List, I am having difficulty locating an essay that is referenced in the bibliography at the end of CP vol. 8.
Here is the citation: "Phaneroscopy, or Natural History of Signs, Relations, Categories, etc.: A Method of investigating this subject, expounded and illustrated," presented 20-22 Nov. 1906. [RNA 1906]18. My assumption is that the essay was presented to the National Academy of Sciences Meeting. The Records of the NAS from 1863-87 are in the Smithsonian. The later records, I am guessing, may be available there or in the National Archives. Two questions: 1. Does anyone know where the essay might be available in a print collection of works, online or have a copy they would be willing to share? 2. If not, does anyone have suggestions about how to find the essay at the Smithsonian or National Archives before I make a request for assistance from the reference librarians? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2017 3:25 AM To: Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt Revisited (was some other topic) Peircers, Storing this here for later discussion. Regards, Jon On 6/28/2017 1:44 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > John, > > Yes, I gave it a careful reading back when the List took it up: > > http://web.archive.org/web/20150116150400/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13825 > > I find some remnants of my comments here: > > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/10/12/semiotic-theory-of-information-3/ > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/10/13/semiotic-theory-of-information-4/ > > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/08/24/c-s-peirce-%e2%80%a2-syllabus-%e2%80%a2-selection-1/ > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/10/04/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-syllabus-%E2%80%A2-selection-2/ > > I have in mind getting back to the issues raised by that reading someday > but it would take me too far afield from my current focus to do that now. > > The short shrift for now is that neither Peirce nor I is/am talking about > propositions in the sense of dicisigns or dicent symbols at this juncture > but rather the simpler sorts of propositions that fall under the heading of > the Propositional Calculus in current usage, adequately and most felicitously > dealt with of course by means of Peirce's own Alpha Graphs. > > The concept of information that comes up in this context is rather distinct. > To my way of thinking the earlier notion of information, however roughly cut, > is superior in its basic principles, it being more realistic compared to the > residual nominalism in the later concept, at least, as interpreted by others. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 6/28/2017 11:53 AM, John F Sowa wrote: >> Jon, >> >> That's an important topic to explore: >> >> JA >>> we can take up the issue of propositions in more detail >>> as it arises in the relevant context. >> >> For a good analysis of the issues, I recommend the following book: >> Stjernfelt, Frederik (2014) Natural Propositions: The Actuality >> of Peirce’s Doctrine of Dicisigns, Boston: Docent Press. >> >> I wrote a 5-page article on propositions from a Peircean perspective: >> http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/proposit.pdf >> >> That article is based on Peirce's notion of equivalence (CP 5.569): >> >>> A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an >>> interpretation, that is, by virtue of its determining another sign >>> of the same object. This is as true of mental judgments as it is of >>> external signs. To say that a proposition is true is to say that >>> every interpretation of it is true. Two propositions are equivalent >>> when either might have been an interpretant of the other. This >>> equivalence, like others, is by an act of abstraction (in the sense >>> in which forming an abstract noun is abstraction) conceived as identity. >>> >>> And we speak of believing in a proposition, having in mind an entire >>> collection of equivalent propositions with their partial interpretants. >>> Thus, two persons are said to have the same proposition in mind. The >>> interpretant of a proposition is itself a proposition. Any necessary >>> inference from a proposition is an interpretant of it. >>> >>> When we speak of truth and falsity, we refer to the possibility of the >>> proposition being refuted; and this refutation (roughly speaking) takes >>> place in but one way. Namely, an interpretant of the proposition would, >>> if believed, produce the expectation of a certain description of percept >>> on a certain occasion. The occasion arrives: the percept forced upon >>> us is different. This constitutes the falsity of every proposition of >>> which the disappointing prediction was the interpretant. Thus, a false >>> proposition is a proposition of which some interpretant represents >>> that, on an occasion which it indicates, a percept will have a certain >>> character, while the immediate perceptual judgment on that occasion is >>> that the percept has not that character. >>> >>> A true proposition is a proposition belief in which would never lead >>> to such disappointment so long as the proposition is not understood >>> otherwise than it was intended. >> >> In the article, I formalize Peirce's notion of equivalence in terms >> of *meaning-preserving translations* (MPTs), which specify a class >> of equivalent sentences in some language or languages. It's easy to >> define MPTs for formal logics, but much harder for natural languages. >> >> John >> > -- inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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