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Jon, list: And here is a key difference.
Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903)."
I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you,
Jon, as a theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a
contentious issue.
Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can
never have been completely embodied....the very being of the General,
of Reason, is of such a mode that this being consists in the Reason's
actually governing events....The very being of the General, of Reason,
consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of
Reason is such that its being never can have been completely
perfecfed. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.
...So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the
occurrence of more individual events than can ever occur. ...This
development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that
is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is going on
today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".
Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES
write that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning
universe' by ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the
same thing.
My own view is that the universe was not created 'by God' and God
does not continue to create it. My view is that the universe, which
is an act of Reason - is a creation of transforming energy to matter
- by 'governing individual existentialities/events' which function
according to habits, laws and thus, prevent entropic dissipation of
that same matter.
Certainly, Peirce uses many metaphors to describe this continuous
nature of the transformative embodiment of Reason: - that it is a
"vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities.....The Universe as an argument is
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem...." 5.119 which can be
even compared with a painting..
But WHY is the universe? Since I reject the notion of agency [God],
then, I'd prefer the articulation of Mind, that energy-to-matter
function, where "the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable. 5.433
And since "5.427 "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in
the future" - then, this suggests to me, that there is no a priori
purpose [i.e., God's purpose].
-------------------
I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary
support and therefore, not really debatable.
I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and 'reasoning function' of the physic-chemical
and biological semiosis within it.
Edwina
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On Sat 08/04/17 2:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Gary F., List:
There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the
universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to
me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and
"living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what
the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902). As
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would
presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself. Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903). Hence the laws of nature in
some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the
very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human
reason is analogous."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 7:47 AM, wrote:
Edwina, Jon S.,
As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I
supplied is “that there is something in nature to which the human
reason is analogous.” If all thought is in signs, all reasoning and
all knowledge is in signs. If we ask what kind of sign the laws of
nature are analogous to, those laws are dynamic objects of the signs
we are now using to describe them. If we agree that those objects are
themselves signs, that the real Universe is a vast representamen,
“precisely an argument,” any knowledge we can have of them must
be both in signs and of signs which are real. It follows that the
real signs we are talking about are analogous to the signs we are
using to talk about them, which are propositions (symbolic dicisigns
as well as legisigns).
But one thing we know about the symbols we use is that they cannot
supply acquaintance with their dynamic objects. Only by collateral
experience can we know anything about those objects, the signs we
call “the laws of nature.” If you assert that they are symbols,
your assertion is meaningless unless you call upon your collateral
experience of symbols to indicate the dynamic object of the symbols
we are using. Your collateral experience consists of having done the
sort of thing we are doing right now, participating in an ongoing
argument. Our hypothesis that the “laws of nature” are symbols
participating in an argument is empty of content unless those laws,
those signs, are analogous to the signs in which our thought about
them is expressed. Our thought is thus metaphorical insofar as it
deploys that analogy.
In short, my claim was not “that our primary experience of these
natural laws is metaphorical.” My claim was that our primary
experience of symbols and of propositions is our own use of them to
participate in arguments. Unless your use of the word “symbol”
differs from the conventional use well formulated by Peirce, our
acquaintance with its dynamic object can only be drawn from the
commens, and only by analogy with that can we mean something definite
by asking whether the laws of nature are symbols.
Gary f.
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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