still no object... J
On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Clark, List: > > CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have > answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone > assuming it’s merely regulative. > > > How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's > *Dictionary > of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902)? > > CSP: It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the > synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him, > especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they > can be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the > matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to > be understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were > looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist > cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute > metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing > what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined. (CP 6.173) > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> >> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a >> reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by >> the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a >> normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence." >> >> >> Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have >> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone >> assuming it’s merely regulative. >> >> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W 5:222-235 (see >> 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says: >> >> >> That’s a very good quotation. I’d forgotten about that since I’ve tended >> of late to restrict myself too much to the later Peircean writings. i.e. >> after 1895 when his ideas are more stabilized. Plus of course it helps that >> EP2 is available on Kindle while inexplicably EP1 is not. >> >> But that’s a really good quote related to some other discussions I was >> having over unknowable things and Peirce. >> >> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can >> even be imagined. What is left is the idea that details may remain vague >> (as indeed a house that one sees is a kind of "statistical" object, >> compatible with the existence of innumerable alternate microstates and >> that, in any case, the object as it is "in itself" does not involve the >> idea of some secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead >> a matter of deciding which questions one cares about. Material processes >> scramble information, and life interpretively unscrambles some of it >> according to standards of value and interest. >> >> An other excellent quote and helpfully quite late - almost 15 years into >> his modal realist period. I rather like his keeping actuality and reality >> separate since that was what confused me the most all those years ago. >> What’s so interesting in that quote is that the realism seems wrapped up >> in his modal realism yet recognizes something is knowable in one possible >> world but not in the other. It’s hard not to think of the hamiltanian >> equation in the wave collapse model of quantum mechanics (say the Dirac >> Equation). There you have all the possible states as real but not actual. >> As soon as one makes one measurement then that constrains the >> possibilities. So Peirce is recognizing on a practical economics of >> epistemology something akin to uncertainty relations. (Here making just an >> analogy and not saying they are really the same sort of thing) >> >> On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's realism was >> stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote things like "How to Make >> Our Ideas Clear" (1878). >> >> >> I think he was more of a platonist by way of Kant in that very early >> phrase. Yet so many of the details weren’t worked out. I tend to see his >> modal realism as the most important idea. It’s connecting realism and >> possibility that seems like the leap that fully makes his ideas work (and >> leads him back to a certain kind of platonism defined in terms of >> possibilities) >> >> Of course his fellow pragmatists were not such strong realists as Peirce, >> and William James later wrote of liking to think that J,S. Mill if he were >> still alive would be the pragmatists' leader. >> >> Yes James definitely wasn’t and was more focused on what individuals >> think rather than the logical and community angle Peirce focused on. Dewey >> seems to be much more of a realist of the style of Peirce even if he >> doesn’t quite embrace Peirce’s logic. The rest (except perhaps for Royce >> depending upon how one looks at him) are too caught up in the nominalism of >> philosophy IMO. >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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