Gary,
This is not the place to enter into an extensive argument, so I will just make this brief elaboration of my claims. On the question of markedness and truth, I offer this translation by Edward Conze of the 5thsection of the Diamond Sutra. Of course, I don’t cite this intending it to be taken as authoritative, but rather to suggest that the idea of this relationship is not only manifest in modern linguistic theory, but has been around a long time and has been well developed in the Buddhist universe of discourse. Begin quote------------------ The Lord continued: ‘What do you think, Subhuti, can the Tathagata be seen by the possession of his marks?’ Subhuti replied: ‘No indeed, O Lord. And why? What has been taught by the Tathagata as the possession of marks, that is truly a no-possession of no-marks.’ The Lord said:’ Wherever there is possession of marks, there is fraud, wherever there is no-possession of no-marks there is no fraud. Hence the Tathagata is to be seen from no-marks as marks.’ End quote------------------- Tathagata = thusness, or truth, and the Sanskrit work (laksana) translated as ‘mark’ here is alternatively translated as ‘symptom’, or ‘sign’. On my claim that truth is presupposed, I am not talking about intention. What I am saying is that when you utter a statement, you don’t have to add something to give it the veridical force of truth. It has the force of truth by default. It is presupposed to be a statement of truth, or at least what the speaker believes to be true. On the contrary, if you want to assert something with less than the force of truth you have to add something to mark it such as ‘I think..’ So, if I ask Ken where Bob is, and Ken says, “He is in the kitchen,” Ken is responsible for the truthfulness of that statement. If it turns out that Ken knew Bob was not in the kitchen, he can be held guilty of lying. And he can’t defend himself by saying, for example, “I didn’t say it was true,” because his bare statement, lacking marks to the contrary, has the force of truth. In fact, the presupposition of truth is so strong that if Ken adds something to a statement to give it the force of truth, such as, “I will tell you the truth. Bob is in the kitchen,” or “Honestly, Bob is in the kitchen, it has the effect of raising doubt about the intended truthfulness of the statement, by Grice’s maxim of parsimony, because it is unnecessary. And the more one adds to increase the force of truthfulness, the more dubious it becomes. These are among the considerations that lead me to the hypothesis that truth is relatively unmarked, and falsity is relatively marked, and that absolute truth is unmarked, that there is, in other words, an essential asymmetry between truth and falsity that is represented by the asymmetry in form of unmarked vs marked. And finally, this is why I like the idea of the sheet of assertion, being unmarked, as the representation of truth. Charles Pyle > On October 11, 2017 at 2:47 PM [email protected] wrote: > > > Charles, > > > > Framing a theory of language in terms of EG is not something Peirce (or > I) would ever do. It was developed by Peirce for a very different purpose. > > > > I do think that in ordinary uses of language, we tend to assume by > default that the speaker intends to speak the truth unless we have some > reason to override that default (such as knowing that the speaker is a > habitual liar). Peirce likewise said that we have an “instinct to believe > testimony, without which human society could not exist” (CP 7.226). But the > intention to speak the truth is very different from the Truth itself, in > Peirce’s usage, because the truth (as opposed to the intention) is > independent of what anybody believes. > > > > For the same reason, I wouldn’t agree that “a mark = a sign; truth is > unmarked, and unmarkable; the more marked, the less true' the less marked the > more true.” I would agree with Luhmann (1995, 150) that “Sincerity is > incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being communicated.” But the > difference between sincerity and truth is the difference between intention > and truth. As Luhmann went on to say, “Communication presupposes the > difference between information and utterance and the contingency of both.” > Logic as represented in the conventions of existential graphs deals only with > “necessary reasoning,” and not with the contingencies of language. > > > > Gary f. > > > > From: Charles Pyle [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 11-Oct-17 13:10 > To: Peirce List <[email protected]>; [email protected] > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.9 > > > > Gary, > > > > I believe you have hit on the quote I was thinking of. > > > > "when we talk logic ... our universe is that universe which embraces all > others, namely The Truth..." > > > > I am interested in this, as a linguist, because if the blank sheet of > assertion that that is presupposed in EG represents truth, and if we frame a > theory of language in terms of EG, that would explain the fact that language > in general presupposes truth. And it can also help to provide a congruent > foundation for the linguistic theory of markedness: a mark = a sign; truth is > unmarked, and unmarkable; the more marked, the less true' the less marked the > more true. > > > > And I am interested in this, as a Buddhist, because Buddhism frames > absolute truth, which is also called 'nirvana', as the signless, which is > prior to and out of which all relative truth, such as natural signs and > language, arise. Thus the signless, truth, would = the sheet of assertion. > And I think it makes sense then to think of truth as the ultimate object of > all signs. > > > > This view agrees with the prevailing position that it is not possible to > represent truth, absolute truth, which after all is just truth, in language, > but does not accept the premise that truth is not knowable because it can't > be represented in language, or in other words, the premise that one can only > know what can be represented. > > > > Charles Pyle > > > > > > > > On October 11, 2017 at 11:17 AM [email protected] > > mailto:[email protected] wrote: > > > > Charles, > > > > > > > > Let us know if you can find where Peirce said that, because I can’t > > find it. (In fact my search didn’t turn up anyplace where Peirce put TRUTH > > in all caps.) > > > > > > > > I think it would be closer to the truth(!) to say that the blank > > sheet of assertion represents the commens, i.e. everything that is taken > > for granted between the graphist and the interpreter. (His explanations of > > EGs usually start by saying that experiments done with them are to be taken > > as a dialogue between these two.) > > > > > > > > Peirce does say that the sheet of assertion represents the universe > > of discourse; and in one of his other writings on EGs, he says that “when > > we talk logic — and people occasionally insert logical remarks into > > ordinary discourse — our universe is that universe which embraces all > > others, namely The Truth, so that, in such a case, we mean that in no > > universe whatever will the addition of the assertion of the consequent to > > the assertion of the antecedent be a conversion of a true proposition into > > a false one” (CP 4.435). But then the “Truth” is an object of every sign > > that is “sufficiently complete” (EP2:304) — which, if it applies to the > > sheet of assertion, does not help us to distinguish it from other signs. > > The Truth is not the only universe, it’s just the one “which embraces all > > others.” > > > > > > > > Gary f. > > > > > > > > From: Charles Pyle [mailto:[email protected]] > > Sent: 11-Oct-17 09:44 > > To: Peirce List <[email protected] > > mailto:[email protected] >; [email protected] > > mailto:[email protected] > > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.9 > > > > > > > > Gary and list, > > > > On what the sheet of assertions represents in EGs, I thought Peirce > > said it represents TRUTH (I don't remember where Peirce stated that, but I > > do recall he put it in all caps). If my recollection is correct, would it > > be reasonable to suppose that the following might be taken as the ordinary > > conventional approximation of truth: “the aggregate of subjects of the > > complexus of experience-forces well-understood between the graphist, or he > > who scribes the graph, and the interpreter of it.” > > > > Charles Pyle > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > [email protected] mailto:[email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > > mailto:[email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY > > of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > >
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