Charles,
Framing a theory of language in terms of EG is not something Peirce (or I) would ever do. It was developed by Peirce for a very different purpose. I do think that in ordinary uses of language, we tend to assume by default that the speaker intends to speak the truth unless we have some reason to override that default (such as knowing that the speaker is a habitual liar). Peirce likewise said that we have an “instinct to believe testimony, without which human society could not exist” (CP 7.226). But the intention to speak the truth is very different from the Truth itself, in Peirce’s usage, because the truth (as opposed to the intention) is independent of what anybody believes. For the same reason, I wouldn’t agree that “a mark = a sign; truth is unmarked, and unmarkable; the more marked, the less true' the less marked the more true.” I would agree with Luhmann (1995, 150) that “Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being communicated.” But the difference between sincerity and truth is the difference between intention and truth. As Luhmann went on to say, “Communication presupposes the difference between information and utterance and the contingency of both.” Logic as represented in the conventions of existential graphs deals only with “necessary reasoning,” and not with the contingencies of language. Gary f. From: Charles Pyle [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 11-Oct-17 13:10 To: Peirce List <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.9 Gary, I believe you have hit on the quote I was thinking of. "when we talk logic ... our universe is that universe which embraces all others, namely The Truth..." I am interested in this, as a linguist, because if the blank sheet of assertion that that is presupposed in EG represents truth, and if we frame a theory of language in terms of EG, that would explain the fact that language in general presupposes truth. And it can also help to provide a congruent foundation for the linguistic theory of markedness: a mark = a sign; truth is unmarked, and unmarkable; the more marked, the less true' the less marked the more true. And I am interested in this, as a Buddhist, because Buddhism frames absolute truth, which is also called 'nirvana', as the signless, which is prior to and out of which all relative truth, such as natural signs and language, arise. Thus the signless, truth, would = the sheet of assertion. And I think it makes sense then to think of truth as the ultimate object of all signs. This view agrees with the prevailing position that it is not possible to represent truth, absolute truth, which after all is just truth, in language, but does not accept the premise that truth is not knowable because it can't be represented in language, or in other words, the premise that one can only know what can be represented. Charles Pyle On October 11, 2017 at 11:17 AM [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> wrote: Charles, Let us know if you can find where Peirce said that, because I can’t find it. (In fact my search didn’t turn up anyplace where Peirce put TRUTH in all caps.) I think it would be closer to the truth(!) to say that the blank sheet of assertion represents the commens, i.e. everything that is taken for granted between the graphist and the interpreter. (His explanations of EGs usually start by saying that experiments done with them are to be taken as a dialogue between these two.) Peirce does say that the sheet of assertion represents the universe of discourse; and in one of his other writings on EGs, he says that “when we talk logic — and people occasionally insert logical remarks into ordinary discourse — our universe is that universe which embraces all others, namely The Truth, so that, in such a case, we mean that in no universe whatever will the addition of the assertion of the consequent to the assertion of the antecedent be a conversion of a true proposition into a false one” (CP 4.435). But then the “Truth” is an object of every sign that is “sufficiently complete” (EP2:304) — which, if it applies to the sheet of assertion, does not help us to distinguish it from other signs. The Truth is not the only universe, it’s just the one “which embraces all others.” Gary f. From: Charles Pyle [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 11-Oct-17 09:44 To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.9 Gary and list, On what the sheet of assertions represents in EGs, I thought Peirce said it represents TRUTH (I don't remember where Peirce stated that, but I do recall he put it in all caps). If my recollection is correct, would it be reasonable to suppose that the following might be taken as the ordinary conventional approximation of truth: “the aggregate of subjects of the complexus of experience-forces well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and the interpreter of it.” Charles Pyle ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . 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