John C., List: *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of* the representamen, object, and interpretant. If there are such passages, I would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them. Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the way that I am advocating? *[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse, which is quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say, Popper).* Maybe, but Peirce also discussed three "Universes of Experience" in "A Neglected Argument," written earlier the same year as the letter to Welby; and those seem to have *metaphysical *significance, since he explicitly affirmed the Reality of all three. In any case, the names that he assigned to the *semeiotic *constituents of the Universes--Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants--imply that they correspond to the different modes of being. *[John Collier] **Peirce uses “subject” in a rather strange way in which predicates can be subjects. Stjernfelt, **Natural Propositions, 6.10 Hypostatic abstraction.* In the passage that I cited (EP 2:411; 1907), I think it is clear that Peirce was *not *referring to the sign, object, and interpretant as predicates when he called them "subjects" ... CSP: (It is important to understand what I mean by *semiosis*. All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two subjects,—whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,—or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of *three *subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. *Σημείωσις* in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero's time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a "sign.") ... especially given the particular definition of "sign" to which he referred here, which appears on the previous page (EP 2:410). CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:12 AM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > Some points interspersed. > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to > name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered > opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from > Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position. I wish > that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a > debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we > cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions. > > ET: I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to > acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in > the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. > > Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic > *function*) that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it * as > *the Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*. The > Object and Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are > the *other two* *correlates * in that triadic relation. To me, this is > absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it > is by definition non-Peircean. > > *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.* > > ET: As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on > their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree > that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that > the three modal categories are 'universes'. > > Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns. > Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and > Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three > modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that > the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are > all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490). Hence your > disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me. > > *[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse, which > is quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say, Popper). Peirce > uses “subject” in a rather strange way in which predicates can be subjects. > Stjernfelt, **Natural Propositions, 6.10 Hypostatic abstraction.* > > > > *I have no objections to raise to your further points.* > > > > *John* >
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