Jon--The Peirce list is a forum, not a kind of personal 'storage' site. Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Jun 29, 2017 at 2:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Storing this here for later discussion ... > > On 6/28/2017 11:53 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, > > > > That's an important topic to explore: > > > > JA > >> we can take up the issue of propositions in more detail > >> as it arises in the relevant context. > > > > For a good analysis of the issues, I recommend the following book: > > Stjernfelt, Frederik (2014) Natural Propositions: The Actuality > > of Peirce’s Doctrine of Dicisigns, Boston: Docent Press. > > > > I wrote a 5-page article on propositions from a Peircean perspective: > > http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/proposit.pdf > > > > That article is based on Peirce's notion of equivalence (CP 5.569): > >> A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an > >> interpretation, that is, by virtue of its determining another sign > >> of the same object. This is as true of mental judgments as it is of > >> external signs. To say that a proposition is true is to say that > >> every interpretation of it is true. Two propositions are equivalent > >> when either might have been an interpretant of the other. This > >> equivalence, like others, is by an act of abstraction (in the sense > >> in which forming an abstract noun is abstraction) conceived as identity. > >> > >> And we speak of believing in a proposition, having in mind an entire > >> collection of equivalent propositions with their partial interpretants. > >> Thus, two persons are said to have the same proposition in mind. The > >> interpretant of a proposition is itself a proposition. Any necessary > >> inference from a proposition is an interpretant of it. > >> > >> When we speak of truth and falsity, we refer to the possibility of the > >> proposition being refuted; and this refutation (roughly speaking) takes > >> place in but one way. Namely, an interpretant of the proposition would, > >> if believed, produce the expectation of a certain description of percept > >> on a certain occasion. The occasion arrives: the percept forced upon > >> us is different. This constitutes the falsity of every proposition of > >> which the disappointing prediction was the interpretant. Thus, a false > >> proposition is a proposition of which some interpretant represents > >> that, on an occasion which it indicates, a percept will have a certain > >> character, while the immediate perceptual judgment on that occasion is > >> that the percept has not that character. > >> > >> A true proposition is a proposition belief in which would never lead > >> to such disappointment so long as the proposition is not understood > >> otherwise than it was intended. > > > > In the article, I formalize Peirce's notion of equivalence in terms > > of *meaning-preserving translations* (MPTs), which specify a class > > of equivalent sentences in some language or languages. It's easy to > > define MPTs for formal logics, but much harder for natural languages. > > > > John > > > > -- > > inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
