Edwina, List: ET: Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'.
I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is "God's purpose" as "the development of Reason." CP 1.615 (1903) continues beyond what you quoted. CSP: Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develope knowledge the most speedily. So it seems to me that Peirce *equated *knowledge and reasonableness, such that the growth of one *is *the growth of other. I would also suggest that this is the *summum bonum* precisely because choosing to pursue it aligns *our *purpose with *God's *purpose. In other words, we have the opportunity to participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative activity. I see no conflict between this interpretation and what you quoted from CP 5.433 (1905), especially since Peirce added in that same passage, "In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for making the rational purport to be general." We contribute to evolution, the growth of reasonableness, by exercising self-control. In fact, right after stating what you quoted from CP 5.427 (1905), Peirce went on to explain what he meant. CSP: It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning in future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to self-control. Meaning is in the future, but purpose is in the present as the end that *guides *our future self-controlled conduct. And since God (or Mind, as you prefer) "has its being outside of time" (CP 6.490; 1908), its purpose is neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, but simply eternal. ET: I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and therefore, not really debatable. I agree that ultimately this is not a topic to argue about on the List. However, I am not convinced that either theism or atheism is completely devoid of evidentiary support. Many people adopt one or the other for various reasons that they consider well-grounded, but often they differ on what *counts *as evidence, as well as *how *it should be evaluated. ET: I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the 'reasonable nature' and 'reasoning function' of the physic-chemical and biological semiosis within it. I continue to share this interest and appreciate being able to set aside our differences to discuss it. Thanks, Jon On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon, list: And here is a key difference. > > Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum > bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge > about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create > (CP 1.615; 1903)." > > I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of knowledge > about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you, Jon, as a > theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a contentious issue. > > Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can never > have been completely embodied....the very being of the General, of Reason, > is of such a mode that this being consists in the Reason's actually > governing events....The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in > its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such > that its being never can have been completely perfecfed. It always must be > in a state of incipiency, of growth. ...So, then, the development of Reason > requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than can > ever occur. ...This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in > embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which > did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is > going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason". > > Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is > the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES write > that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning universe' by > ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the same thing. > > My own view is that the universe was not created 'by God' and God does not > continue to create it. My view is that the universe, which is an act of > Reason - is a creation of transforming energy to matter - by 'governing > individual existentialities/events' which function according to habits, > laws and thus, prevent entropic dissipation of that same matter. > > Certainly, Peirce uses many metaphors to describe this continuous nature > of the transformative embodiment of Reason: - that it is a "vast > representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions > in living realities.....The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great > work of art, a great poem...." 5.119 which can be even compared with a > painting.. > > But WHY is the universe? Since I reject the notion of agency [God], then, > I'd prefer the articulation of Mind, that energy-to-matter function, where > "the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, > but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent > comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be > destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. > 5.433 > > And since "5.427 "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in the > future" - then, this suggests to me, that there is no a priori purpose > [i.e., God's purpose]. > > ------------------- > > I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic > premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and > therefore, not really debatable. > > I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the > 'reasonable nature' and 'reasoning function' of the physic-chemical and > biological semiosis within it. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Sat 08/04/17 2:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Gary F., List: > > There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe > "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living > realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is > the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its > Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP > 2.95; 1902). As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature > would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same > relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself. Besides the > still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which > obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature > within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's > purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum > bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge > about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create > (CP 1.615; 1903). Hence the laws of nature in some sense represent the > development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them > "something in nature to which the human reason is analogous." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 7:47 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon S., >> >> >> >> As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I >> supplied is “that there is something in nature to which the human reason >> is analogous.” If all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge >> is in signs. If we ask what kind of sign the laws of nature are analogous >> to, those laws are dynamic objects of the signs we are now using to >> describe them. If we agree that those objects are themselves signs, that >> the real Universe is a vast representamen, “precisely an argument,” any >> knowledge we can have of them must be both in signs and of signs which >> are real. It follows that the real signs we are talking about are analogous >> to the signs we are using to talk about them, which are propositions >> (symbolic dicisigns as well as legisigns). >> >> >> >> But one thing we know about the symbols we use is that they cannot supply >> acquaintance with their dynamic objects. Only by collateral experience can >> we know anything about those objects, the signs we call “the laws of >> nature.” If you assert that they are symbols, your assertion is meaningless >> unless you call upon your collateral experience of symbols to indicate the >> dynamic object of the symbols we are using. Your collateral experience >> consists of having done the sort of thing we are doing right now, >> participating in an ongoing argument. Our hypothesis that the “laws of >> nature” are symbols participating in an argument is empty of content unless >> those laws, those signs, are analogous to the signs in which our thought >> about them is expressed. Our thought is thus metaphorical insofar as it >> deploys that analogy. >> >> >> >> In short, my claim was not “that our primary experience of these natural >> laws is metaphorical.” My claim was that our primary experience of >> symbols and of propositions is our own use of them to participate in >> arguments. Unless your use of the word “symbol” differs from the >> conventional use well formulated by Peirce, our acquaintance with its >> dynamic object can only be drawn from the commens, and only by analogy >> with that can we mean something definite by asking whether the laws of >> nature are symbols. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >
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