Kirsti, List:
What you wrote on Tuesday: "Definitions I do abhorre."
What I wrote on Thursday: "You say now that you are not denying the
usefulness of definitions,
but you said before that you abhor definitions."
What you wrote today: "I definitely never said that I "abhorr
definitions"."
All of these comments are copied directly from the messages threaded
below. Needless to say, I am even more confused now, and still wondering
what exactly you find "nominalistic" about my "ways of thinking."
Regards,
Jon
On Sat, Jan 21, 2017 at 7:26 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
> Sorry Jon. Again. - I definitely never said that I "abhorr definitions".
> If you do not regocnize an intrepretation here, compared to what I wrote,
> I'm afraid there is nothing to discuss. - We are not on anything like a
> same page.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 19.1.2017 16:25:
>
>> Kirsti, List:
>>
>> Just to clarify, Alan is my middle name; I go by Jon.
>>
>> What makes you think that I am missing that "crucial aspect"? I
>> provided this quote very early in the thread.
>>
>> But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the
>>> sense of that which has no generality and which here appears as a
>>> mere ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider
>>> sense of that which can be only in one place at one time. It will
>>> be convenient to call the former singular and the latter only an
>>> individual … With reference to individuals, I shall only remark
>>> that there are certain general terms whose objects can only be in
>>> one place at one time, and these are called individuals. They are
>>> generals that is, not singulars, because these latter occupy neither
>>> time nor space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one
>>> date. (W2:180-181; 1868)
>>>
>>
>> You say now that you are not denying the usefulness of definitions,
>> but you said before that you abhor definitions. I find this
>> confusing. Again, how would one go about better understanding the
>> concepts of universal/general/continuous and
>> particular/singular/individual by means of "strict experimental work"?
>> In other words, how can we achieve the third grade of clarity
>> regarding those concepts?
>>
>> Most importantly, I am still wondering what you find "nominalistic"
>> about my "ways of thinking." On a Peirce list, that is a rather
>> serious allegation.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 7:51 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
>>
>> Alan,
>>>
>>> Sorry for the typo. - Sill it seems to me you miss a crucial aspect
>>> of ' to kath ekaston', what is singular. - The difference lies in it
>>> being determinate only as long as 'time is so'. - What is real, in
>>> contrast to existent individuals, always lies (partly) in the
>>> future. Thus it is never wholly determined, but possesses the
>>> element of vagueness, never wholly captured by any definition.
>>>
>>> I am not denying the usefulness of definitions. - By no means.
>>>
>>> With all respect,
>>>
>>> Kirsti
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 22:10:
>>> Kirsti, List:
>>>
>>> What problems do you think I am trying to solve with definitions?
>>>
>>> What is intrinsically nominalistic about working with definitions?
>>> Peirce associated them with the second grade of clarity, and wrote
>>> many of them for the _Century Dictionary_ and Baldwin's
>>> _Dictionary_.
>>>
>>> How would one go about better understanding the concepts of
>>> universal/general/continuous and particular/singular/individual by
>>> means of "strict experimental work"?
>>>
>>> Since you brought it up, I actually found no mentions of "atomos"
>>> but
>>> three of "atomon" in the Collected Papers.
>>>
>>> This distinction between the absolutely indivisible and that which
>>> is one in number from a particular point of view is shadowed forth
>>> in the two words _individual _{to ATOMON} and _singular _(to kath'
>>> hekaston); but as those who have used the word _individual _have
>>> not
>>> been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has come
>>> to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870)
>>>
>>> (As a technical term of logic, _individuum _first appears in
>>> Boëthius, in a translation from Victorinus, no doubt of {ATOMON},
>>> a
>>> word used by Plato (_Sophistes_, 229 D) for an indivisible species,
>>> and by Aristotle, often in the same sense, but occasionally for an
>>> individual. Of course the physical and mathematical senses of the
>>> word were earlier. Aristotle's usual term for individuals is {ta
>>> kath' hekasta}, Latin _singularia_, English _singulars_.) Used in
>>> logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According to the more
>>> formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only
>>> actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general
>>> character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated
>>> by its mode of being to be so determinate. See Particular (in
>>> logic)
>>> ... (2) Another definition which avoids the above difficulties is
>>> that an individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it
>>> does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it
>>> might react, or have reacted, against my will. (CP 3.611-613; 1911)
>>>
>>> But experience only informs us that single objects exist, and that
>>> each of these at each single date exists only in a single place.
