Some points interspersed. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term Edwina, List: It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position. I wish that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions. ET: I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a triad (or a triadic function) that includes the Representamen; rather, he defines it as the Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic relation. The Object and Interpretant are not additional parts of the Sign, they are the other two correlates in that triadic relation. To me, this is absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it is by definition non-Peircean. [John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing. ET: As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the three modal categories are 'universes'. Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns. Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490). Hence your disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me. [John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse, which is quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say, Popper). Peirce uses “subject” in a rather strange way in which predicates can be subjects. Stjernfelt, Natural Propositions, 6.10 Hypostatic abstraction. I have no objections to raise to your further points. John ET: There is nothing wrong with using different terms. I agree! My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different terms, but then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's. ET: With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are doing? What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of habits of formation." I do not see where Peirce ever associates the Representamen with habits. Rather, he identifies a habit as a final logical Interpretant, precisely because it does not act as a Representamen to determine any further logical Interpretants (EP 2:418). ET: As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing. Saying that bundles of habits are substances (as Peirce did) is not the same as saying that bundles of habits form substances (as you do). When they are Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and Interpretants are all bundles of habits in this sense. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you. 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the three modal categories are 'universes'. You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is going on? I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process! 2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are doing? Do you deny that there are 'habits'? I'm sure you don't, as Peirce uses the term! But to what purpose is that habit? You ignore this. What's going on in the world that is due to habit-taking? Why don't you explore this? Do you think that an atom has no continuity of type? That this continuity of type doesn't provide it with a continuity of behaviour? That this continuity of type doesn't differentiate it from another atom? WHY do habits exist? You don't examine this. As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing. And, as he notes [1.22] "The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the course of its development took on form. Form is an element having a different mode of being....My view is that there are three modes of being" 1.22. Here Peirce is referring to the FORM that matter takes on, i.e., within the three categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. You seem to focus only on the words and don't examine what they mean in actual actions and in the actual formation of matter. Again- there's no point in arguing about this - as you will resort to insults [telling me that I am 'non-Peircean']...and such interactions are not a productive debate. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Wed 29/03/17 3:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> sent: Edwina, List: ET: As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction. This is what I personally have a hard time recognizing as Peircean semeiosis, which is certainly not mechanical or linear--i.e., dyadic--but I understand it to be a matter of triadic relations, rather than relations between triadic processes. Again, the Sign is not a triadic function, it is one participant in an irreducibly triadic relation. The Sign (or Representamen), the Object (Dynamic and Immediate), and the Interpretant (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final) are not themselves relations, they are all real subjects from a logical and metaphysical standpoint. Each of them, as well as their relations to each other, can be a constituent of any of the three Universes--a Possible (1ns), an Existent (2ns), or a Necessitant (3ns). The Sign itself is a qualisign/mark, sinsign/token, or legisign/type. The Sign's relation to its Object is what makes it an icon, index, or symbol. The Sign's relation to its Interpretant is what makes it a rheme, dicent, or argument. I find all of this to be fully consistent with a straightforward reading of Peirce's extensive writings on semeiosis. At the risk of being labeled once more as "literal-bound," a quick search of the Collected Papers turns up zero instances of "habit(s) of formation," "morphological generation," "triadic process," or "triadic function." While these are evidently "key factors" in Taborskyan semiosis, to me this suggests rather strongly that Peircean semeiosis has nothing to do with any of them. On the other hand, "triadic relation" appears 84 times. What is unscientific or arrogant about simply stating what the textual evidence clearly indicates to me? You express just as much certainty about the validity of your views as I do about mine. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: Helmut, list - I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework and I'm not sure that it has any function. Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpret ant. And we can fine-tune that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants. So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'. But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that insect'. And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect and bird. AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness]. As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction. There is no point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set of terms' used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology. Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his Laws of Form. As he wrote: "the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance". [1973:v]. Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline [1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A Guess at the Riddle]. And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can see that influence throughout his remarkable book. Edwina
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