Peircers,

Looking over these old articles it occurs to me
there may be a few bits in them worth salvaging,
so I started a blog series for attempting that:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/11/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-1/

I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring 
[Peirce]”
and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a “Procrustian bed
for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will have more to say
in that regard if I can get to it.

Regards,

Jon

On 3/10/2017 4:18 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Peircers,

I haven't looked at these articles since the days I wasted
trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other
than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of
their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions,
especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal
character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.
To make the shortest possible shrift, I think we have to
keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean
“triple correspondence”, in other words, just another
name for a triadic relation.

Note.  The document histories of these InterSciWiki forks
tell me that these drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions
of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth

Regards,

Jon


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