Clark, list:
Every time I hear “modal realism”, my eyes roll to the back of my head. But if it’s Truth you’re after, here is Peirce: “The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe… We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua* fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.” *The surprising fact, C, is observed;…* Here is Aristotle: “Every syllogism is effected by means of three terms. One kind of syllogism serves to prove that A inheres in C by showing that A inheres in B and B in C.. Assume them as they have been stated, and proof is bound to follow- proof that A inheres in C through B, and again that A inheres in B through some other middle term, and similarly that B inheres in C. If, however, one is aiming at truth, one must be guided by the real connexions of subjects and attributes. I mean this: suppose for example that A inheres in C and B is intermediate between them, but between B and A there are other middles, and between these again fresh middles; can these proceed to infinity or can they not? This is the equivalent of inquiring, do demonstrations proceed to infinity, i.e. is everything demonstrable? Or do ultimate subject and primary attribute limit one another?” ~Posterior Analytics, I-19 “Hence, in any sequence, when the being of the consequent is necessary, the nexus is reciprocal-in other words, when the antecedent has come-to-be the consequent must always come-to-be too.” ~ *On Generation and Corruption* “If, then, we suppose a syllogism in which, though A necessarily inheres in C, yet B, the middle term of the demonstration, is not necessarily connected with A and C, then the man who argues thus has no reasoned knowledge of the conclusion, since this conclusion does not owe its necessity to the middle term; for though the conclusion is necessary, the mediating link is a contingent fact. .. On the other hand, when the middle is necessary the conclusion must be necessary; just as true premisses always give a true conclusion. Thus, if A is necessarily predicated of B and B of C, then A is necessarily predicated of C. To sum up, then: demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexus, and therefore must clearly be obtained through a necessary middle term; otherwise its possessor will know neither the cause nor the fact that his conclusion is a necessary connexion.” ~ *Posterior Analytics*, I-6 “It is clear from what has been said that the syllogisms in these figures are made perfect by means of universal syllogisms in the first figure and are reduced to them.”~*Prior Analytics*, I-23 Hth, Jerry Rhee On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > Over the years I’ve gone back and forth in terms of how to think of > Peirce’s conception of truth. I’m here speaking of the notion of truth and > less the historical question of what Peirce believe at which times. What > brought this about was our discussion off and on over the past few months > of Peirce’s modal realism starting in the late 1890’s. Prior to that time > while he recognized the need to switch to counterfactual discussions in say > the Pragmatic Maxim he didn’t fully embrace modal realism until quite late. > > The question is what his modal realism does for his conception of truth as > what inquiry would lead to in the long run with an idealized community. > > Way back years ago when I was much more of a novice in Peirce my gut > tended to read this “in the long run” as something actual. Then over time > (primarily due to arguments made here) I switched over to just thinking of > it as a regulative notion. That is we can talk about what we *mean* by > truth but there’s not some actual truth that grounds our statements as > true. This is the way I suspect the majority of Peirceans think about it. > However with modal realism, if continued inquiry and continuity are > possible, they are real as possible. This means that this “in the long” run > of the universe acting has as a real possibility this ‘end.’ It might not > be *actual* but it is *real*. (In a way analogous to how Peirce treats > God) > > Does this seem about right? > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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