Kirsti, List:
What problems do you think I am trying to solve with definitions?
What is intrinsically nominalistic about working with definitions? Peirce
associated them with the second grade of clarity, and wrote many of them
for the *Century Dictionary* and Baldwin's *Dictionary*.
How would one go about better understanding the concepts of
universal/general/continuous and particular/singular/individual by means of
"strict experimental work"?
Since you brought it up, I actually found no mentions of "atomos" but three
of "atomon" in the Collected Papers.
This distinction between the absolutely indivisible and that which is one
in number from a particular point of view is shadowed forth in the two
words *individual *{to *atomon*} and *singular *(to kath' hekaston); but as
those who have used the word *individual *have not been aware that absolute
individuality is merely ideal, it has come to be used in a more general
sense. (CP 3.93; 1870)
(As a technical term of logic, *individuum *first appears in Boëthius, in a
translation from Victorinus, no doubt of {*atomon*}, a word used by Plato (
*Sophistes*, 229 D) for an indivisible species, and by Aristotle, often in
the same sense, but occasionally for an individual. Of course the physical
and mathematical senses of the word were earlier. Aristotle's usual term
for individuals is {ta kath' hekasta}, Latin *singularia*, English
*singulars*.) Used in logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According
to the more formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only
actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general character
and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated by its mode of
being to be so determinate. See Particular (in logic) ... (2) Another
definition which avoids the above difficulties is that an individual is
something which reacts. That is to say, it does react against some things,
and is of such a nature that it might react, or have reacted, against my
will. (CP 3.611-613; 1911)
But experience only informs us that single objects exist, and that each of
these at each single date exists only in a single place. These, no doubt,
are what Aristotle meant by {to kath' hekaston} and by {ai prötai ousiai}
in his earlier works, particularly the Predicaments. For {ousia} there
plainly means existent, and {to ti einai} is existence. (I cannot satisfy
myself that this was his meaning in his later writings; nor do I think it
possible that Aristotle was such a dolt as never to modify his metaphysical
opinions.) But {to *atomon*} was, I think, the strict logical individual,
determinate in every respect. In the metaphysical sense, existence is that
mode of being which consists in the resultant genuine dyadic relation of a
strict individual with all the other such individuals of the same universe.
(CP 6.335-336; c. 1909)
Regards,
Jon
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 11:39 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
> Solving problems with definitions and defining is the nominalistic way to
> proceed.
> I do not work in the way of presenting definitions. - I work with doing
> something, with a (more or less) systematic method. - Just like in a
> laboratory.
>
> I have done strict experimental work. And strict up to most meticulous
> details!
>
> Since then, I have been studieing tests. With just as keely meticulous
> aattitude.
>
> Definitions I do abhorre.
>
> If you are looking for definitions, you'll be certainly going amiss with
> CSP. - So I will not offer you any.
>
> CSP does mention ATOMOS, once. Referring to Ariatotle and the ancients.
>
> Best,
>
> Kirsti
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 16:12:
>
>> Kirsti, List:
>>
>> KM: Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not
>>> consist of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or
>>> not so. A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without
>>> breaking the very continuity you are trying to capture. - It
>>> presents just the same geometrical problem as do points.
>>>
>>
>> You are correct, "segment" was probably a poor choice of word on my
>> part.
>>
>> KM: You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of
>>> thinking) by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
>>>
>>
>> What specific "nominalistic ways of thinking" do you detect in my
>> posts? How would you define an "individual" from a Peircean
>> standpoint?
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>> [2]
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 5:04 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
>>
>> Jon S.
>>>
>>> Not only is continuity the most difficult problem for philosophy to
>>> handle, it is also the most difficult problem for mathematics to
>>> handle.
>>>
>>> Taking into consideration the view of CSP that we always have to
>>> start with math, then proceed to phenomenology, and only after this
>>> try to handle logic (in the broad sense or in ny more restricted
>>> sense), it follows that some (not yet definable) mathematical ideas
>>> should be developed. - Such may not as yet exist!
>>>
>>> Viewing Moore's collection of mathematical writings of CSP & his
>>> introductions there seems to prevail a basic misunderstanding of the
>>> relation between continua and continuity.
>>>
>>> Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not consist
>>> of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or not so.
>>>
>>> A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without breaking the
>>> very continuity you are trying to capture. - It presents just the
>>> same geometrical problem as do points.
>>>
>>> One has to start with (geometrical) topology. A topic SCP says so
>>> little about e.g. in Kaina Stoicheia. - He only states that it must
>>> come first. And followed by perspective, and only after these any
>>> kinds of measuring.
>>>
>>> But what kind of topology? - And how and why the simplest math must
>>> come before phenomenology & be followed by (a special kind of)
>>> phenomenology?
>>>
>>> Definitely not Husserlian, according to CSP.
>>>
>>> But there are grounds in the writings of CSP to assume that
>>> Hegelian dialectics, with the three moments, are not such a far
>>> catch.
>>>
>>> You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of thinking)
>>> by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
>>>
>>> True continuity involves time. (And vice versa: time involves
>>> continuity.) They are like RECTO and VERSO in CSP's Existential
>>> Graphs.
>>>
>>> Or a jacket with a lining. Most jackets do have a separable inside
>>> cloth but even if it is taken away, there always remains a RECTO and
>>> VERSO. As well as both taken together: the jacket!
>>>
>>> With this there comes triadicity.
>>>
>>> Keen to hear your response,
>>>
>>> Kirsti
>>
>>
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