>>> These, no doubt, are what Aristotle meant by {to kath' hekaston}
>>> and
>>> by {ai prötai ousiai} in his earlier works, particularly the
>>> Predicaments. For {ousia} there plainly means existent, and {to ti
>>> einai} is existence. (I cannot satisfy myself that this was his
>>> meaning in his later writings; nor do I think it possible that
>>> Aristotle was such a dolt as never to modify his metaphysical
>>> opinions.) But {to ATOMON} was, I think, the strict logical
>>>
>>> individual, determinate in every respect. In the metaphysical
>>> sense, existence is that mode of being which consists in the
>>> resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all
>>> the other such individuals of the same universe. (CP 6.335-336; c.
>>> 1909)
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 11:39 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
>>>
>>> Solving problems with definitions and defining is the nominalistic
>>> way to proceed.
>>> I do not work in the way of presenting definitions. - I work with
>>> doing something, with a (more or less) systematic method. - Just
>>> like in a laboratory.
>>>
>>> I have done strict experimental work. And strict up to most
>>> meticulous details!
>>>
>>> Since then, I have been studieing tests. With just as keely
>>> meticulous aattitude.
>>>
>>> Definitions I do abhorre.
>>>
>>> If you are looking for definitions, you'll be certainly going amiss
>>> with CSP. - So I will not offer you any.
>>>
>>> CSP does mention ATOMOS, once. Referring to Ariatotle and the
>>> ancients.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Kirsti
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 16:12:
>>> Kirsti, List:
>>>
>>> KM: Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not
>>> consist of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or
>>> not so. A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without
>>> breaking the very continuity you are trying to capture. - It
>>> presents just the same geometrical problem as do points.
>>>
>>> You are correct, "segment" was probably a poor choice of word on my
>>> part.
>>>
>>> KM: You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of
>>> thinking) by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
>>>
>>> What specific "nominalistic ways of thinking" do you detect in my
>>> posts? How would you define an "individual" from a Peircean
>>> standpoint?
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] [1] [1] -
>>>
>>> twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] [2]
>>>
>>> [2]
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 5:04 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon S.
>>>
>>> Not only is continuity the most difficult problem for philosophy to
>>> handle, it is also the most difficult problem for mathematics to
>>> handle.
>>>
>>> Taking into consideration the view of CSP that we always have to
>>> start with math, then proceed to phenomenology, and only after this
>>> try to handle logic (in the broad sense or in ny more restricted
>>> sense), it follows that some (not yet definable) mathematical ideas
>>> should be developed. - Such may not as yet exist!
>>>
>>> Viewing Moore's collection of mathematical writings of CSP & his
>>> introductions there seems to prevail a basic misunderstanding of
>>> the
>>> relation between continua and continuity.
>>>
>>> Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not consist
>>> of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or not so.
>>>
>>> A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without breaking the
>>> very continuity you are trying to capture. - It presents just the
>>> same geometrical problem as do points.
>>>
>>> One has to start with (geometrical) topology. A topic SCP says so
>>> little about e.g. in Kaina Stoicheia. - He only states that it must
>>> come first. And followed by perspective, and only after these any
>>> kinds of measuring.
>>>
>>> But what kind of topology? - And how and why the simplest math must
>>> come before phenomenology & be followed by (a special kind of)
>>> phenomenology?
>>>
>>> Definitely not Husserlian, according to CSP.
>>>
>>> But there are grounds in the writings of CSP to assume that
>>> Hegelian dialectics, with the three moments, are not such a far
>>> catch.
>>>
>>> You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of thinking)
>>> by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
>>>
>>> True continuity involves time. (And vice versa: time involves
>>> continuity.) They are like RECTO and VERSO in CSP's Existential
>>> Graphs.
>>>
>>> Or a jacket with a lining. Most jackets do have a separable inside
>>> cloth but even if it is taken away, there always remains a RECTO
>>> and
>>> VERSO. As well as both taken together: the jacket!
>>>
>>> With this there comes triadicity.
>>>
>>> Keen to hear your response,
>>>
>>> Kirsti
>>>
>>
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