two kinds of universals, those which do not assert the subject to exist, and these have no particular propositions under them, and those which do assert that the subject exists, and these strictly speaking have no contradictories. For example, there is no use of such a form of proposition as "Some griffins would be dreadful animals," as particular under the useful form "The griffin would be a dreadful animal"; and the apparent contradictories " All of John Smith's family are ill," and "Some of John Smith's family are not ill," are both false at once if John Smith has no family. Here, though an inference from a universal to the particular under it is always valid, yet a procedure which greatly resembles this would be sophistical if the universal were one of those propositions which does not assert the existence of its subject. The following sophism depends upon this; I call it the True Gorgias: *Gorgias.* What say you, Socrates, of black? Is any black, white? *Socrates.* No, by Zeus! *Gor.* Do you say, then, that no black is white? *Soc.* None at all. *Gor.* But is everything either black or non-black? *Soc.* Of course. *Gor.* And everything either white or non-white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* And everything either rough or smooth? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* And everything either real or unreal? *Soc.* Oh, bother! yes. *Gor.* Do you say, then, that all black is either rough black or smooth black? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* And that all white is either real white or unreal white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* And yet is no black, white? *Soc.* None at all. *Gor.* Nor no white, black? *Soc.* By no means. *Gor.* What? Is no smooth black, white? *Soc.* No; you cannot prove that, Gorgias. *Gor.* Nor no rough black, white? *Soc.* Neither. *Gor.* Nor no real white, black? *Soc.* No. *Gor.* Nor no unreal white, black? *Soc.* No, I say. No white at all is black. *Gor.* What if black is smooth, is it not white? *Soc.* Not in the least. *Gor.* And if the last is false, is the first false? *Soc.* It follows. *Gor.* If, then, black is white, does it follow, that black is not smooth? *Soc.* It does. *Gor.* Black-white is not smooth? *Soc.* What do you mean? *Gor.* Can any dead man speak? *Soc.* No, indeed. *Gor.* And is any speaking man dead? *Soc.* I say, no. *Gor.* And is any good king tyrannical? *Soc.* No. *Gor.* And is any tyrannical king good? *Soc.* I just said no. *Gor.* And you said, too, that no rough black is white, did you not? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Then, is any black-white, rough? *Soc.* No. *Gor.* And is any unreal black, white? *Soc.* No. *Gor.* Then, is any black-white unreal? *Soc.* No. *Gor.* No black-white is rough? *Soc.* None. *Gor.* All black-white, then, is non-rough? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* And all black-white, non-unreal? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* All black-white is then smooth? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* And all real? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Some smooth, then, is black-white? *Soc.* Of course. *Gor.* And some real is black-white? *Soc.* So it seems. *Gor.* Some black-white smooth is black-white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Some black smooth is black-white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Some black smooth is white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Some black real is black-white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Some black real is white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Some real black is white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* And some smooth black is white? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Then, some black is white? *Soc.* I think so myself. The principle of the *reductio ad absurdum* also occasions deceptions in another way, owing to the fact that we have many words, such as *can*, *may* , *must*, etc., which imply more or less vaguely an otherwise unexpressed condition, so that these propositions are in fact hypotheticals.” Hth, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 4:56 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > As I think through the dispute I think really what we’re getting at is > Peirce’s notion of the Universe of Discourse. The question then becomes > what distinguishes or differentiates one universe of discourse from an > other? We recognize that there is not just one universe of discourse. For > Peirce to denote is to put the sign in relation to the object of common > communication. That is, a universe of discourse. > > We can of course distinguish two universes such as the universe in which > Superman exists and the universe (such as our own) in which he does not. > But as soon as we concede this distinguishing universes it seems to me much > of what I said follows as a corollary. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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