List,

 

The first paragraph of Lowell 1.9 marks the beginning of the exchange
between Peirce and Welby which continued until 1911; it began when she had
her publisher send him a copy of her book and Peirce wrote a very positive
review of it for The Nation. In this lecture, it serves to contextualize the
study of logic, which is the main subject of the Lowell Lectures, by
defining the three grades of meaning.

 

The second paragraph explains some limitations of logic. Peirce acknowledges
that our reasoning is always informed by tacit assumptions, and that our
logic has to leave these out of account if it is to be exact. He also says
that "the logician assumes that the meaning of language is well known
between himself and the person to whom he is imparting his doctrine" - an
assumption that is quite unrealistic in ordinary dialogue, and in fact is a
common source of miscommunication between people, as I argued in Chapter 2
of Turning Signs (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm). Nevertheless, if we
want to communicate, we have to hope that our dialogue partners will
understand what we mean by our words, and that we understand what our
partners mean by theirs, at least until it becomes clear that this is not
the case. In logic as represented by existential graphs, this "hope" becomes
an assumption, or rather field of assumptions, represented by the sheet of
assertion on which graphs are "scribed." As Peirce says in Lowell 2, the
blank sheet of assertion is already a graph, representing "the aggregate of
subjects of the complexus of experience-forces well-understood between the
graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and the interpreter of it."

 

But I'm getting ahead of myself here - we still have one more paragraph of
Lowell 1 to consider, and I'll post that tomorrow.

 

Gary f.

 

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 10-Oct-17 08:50
To: 'Peirce List' <[email protected]>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.9

 

Continuing from Lowell 1.8 (EP2:255):

 

A little book by Victoria Lady Welby has lately appeared entitled What is
Meaning? The book has sundry merits, among them that of showing that there
are three modes of meaning. But the best feature of it is that it presses
home the question "What is meaning?" A word has meaning for us in so far as
we are able to make use of it in communicating our knowledge to others and
in getting at the knowledge that those others seek to communicate to us.
That is the lowest grade of meaning. The meaning of a word is more fully the
sum total of all the conditional predictions which the person who uses it
intends to make himself responsible for or intends to deny. That conscious
or quasi-conscious intention in using the word is the second grade of
meaning. But besides the consequences to which the person who accepts a word
knowingly commits himself, there is a vast ocean of unforeseen consequences
which the acceptance of the word is destined to bring about, not merely
consequences of knowing but perhaps revolutions of society. One cannot tell
what power there may be in a word or a phrase to change the face of the
world; and the sum of those consequences makes up the third grade of
meaning. 

Let us now consider what the science of logic ought to embrace. Although
whatever is true is logical whether we know it to be so or not, yet it is
plain that logic cannot embrace all human knowledge. The logician endeavors
to assume an attitude as if, as logician, he had no information at all
except what everybody must have to reason at all. This, however, is not
exactly possible. There is no exactly defined sphere of knowledge such that
everybody who reasons must possess the whole of it and need know nothing
else. But the logician assumes that the meaning of language is well known
between himself and the person to whom he is imparting his doctrine,
although that meaning may not be analyzed and all its elements distinctly
recognized, but that no other facts are known. Of course, some others must
be known; but they are left out of account. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

 

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