Thanks, John. Very helpful.
However, I get confused trying to map these steps in the process of perception onto sign categories, I would think the first step must be a raw percept, an unprocessed visual field, which would then be instantly analyzed and categorized in terms of the preexisting catalog of types of objects, i.e. symbolic signs. Isn't that mapping the abduction? Only then, after the percept has been mapped onto a symbolic sign, could the process be regarded as a hypothesis from which implications could be drawn. I don't think one can generate hypotheses from an raw image, a pure icon. So isn't there a step before the abduction? Charles Pyle > > On October 24, 2017 at 10:21 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary R and Jon , > > Gary > > > > > > as Peirce argues in the Neglected Argument and elsewhere is, > > first, hypothesis formation (abduction), deduction of the > > implications of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising > > a test of it, and, once a test has been devised, finally the > > inductive experimental testing is made. Lessons are learned. > > > > > > Thank you. That is exactly the order in my drawing. Since > the cycle continues indefinitely, you can begin at any point. > (For a copy of the cycle, see http://jfsowa.com/talks/cogcyc.pdf ): > > 1. The abduction arrow (upper left). > > 2. Generates hypothesis (crystal at the top). > > 3. Implications (prediction on the right side). > > 4. Testing upon the world (lower right). > > 5. Observation and induction to evaluate prediction. > > 6. Results of induction go into the soup for further reuse. > > Jon > > > > > > perception itself, has an abductive character in Peirce’s analysis > > > > > > Yes. Modern cognitive scientists agree -- even those who learned > the word 'abduction' without knowing anything about CSP. > > But Peirce also says that the abductions during perception are > not major insights. They are rather routine aspects of the > observation. The abductions that generate a new hypothesis or > theory are far from routine. > > Jon > > > > > > induction for [Peirce] is more a final testing than initial > > conception stage > > > > > > Yes. That's Gary's point (steps 5 and 6 above). But when you > draw it as a cycle, no stage is "initial" or "final". > > I have been using versions of that cycle -- in one form or another > -- for years. And I keep discovering similar cycles from other > sources. I extracted a dozen slides from various talks I've > presented and put them together in one short sequence: > http://jfsowa.com/talks/cogcyc.pdf > > Slide 3: Quotations by Peirce, Whitehead, and Robert Frost to show > why I use the word 'soup' instead of a more "elegant" word. > > Slides 7 & 8: John Boyd's OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, > Act). I had never heard of John Boyd until somebody in one of > my lectures said "That looks like the OODA loop by John Boyd." > > Slide 9: The "Hierarchical Cognition Affect Architecture" by > the philosopher Aaron Sloman. > > Slide 10: The Albus Cognitive Architecture by James Albus, who was > a pioneer in using ideas from neuroscience to design AI systems. > > The similarities in these loops indicates that people who come > from totally different backgrounds can independently converge > on similar designs. Those slides contain URLs that point to > articles about Boyd and by Sloman and Albus. > > John > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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